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ABSTRACT
The family farm has been the foundation of America’s cheap food model. This research
examines how cheap food from the Corn Belt was produced from 1840s to the late
twentieth century. It investigates how the interrelationships between family farming,
proletarianization-housewifization, and national and world markets configured and
reconfigured. Utilizing a world-ecological framework, I argue that Illinois and Iowa, the
heart of the Corn Belt, were the epicenter of two successive agricultural revolutions that
fundamentally transformed world accumulation and world nature. The analysis is
centered on the development of successive agricultural revolutions over the longue durée
of capitalism, with the greatest attention on the nineteenth and twentieth century
revolutions in the United States. At the core of the dissertation I examine what I call the
‘double dialectic’: the contradictory relationship within the agrarian household and in
relation to world markets and world power. The findings of the study are historical and
methodological. Historically, the Corn Belt family farm possessed a unique position
within the capitalist world-economy, resulting in relative prosperity and long-term
stability. Contrary to regional studies of the Corn Belt, the study provides a worldecological framework for reconstructing the origins, development, and crisis of the Corn
Belt family farm and interpreting how the production of nature, the pursuit of power, and
capital accumulation constitute its development.
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Introduction: America’s Cheap Food Model
If the modern world was paved with cheap food, as Moore (2010, 2015) claims,
how did that process unfold in the United States in the world-system? The following
study examines the origins, development, and crisis of the family farm in the American
Midwest to explain the role of cheap food in the world-system. production of cheap food
over the longue durée of American capitalism in the world-system. I argue from a worldecological perspective that Illinois and Iowa, the heart of the Corn Belt, were the
epicenter of two successive agricultural revolutions that fundamentally transformed
world accumulation and world nature. Illinois and Iowa’s unique position in the capitalist
world-ecology provided stability and relative prosperity to farm families while producing
cheap food. The study makes clear that machines were not the sole source of cheap food.
Instead, cheap food understood here emerged through interrelationships between the farm
enterprise and household, proletarianization-housewifization, and finally, world-systemic
cycles of accumulation.
The following study asks, what are the forces and conditions that give rise to
successive agricultural revolutions? What is the relation between agricultural revolutions
and capitalist crises? Finally, how do agricultural revolutions reshape the world-system?
The historical reconstruction the nineteenth and twentieth century United States
agricultural revolutions focuses on two interrelated developments. The first is world
accumulation in the context of the core. For example, as will be argued in chapter two,
Britain’s developmental crisis was pivotal to the emergence of the United States first
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agricultural revolution. The second is the contradictory farm relations existing primarily
with the farm family itself. The conflicting demands of work for farm men and women,
and their interests, became a limit and opportunity to capital accumulation. From a worldecological perspective, I theorize and historicize the unique position of the Corn Belt
family farm in relation to world accumulation and world nature. While the global law of
value operates through time and across space as a central force constituting different
social formations, those social formations possess their own logic, tendencies, and
demands that reproduce in relation to the law of value. As a socio-ecological formation,
the family farm has reproduced and transformed through dynamics of the conditions of
re/production and world accumulation and state power. From this perspective, the family
farm must be situated within cycles of accumulation, the production of nature, and the
penetration of capitalist markets in agriculture.
Agricultural revolutions are productivity revolutions in farming that produce more
food with less labor input, driving down the costs of food for wage-laborers in core
countries. Successive agricultural revolutions over the long-durée of world capitalism
have centered on what Braudel calls ‘civilizational crops’. The ecology of crops, like
wheat and corn, demand specific material transformations that in turn give rise to new
opportunities for capital accumulation that in turn transform agrarian and urban
households worldwide. Additionally, agrarian social formations directly involved in the
production of civilizational crops must be examined as those social relations of
production and their contradictory developments constitute the emergence and
development of agricultural revolutions. To be sure, the material transformations are
dialectically bounded to the maintenance and ongoing transformation of the agrarian
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social formation. The key indicators of determining what an agricultural revolution is will
be elaborated later in the introduction.
There are numerous regional accounts of the historical development of the Corn
Belt. Indeed, I have drawn on specialists as an important secondary source. At best, these
studies provide a clear historical reconstruction of the social, economic, and cultural
relations of the family farm in relation to the development of American capitalism. At
worst, they provide tedious historical details without synthesis. The objective of this
study is not to provide another regional account of the Corn Belt. Instead, this study
provides the first world-ecological account of the unique position of the Corn Belt family
farm. The world-ecological framework, as discussed below, permits a unified historical
analysis of family farming and world-systemic processes as mutually conditioning
relations constituting the totality of the capitalist world-ecology.
The following study is situated at the intersection of the agrarian question and the
domestic labor debate to explain the origins, development, and crisis of the Midwestern
agrarian household and its contribution to American development in the capitalist worldsystem. It is a call for a world-ecological synthesis that transcends the limits of the
agrarian question and the domestic labor debate in the reconstruction of America’s cheap
food model. The analysis is centered on a double dialectic: the internal dynamics of the
agrarian household and the household and market. In this way, there exists multiple
dialectics within the household (accumulation, power, and nature) and in relation to
capitalist markets (accumulation, power, and nature). We are, then, speaking of layers
within layers of contradictions and surpluses in the web of life. The challenge of the
dissertation is to discern the patterns, forces, and trends of capital accumulation, the

3

pursuit of power, and the production of nature in the agrarian household and in and
through the capitalist world-ecology. In doing so, I explain the contradictory relationship
of micro-level processes on the farm in the Corn Belt, primarily between farm men and
women, and the contradictory relationship of macro-level processes of national and world
markets that constitute America’s cheap food model in the making of the capitalist worldecology. The broader, and more abstract, objective of this study is to historicize and
theorize this double dialectic to contribute to our understanding of large-scale social
change.
Introduction of introduction concludes
Capital’s cheap food model emerged through the cheap natures of households and
frontiers. Agrarian households are gendered and classed contradictory sites of production
and reproduction. The rhythms of capital accumulation and secular nature of capitalism
impose demands and limits on households such that the production of commodity crops
and the reproduction of the household are “simultaneously mutually supporting and
mutually undermining one another” (Ollman 2008: 18). The cheapness of food stems
from the ongoing cheapening of the social formation of family farming, particularly, of
agrarian women and extra-human nature. The socio-ecological conditions of existence for
the family farm necessarily changes as capital accumulation, state power, and the
production of nature configure and reconfigure.
At some point, however, exhaustion sets in for the reproduction of the family
farm or capital accumulation, or both simultaneously. When crisis conditions persist in
the proletarian household or in centers of accumulation, movements to fresh frontiers had
been a tried and true strategy. Fresh frontiers eclipse decaying frontiers, producing an
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ecological surplus that at once improves the economic standing of proletarian households
and renews accumulation. However, at the point of production where cheap natures in
their many forms may undermine the conditions of reproduction for that particular group,
depending on the characteristics of said group in relation to the historical conjuncture.
Nevertheless, capital’s cheap nature strategy of successive frontier movement has been
crucial to the production of cheap food.
But the production of bountiful cheap food for capital accumulation does not
necessarily concentrate in the cheapest zones of the world-system. In the Corn Belt
United States, the social conditions of existence of farming were relatively higher than
the Wheat or Cotton belts. The timing of incorporation into the capitalist world-ecology
and the socio-ecology of the different regions mattered to the production of cheap food.
When and how certain regions were incorporated enable us to explicate on the one hand
the conditions of existence of world accumulation and the other hand the unique
opportunities regions present. In this context, zones of cheap food raise questions of the
reproduction of the different social formations in their different combinations of
commodity crops, household production, and national and world markets. This study will
theorize these relationships.
Justification
Why should we care about agriculture? Organizations and researchers from all
political persuasions agree that agricultural development is crucial for comprehending the
ongoing water, energy, and climate crises, as well as the possible solutions. If, as the
FAO (2014) claims, saving the family farm is the key to resolving the manifold crises of
our times, then what were the causes of such crises? The short answer is productivity
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revolutions. Importantly, however, what were the historical, ecological, and geographical
conditions that allowed for such productivity revolutions? Are such revolutions beneficial
and desirable, and for whom? To adequately address the hard-pressing questions of
agricultural development, economic growth, and sustainability, this dissertation examines
the historical development of the Midwestern family farm in the United States.
The Family Farm as a Social Formation
Defining the family farm has been a highly contentious objective over many
decades in the United States. As an ideology, the family farm has been used as a tool to
legitimize private property and capitalist development (Buttel 1980). There are political
and economic consequences linked to policies for how the family farm is defined. The
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), for example, who is the leading
authority influencing Congress, scientists, farms and the public has a vague definition of
family farming. According to the USDA, 97 percent of the 2.1 million US farms are
family-owned operations, and is defined as “any farm where the majority of the business
is owned by the operator and individuals related to the operator, including through blood,
marriage, or adoption” (USDA 2015). The highest concentration is the Midwest. Since
the family farm is the unit of observation in this study I will attempt to define it. Note,
however, that abstraction is necessary to defining the family farm and that as a historical
formation its definition must co-evolve. As we will see, Marxists have constructed a
much different definition than that of the USDA, each containing political and economic
projects.
Buttel (1980: 10-11) describes four characteristics that adequately defines the
family farm: 1. owning and operating the farm, 2. family labor makes up most of the
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labor utilized, 3. is fully, or nearly, commercial and competes with other producers, and
4. the majority of the family income is derived from farm-produced commodities. Taken
together, these characteristics define the family farm. However, the absence of one or
more of the characteristics indicate a structural transition away from family farming.
Historically, the family farm has been the most common unit of agricultural production
(Friedmann 1980).
The family farm, or what Friedmann (1978a) refers to as “simple commodity
production” are distinct from capitalist enterprises on a number of fronts. We often think
of capitalism as the separation of people from the land and concomitant dependence on
wage-labor. This is not the case for simple commodity producers in which the ownership
of the farm and the provision of labor is unified in the household through specialized
commodity production that exists in a capitalist mode of production (Friedmann 1980:
161).1 “The unity of property and labour…is contradictory because it internalises within
one person or family the structured conflict between property owners and labourers, who
are usually related as employers and employees” (Friedmann forthcoming, cited in
Bernstein 1986: 14). The contradictory nature of simple commodity producers operates
through the presence of the household and the business. The success and reproduction of
the family farm is dependent on both the reproductive and productive activities of the
members of the household in its lifecycle. Forces outside of the household, such as

1

Bernstein (2010: 128) defines petty commodity producers as follows: “small-scale
commodity production in capitalism, combining the class places of capital and labour,
whether in a household or an individual; subject to class differentiation.” Bernstein’s
(2010) “petty commodity producers” is the equivalent to Friedmann’s (1980) “simple
commodity producers,” although petty commodity producers is the most commonly used
term for family farming.
7

policies, may strengthen the capacity of family farms to reproduce. Conversely,
agribusinesses who control large segments of commodity chains may weaken the family
farm unit. Note, for Friedmann (1980), simple commodity producers are not fully
capitalist. That is, the family farm is not fully commoditized and as such their conditions
of existence cannot be analyzed from the ‘logic of the market’ only (Bernstein 1986: 12).
This allows Friedmann to explain how farming households reproduce the conditions of
existence outside of market relations, but also always within competition between
capitalist producers. On the one hand, simple commodity producers have a
distinctiveness than that of capitalist producers (i.e. unity of labor and property). On the
other hand, simple commodity producers’ conditions of existence are always in relation
to capitalist producers’ conditions of existence in the world market. Relatedly, production
is determined by kinship and the farm division of labor is formed through gender and age.
Inequality and power differentials exist within households based on gender and age in
which the male head of the household accrues the greatest surplus. This is unique in the
context of advanced capitalist countries with well-developed labor markets.
For the remainder of the study the term “petty commodity producer” will be used
to specify family farming. Farmers are petty commodity producers when they are
subjected to the law of value which compels them to compete successfully on the market
to maintain land and unwaged labor—their key means of production (Post 2011). Petty
commodity producers, while often thought of as an obstacle to capital accumulation,
dependence on the market have created a dynamic of “specialization, competition,
accumulation and technical innovation,” similar to that of capitalist development (Post
2011: 45). Taken together, Buttel’s four characteristics, Friedmann’s notion of
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reproduction of simple commodity production, and Post’s conceptualization, we form a
definition of family farming i.e. petty commodity production.
Petit Bourgeois Yeoman Household
While a standard definition has been constructed for the family farm, one class of
farmers, what I call the “petit bourgeois yeoman household,” were fundamental to two
successive agricultural revolutions in the Corn Belt. These farm families were not
capitalist farms that employed year-round wage-labor, nor were they tenants or
sharecroppers. These farm families were relatively wealthy, and certainly more numerous
than capitalist farms, with many concentrated in Illinois and Iowa. After the capitalist
farms, these agrarian households were usually the first to purchase modern farm and
household equipment. Their standard of living was better than most farmers and certainly
better than many proletarian households. The value of their land was usually higher than
most, reflecting the high-quality soils and proximity to major markets. Finally, this group
of farmers were more likely to join the conservative, commercial-orientated farm groups,
like the American Farm Bureau Federation (AFBF), and not populist farm groups.
The development and persistence of the petit bourgeois yeoman household
suggests that farming in the Midwest was not a classless endeavor. Indeed, beyond the
capitalist farmers, the class of petit bourgeois yeoman household who is at the center of
the study was selected based on their ability to persist and give rise to two, and perhaps
three, agricultural revolutions.
The Agrarian Question and Domestic Labor Debate
The following study is situated at the intersection of two fields of study: the
agrarian question and the domestic labor debate. Each of these literatures are broadly
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concerned with capitalist development. However, the center of analysis for the agrarian
question are class politics, agricultural transformation, and the persistence or demise of
the family farm or peasantry. Whereas the center of analysis for the domestic labor
debate are the experiences of women and their unpaid work, social reproduction in
relation to commodity production, and women’s changing patterns of work in and outside
the household. A world-ecological synthesis of these two literatures can be fruitful for
historicizing and theorizing the Midwestern agrarian household. Before attempting
synthesis, I will explicate the motivates and insights from the agrarian question and the
domestic labor debate.
The Agrarian Question
The initial agrarian question asked what was the fate of the peasantry as
capitalism penetrated agriculture? Originally formulated by Engels (1894), and later
Kautsky (1899) and Lenin (1899), the agrarian question was principally concerned about
agrarian transformation resulting from capitalist development, and the ways in which
class conflict and solidarity would emerge. This was expressed in the politics of the
peasantry in the transition to bourgeois democracy and socialism during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Less than a hundred years later Byres (1996)
and Bernstein (1996) forwarded three problematics of the agrarian question: the
contribution of agricultural surplus to capitalist industrial development, how changes in
the forces and relations of production transform agrarian social formations, and how
changes in agrarian class structures generate political resistance. Each of these are
discussed in turn respectively.
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The first foundational problematic of the agrarian question examined here is the
importance of agricultural surplus fueling system-wide capital accumulation—what
Bernstein (1996) called the ‘accumulation’ problematic. Capitalist agriculture produces
surplus above and beyond its immediate consumption. Private property and the
imposition of taxes compels agrarian producers to compete. As agrarian producers are
subjected to the law of value they must compete, leading to specialization,
commercialization, and technologies that advance labor productivity. The result of this
development is cheap food and fiber that serves proletarianization and industrialization.
The ‘accumulation’ problematic suggests that agricultural surplus is necessary to, and
conditions, industrialization and capital accumulation (Akram-Lodhi 2017: 2). Our
concern here is to what extent Midwestern petty commodity producers were a source of
surplus to industrialization and accumulation.
The restructuring of agrarian political economies through the forces and relations
of production represents the second foundational problematic of agrarian question—what
Bernstein (1996) called ‘production’. From the agrarian colonial division of labor to
British ‘high farming’ to nineteenth century United States family farms and
sharecropping to the long Green Revolution, the development of the forces and relations
of agrarian production have been pivotal to the restructuring of capital’s agro-food
systems. Revolutions in the forces and relations of production have fundamentally
transformed agrarian social formations worldwide. The production problematic, then, is
above all else concerned about the ways in which the forces and relations of production
restructure farm production and productivity, and attended consequences on agrarian
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classes. Our concern here is to explain how Midwestern petty commodity producers were
foundational to two successive agricultural revolutions.
The third problematic, what Bernstein (1996) called ‘politics’, concerned the class
struggle of the peasantry. Part of this scholarship has examined the ongoing class
differentiation and conflict unfolding in rural economies (Bernstein 2010). Capitalist
agriculture has been a rapacious combination of dispossession by displacement and
differentiation, dispossessing peasants and small-scale farmers through the arm of the
state (successive rounds of enclosures) and the politically constructed inequitable agrofood markets of the world-economy. Throughout the history of the modern world-system
land reform in favor of rural elites have been a recurring phenomenon resulting in the
privatization of the commons, the enlargement of agricultural land for better off peasants,
and pushing poor peasants into increasingly marginalized lands. Such political economic
developments have generated worldwide ‘peasant wars’ (Wolf 1969). The balance of
class forces and class struggle between agrarian social classes constitute “structures of
domination, subordination and surplus appropriation” (Akram-Lodhi 2017: 3). Rural
uprisings have been a political response to the exploitative agrarian class structure. Our
concern here is to what extent agrarian class politics constituted the trajectory of
Midwestern petty commodity production.
Two more recent developments in the agrarian question are worth noting in
relation to the study at hand. First, following Byres (1996), we are concerned about
“agrarian transitions”. That is, how non-capitalists forms of agrarian production are
transformed into capitalist or semi-capitalists social formations. In turn, those older
agrarian social formations no longer pose as an obstacle to capitalist development. Byres
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(1996) ‘agrarian transitions’ incorporate the three problematics of the agrarian question to
explain how each country historically and spatially traverse different paths to agrarian
capitalism. In Capitalism from Below and Capitalism from Below, Byres (1996)
historicizes the American and Prussian paths to agrarian capitalism. In the American
path, as Byres (1996) and Post (2011) argue, independent farm producers turned petty
commodity producers were at once a precondition for American industrialization and a
home market for manufactured goods. Agrarian transitions, then, are fundamentally about
the ways in which agrarian social formations are obstacles and opportunities to capital
accumulation. Chapter three challenges the current consensus of the American agrarian
transition (Headlee 1991; Byres 1996; Post 2011; Bauerly 2016).
The second important development is Bernstein’s (2006) notion of the agrarian
question of capital and the agrarian question of labor. Bernstein (2006: 452) argues that
as early as the 1970s the agrarian question of capital had been resolved through
worldwide land reforms—that is, all of world’s peasantry had been effectively
incorporated into capitalist relations of production. The end of the agrarian question of
capital marked the beginning of the agrarian question of labor. Importantly, as Bernstein
(2006: 455) points out, how will “classes of labour,” those that “compromise ‘the
growing numbers…who now depend – directly and indirectly – on the sale of their labour
power for their own daily reproduction’” (original is italicized). Those classes of labour
now must pursue the means of subsistence through a variety of income-generating
activities beyond farming, including both rural and urban labor markets. Bernstein’s
innovation enable us to further analyze the interconnected processes of agrarian change,
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evolving labor markets, and escalating surplus humanity in the era of so-called
globalization.
Extending Bernstein’s innovation, Friedmann (2006) makes a call for analyzing
the dialectic of the agrarian question of capital and the agrarian question of labor as
world-historical phases of capital accumulation and the state-system. The cyclical
movements of the agrarian question of capital and the agrarian question of labor can tell
us about the scope and scale of historical capitalism’s projects and processes. British
hegemony was not equal to that of American hegemony, nor was the rising world
dominance of agro-food capitals in the most recent phase of historical capitalism. Rural
expulsions and migrations (domestically and internationally) have been highly uneven,
depending on the degree of dispossession by displacement and differentiation and
industrial capital’s absorption capacity. Those developments themselves are constituted
through the modalities of world accumulation and world hegemony. Thus, the dialectic
the agrarian question of capital and the agrarian question of labor can improve our
historical analysis and theorizations of the interconnected processes of agrarian change,
labor markets, and surplus humanity in both its cyclical movements and secular trends.
The Domestic Labor Debate
During the late 1960s and 1970s, following the women’s movement, radical and
socialist feminists began to challenge economists and orthodox Marxists, who ignored the
political economy of women in capitalism. Feminist scholar-activists sought to synthesize
a theory production and reproduction, or resolve “the unhappy marriage of Marxism and
Feminism” (Hartmann 1979: 1), to explain the totality of capitalism. Based on Marx’s
undertheorized notions of the reproduction of labor-power, feminists began constructing

14

a theory of social reproduction. Following Brenner and Laslett, social reproduction
theory is defined along two interrelated aspects. First, societal reproduction refers to the
reproduction of the dominant system organizing society. The reproduction of capitalism
is dependent on ever-increasing capital accumulation. Second, social reproduction refers
to

“the activities and attitudes, behaviors and emotions, and
relationships directly involved in maintaining life, on a daily basis
and intergenerationally. It involves various kinds of social
necessary work—mental, physical, and emotional—aimed at
providing the historically and socially, as well as biologically,
defined means of maintaining and reproducing population. Among
other things, social reproduction includes how food, clothing, and
shelter are made available for immediate consumption, how the
maintenance and socialization of children is accomplished, how
care of the elderly and infirm is provided, and how sexuality is
social constructed” (Brenner and Laslett 1991: 314, cited in
Bhattacharya 2017: 6-7).
Social reproductive labor has three main forms: the biological reproduction of
children, care work and socialization of those children, and the daily maintenance of the
labor force through cleaning, cooking, and shopping, as well as emotional labor (Briskin
1980: 137). Combined, this unpaid domestic labor formed the basis of social
reproduction. Thus, the domestic labor debate was born. Utilizing Marxist categories,
feminists sought to insert a materialist analysis to the experience of women and their
contribution to capitalism. If the conditions of existence for capitalism is the exploitation
of a class proletarians, what about the proletarian housewife? Does the housewife under
capitalism produce value? Is her labor subjected to the law of value? What is her
contributions to capital accumulation? The domestic labor debate, like the agrarian
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question, is immense. We are only concerned about the main insights gained from the
debate as it relates to the study.
To address these questions, some scholars within the domestic labor debate have
conceptualized two distinct modes of production—the capitalist mode of production and
the domestic mode of production (Benston 1969; Harrison 1973; Delphy 1976; Walby
1986, 1990). The capitalist mode of production is constituted through capitalist’s
exploitation of laborers. The domestic (or patriarchal) mode of production is constituted
through men’s exploitation of women. 2 The domestic mode of production is said to be
‘non-capitalist’. In this schema, capitalists are to be the ultimate winners, male
proletarians shared, albeit less, in the surplus, and women and the wives of proletarians
are largely the losers. Women are said to be an exploited class that are separate from their
husbands and male counterparts. Male proletarians benefited from controlling the private
labor of their wives. Capitalism and patriarchy infused in, and, of course, outside, the
household, reproducing patterns of work and inequality. However, the theory of the
domestic mode of production, as Molyneux (1979: 16) argues, is problematic based on
inconsistency in the levels of abstraction, as compared to Marx’s mode of production,
and that the determination of households is “subject to considerable variation”. The dualsystems theory, as described here, had been supplanted by a more dialectical approach to
social reproduction and capital accumulation.
Beyond a theory of the domestic mode of production, feminists have sought to
explain if, and to what extent, domestic labor affects the value of labor power. Strictly
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The use of the word “exploitation” is used polemically rather than theoretically or
analytically. There is a tendency in some of the domestic labor debate to use Marxists
concepts as metaphors, as opposed to historical or theoretical categories.
16

speaking, the value of labor power is “determined by the value of the ‘bundle of
commodities’ necessary for the reproduction of labour power” (Molyneux 1979: 10). But
it is certainly more than that. Seccombe (1974: 7) quoting Marx, states that “the value of
labour power is determined…by the labour time necessary for the production, and
consequently also the reproduction of this special article”. For Seccombe (1974), since
domestic labor is not governed by the law of value, it produces no surplus-value. Yet,
according to Seccombe (1974: 9), domestic work does create value through the selling of
labor power. That is, when labor power is exchanged on the market for a wage, capital
“realizes the value created by the housewife’s labour also” (Coulson et al. 1975: 62).
Seccombe’s claim that domestic work produces value is based on the fact that purchased
commodities are rarely consumable without several steps of processing. For example,
food must be grown or purchased, cleaned and prepared, and served. Molyneux (1979)
and Briskin (1980) argue that domestic labor does not produce value, but transfers value
to reproduce labor-power. In any case, the consumption (and production) of the means of
subsistence is the precondition for the reproduction of labor power (Seccombe 1974;
Molyneux 1979; Briskin 1980).
One of the main theses within the domestic labor debate is that housework lowers
the value of labor-power. The argumentation follows like this. Capitalists do not pay for
domestic work performed in proletarian households. Unpaid domestic labor is
overwhelming performed by women. This unpaid domestic labor forms a ‘subsidy’ for
capitalism, a cost that does not enter capital’s balance sheet. There is consensus that
domestic labor necessarily lowers the value of labor-power and that this form of unpaid
work is “essential” or “crucial” to the reproduction of capitalism.
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However, we cannot assume a priori that domestic work necessarily lowers the
value of labor-power. Molyneux (1979: 10) explains that the value of labor-power is
determined by the standard of living of a particular region in a particular time, differences
in skills and gender, class struggle.3 Low-paid labor, such as migrant farm workers, may
live in squalor conditions that may make it difficult or unrealistic to perform domestic
work. Medium or high-paid labor can afford to purchase better housing that enables the
improved conditions of domestic work. There is at once qualitative and quantitative
dimensions to domestic work, depending on class, geography, and access to resources.
The quality of the housework may improve with women’s ability to access better homes
and improved household technologies. Those household technologies may decrease the
time spent on household domestic labor. There are class-determined thresholds in this
qualitative/quantitative dynamic of domestic work that must be acknowledged.
Therefore, we cannot simply assume the invariance of domestic labor determining the
value of labor-power, without historicizing the standards of living, wages-levels, and
material conditions, and how those determinants themselves constitute the nature of
domestic work.
Within the domestic labor debate, the question of whether domestic labor is
subjected to the law of value is central. The law of value compels capitalists and petty
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The value of labor-power is also determined by the “general level and rate of
accumulation, the level of profits in a given enterprise or sector of production, the
relation between Departments I and II, and the general technological levels” (Molyneux
1979: 10). The amount of domestic work in part depends the prices of daily inputs. On
the one hand, high market prices for daily inputs may necessitate an increase in domestic
work so as to reduce purchasing commodities. On the other, low market prices for daily
consumable commodities may be purchased by proletarians so as to reduce domestic
work.
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commodity producers to commercialize, specialize, and innovate to lower the socially
necessary average labor time objectified in commodity production. In short, producers
are forced to raise the productivity of labor, a process that occurs either through
mechanization or the intensification of labor (Post 2011: 45). Domestic labor, however, is
not compelled by the same objective forces as commodity production. Domestic labor
experiences no specialization, no direct competition with other domestic producers, no
equalization or labor, nor any fundamental transformation on the organization of labor.
The privatization of domestic labor, then, is not directly subjected to the law of value. In
part, this is due to the fact that domestic labor lays necessarily (or not necessarily)
external to the inner dynamics of capital accumulation (Collins 1990).
Indirectly, the law of value shapes the specific form of domestic labor under
capitalism. Because household work is less directly affected by the law of value it
contains a higher degree of elasticity than commodity production. The elasticity of
household work enables capital to draw on women as a labor reserve. Women’s
participation in the labor market shortens the time to perform domestic work. While there
is a large debate on whether or not household technologies reduce the intensity of
domestic labor or shorten the necessary time of social reproduction, it does seem on the
whole that the rationalization of women’s domestic work has provided a “modicum of
extra time” (Coulson et al. 1975: 67). However, this extra time, which can only be
determined historically on a case by case basis, has been used either to maintain or
improve the economic and social existence of women and households. Finally, the
dynamism of capitalism, compelled by the law of value, has historically meant the taking
over of household enterprises and domestic work by capital and the state. For example,
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the development of semi-processed food, nurseries, hospitals, retirement homes, etc.
While the law of value does not directly enter into the process of domestic work, it does
indirectly structure the unpaid activities of members of the household, women in
particular.
Beyond the central questions addressed in the domestic labor debate, we also gain
insight from the dialectical unity of production and reproduction. The origins of
capitalism and accumulation of capital gave rise to the contradictions between production
and reproduction. As whole populations become divorced from the means of the
production there is a corresponding spatial separation in the spheres of production and
reproduction, a historical process that relegated women to the privatization of domestic
labor (Seccombe 1974). From here, as families become more dependent on wages for
survival, the demands of production are imposed on reproduction. Wage labor necessarily
becomes elevated above all other forms of labor because the survival of the family unit
depends on it. The opposing forces of production and reproduction is expressed in
women most explicitly in work and family (Bridenthal 1976). For many working women
the increased separation of the spheres entailed a double burden, imposed by the
conflicting demands of production and reproduction. This was beneficial to capital and
men on several fronts. Capitalists could draw on women as a surplus labor pool when
class struggle intensified. Over the longue durée of capitalism women have received
lower wages than men. In part, this is an outcome of patriarchy and women’s role as
housewives. Women are saddled with the bulk of domestic work requiring that she work
around the schedules of their husbands and children, forcing many women into part-time
jobs. Thus, their wage labor is only viewed as supplementary to the male bread-winner.

20

Men derive real material benefits from being the “main” income earner, including “an
independent source of spending money, homeownership, pension security in old age, and
the customary right to be served at home while abstaining from domestic labour”
(Seccombe 1993: 12). When women do enter the wage labor they are relegated to lowwage employment, a product of the patriarchal subordination of women in the household
and the material conditions of reproduction. The dialectical unity of production and
reproduction enables us to see how the changing sexual division of labor, work patterns,
and gender inequalities configure and re-configure. More broadly, social reproduction
theory enables an understanding of “how categories of oppression…are coproduced in
simultaneity with the production of surplus value” (Bhattacharya 2017:14).
A World-Ecological Synthesis: Accumulation, the Production of Nature, and
Pursuit of Power
The previous section explicated the questions and insights animating the agrarian
question and the domestic labor debate. We now turn to synthesis. While Marx’s dialectic
methodology, specifically his method of abstraction, was simultaneously an ontology and
epistemology4 for conceptualizing capital accumulation and capitalist development, it
was Marx’s labor theory of value that formed his main theorizations of capitalism. Marx
sought to explain where value came from under capitalism. Unlike Smith and Ricardo
who thought value derived from the exchange of commodities, Marx argued that value is
formed through production and can be understood as the abstract social labor time
objectified in commodities. That is, the socially necessary labor time to produce a given
commodity i.e. the normal conditions prevailing in an industry and its productivity. The
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Paolucci (2007: 71) calls this an “onto-epistemology”.
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whole competitive nature of capitalism, its technological dynamism, and its expanded
reproduction turns on the socially necessary labor time.
The law of value soon begins to dominate more spheres of life, both for capitalists
and workers. This is evident in the expansion of the proletarian class and generalized
commodity production. The law of value finds its origins in the dispossession of rural
producers from the means of production and in the frontiers of the “New World,” each
operating in a mutually dependent fashion. Marx’s value relations do not explain
everything about historical capitalism, but one cannot adequately explain its development
without incorporating Marx’s labor theory of value. Marx’s value relations form the
foundation of world-ecology.
A World-Ecological Methodology
Environmental sociology has long claimed that humans are part of nature. Rarely,
though, has it demonstrated that humans are indeed part of nature. World-ecology seeks
to rectify epistemological rifts correlated with our common analysis of nature and
society. Synthesizing insights from world-systems analysis, environmental history, and
radical feminism, the world-ecological perspective seeks to theorize and historically
reconstruct the bundled relations of humans and the rest of nature. In challenging
common understandings and analysis of nature and society, the world-ecology
framework forces us to rethink our “methodological procedures, narrative strategies, and
conceptual language all at the same time” (Moore 2015: 5). Easier said than done. It was
not for nothing that Marx (1976) said, “There is no royal road to science, and only those
who do not dread the fatiguing climb of its steep paths have a chance of gaining its
luminous summits”. World-ecology challenges us to rethink our assumptions and notions
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of the world around us in innovating ways. It is to this end that a world-ecological
perspective may improve our explanations of the challenges facing the modern world.
I follow Moore’s (2015: 3) conception of capitalism as world-ecology, that is,
“joining the accumulation of capital, the pursuit of power, and the co-production of
nature in a dialectical unity”. A world-ecological framework seeks to reveal the forces,
patterns, and trends of world-historical development, and suggests, that capitalism as
world-ecology is both a process and a project to remake material natures, our ideas of
nature, and to control unruly natures. It is a framework that theorizes the strategic
relations that have been fundamental to historical capitalism. Marx’s dialectics and value
relations approach enable us to begin to think through capitalism-in-nature. This will be
explored later in detail.
The methodology of world-ecology is consistent with the world-systems tradition.
World-ecology research is rooted in Hopkin’s (1982) methodological critique that
forwarded the parts-whole relation in contrast to the methodological movement from
concept to indicator. To illustrate this critique let us take climate change to examine how
each methodology gets from abstract to concrete. Climate change is an abstraction or
concept that is typically known through a set of indicators—CO2, methane, rising global
average temperatures, more extreme storms, etc. In world-systems analysis, climate
change is understood through the way parts configure into the whole, where the whole is
climate change and the parts are elements of production and power named through
theoretical abstraction. The parts-whole directive “says to keep moving out by successive
determinations, bringing in successive parts –themselves abstract processes—in
continuous juxtaposition and in this way form the whole which you need for interpreting
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and explaining the historical changes or conditions under examination” (Hopkins 1982:
147). The totality of climate change or, say capitalism, can partially be explained through
the parts-whole relationship.
Following the parts-whole dialectic, world-ecological framework moves beyond
ideal-type conceptions of capitalism in favor of explanations that explain cumulative and
cyclical configurations of humans and the rest of nature over the longue durée of
historical capitalism. In world-ecological perspective, “the goal is to focus our attention
on the relations of the oikeios that form and re-form capitalism’s successive contradictory
unities of the exploitation of labour-power (paid work) and the appropriation of a global
zone of reproduction (unpaid work) from the family to the biosphere” (Moore 2011b: 26).
Extending Marx’s labor theory of value into world-ecological framework means
systematically incorporating the unpaid work of humans and the rest of nature. The
production of value pivots on the paid (productive) and unpaid (reproductive) work of
humans and the rest of nature. From world-ecological perspective value-relations unify
production and reproduction, operating through the dialectic of exploitation and
appropriation. Exploitation refers to Marx’s classic conceptualization of paid work,
whereas appropriation refers to capital’s capacity to usurp the unpaid work of humans
and the rest of nature in service to capital accumulation (Moore 2015). Enlarged capitalist
reproduction depends on increasing the unpaid work of nature (including humans) faster
than the exploitation of workers. Capitalism’s vitality depends on appropriating larger
and larger swaths of unpaid work over and above what it pays out in wages. Given all
this, social reproduction is at the core of world-ecological thinking.
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Capitalism as world-ecology is a way of organizing nature. As a world-historical
civilization, the capitalist world-system originates and develops through world
accumulation, world nature, and world time. World hegemonies have been at the center
of remaking those forces to serve its demands. Successive hegemonic cycles of
accumulation give rise to new sources of cheap natures that serve capitalists, proletarians,
and farmers in the heartland, albeit unevenly. Those forces that enabled hegemonic ascent
form the limits of growth that give rise to developmental crises. As world hegemons
experience developmental crises the solution is a twofold mutually interpenetrating
process: advance proleterianization-housewifization and increase agricultural
productivity. At a higher level of abstraction, the mutually interpenetrating relation
represents the agrarian question of capital and the agrarian question of labor (Bernstein
2006). The twofold solution only works to the extent that fresh frontiers and households
produce cheap natures, cheap food in particular, so as to enlarge world-ecological surplus
and revive world accumulation. Capitalism as world-ecology, then, develops through
crisis, revolution, and renewal, ratcheting up the capitalization of nature and restructuring
world accumulation. Following this section, the broad sweeps of historical capitalism will
be discussed in further detail.
This dissertation utilizes three concepts derived from world-ecology:
work/energy, commodity frontiers, and world-ecological surplus. Work/energy refers to
the capacity to do work, implicating both productive and reproductive activities (White
1996; Moore 2015). To perform work requires the expenditure of energy and in doing so
generates energy—the life-making processes in which humans and the rest of nature
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participate.5 It is through this work-energy nexus that humans form an important and
decisive relation with the rest of nature. Capitalism as world-ecology is a definite
historical relational process and project forming through the work-energy nexus of
historical natures. Governed by the law of value, work/energy as value-in-motion
contributes to capital accumulation and to the basic reproductive necessities of both day
to day and inter-generational relations. In discussion with the value form (the
commodity), Moore (2015: 102-3, original is italicized) states,
“From this perspective, work encompasses much more than direct
participation in commodity production. Rather, work encompasses
the totality of waged and unwaged activity performed by humans
and the rest of nature within the reach of capitalist power…both
moments are inscribed in the law of value…the value relation—
including the systemic determination of socially necessary labortime—encompasses not only production relations, but also the
broader relations of appropriation of nature’s work/energy,
provided “free of charge,” or as close to free as possible.”
All civilizations require people to expend energy to work to produce food,
clothing, shelter, and fuels. Under capitalism, work/energy takes a particular form,
operating through the soils, waterways, humans, and climates in order to advance labor
productivity. The work/energy concept enables us to move beyond Cartesian thinking by
unifying the dialectic of productive and reproductive activities of humanity-in-nature.
The key question is how does capitalism exploit and appropriate the work/energy of
historical natures?

5

Farming is a clear example of the work/energy of natures. In raising crops farmers must
work with the soil fertility, hydrology, and crop needs all within a human-led productive
system. The totality of the farm, and its reproduction, is formed through the work/energy
of human and non-human natures.
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The concept of commodity frontiers is also valuable to the study at hand.
Commodity frontiers examine the work/energy relations in commodity production and
how those enter into the circuits of capital. “Commodity frontiers are regions where
minimal capital investment can consolidate and accumulate great quantities of land, labor
and resources” (Marley 2015: 4). They connect cores and peripheries and fundamentally
transform regional and global ecologies through production, trade, colonialism, and
accumulation. The impoverishment and wealth accumulated from these frontiers enabled
a great divergence between regions and countries around the world, reproducing
inequality and uneven development. “The concept of the commodity frontier sheds light
on the ways in which place-specific commodity production shapes and is shaped by the
socio-spatial expansion of the law of value” (Moore 2000: 411). Commodity frontiers are
not simply out there, nor do they exist in a vacuum. Rather, they are made and remade
through flows of capital and world powers, connecting for example family wheat farmers
into a global wheat market. In the late nineteenth century the socio-ecology of regional
wheat baskets, from Argentina to the United States to Russia, became connected through
wheat as a commodity, as well as relations of power and politics. Crucially, commodities
frontiers lower the system-wide costs of reproducing labor-power, setting off a wave of
economic expansion. The origins and development of historical capitalism were made on
the frontier.
The final concept introduced here is world-ecological surplus, which refers to the
“ratio of the system-wide mass of capital to the system-wide appropriate of unpaid
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work/energy” (Moore 2015: 95). 6 World-ecological surplus, or simply ecological surplus
is a heuristic concept that is analogous to Marx’s organic composition of capital, that
incorporates the unpaid work/energy into an analysis of different phases of capitalist
expansion and contraction. It helps to explain the quantitative/qualitative dimensions of a
given phenomenon, process, or development. Post-WW II witnessed a high ecological
surplus in which cheap food and energy greatly reduced the costs of the proletarian class
in the industrial world, which enabled workers to consume basic and luxurious
commodities that fueled the economy. Over the course of an accumulation cycle, the
unpaid work of extra-human natures tends to fall, resulting in a falling rate of profit in the
world economy. Low ecological surplus refers to moments when the prices of basic
commodities—food, clothing, shelter, and fuel—begin to rise, a process that may lead to
crises. Low ecological surplus means that capital is expending more work/energy on
capitalized nature than appropriating unpaid work/energy. Over the last half century more
energy is required to produce a single calorie of energy: in 1930s 2.5:1, 1970s 10:1, and
today around 20:1 (Steinhart and Steinhart 1974: Pimentel et al. 1973; Acker et al. 2013).
World-ecological surplus, like Marx’s organic composition of capital, is not exact
measurement. Rather, it a concept to analyze the changing configuration of the
work/energy of humans and the rest of nature, and how those relations contribute to
productivity and accumulation.
It should be clear that the concepts are interrelated. Work/energy is the basis of
the reproduction of civilizations. Work/energy takes particular historical forms under
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For nearly two decades ecological economists have begun to calculate the world
ecosystem services. In 2011, world ecosystem services came to $125 trillion (Costanza et
al. 2014: 152).
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capitalist value relations so as to advance labor productivity and accelerate capital
accumulation. Central to capitalism as world-ecology are the emergence and
development of commodity frontiers, which are made possible by work/energy regimes
and flows of capital and power. These commodity frontiers lower the system-wide cost of
reproducing labor-power, which is indicated by the ratio of the mass of capital to the
mass of unpaid/work energy i.e. world-ecological surplus. These concepts allow analysis
of one or multiple processes at the local, regional, and world scale. They also allow one
to see how processes change over time and space.
Finally, for the purpose of this study, I must explain what are agricultural
revolutions and what do they do. Agricultural revolutions are fundamental
transformations in the productive relations of farming and food provisioning. It entails
transformations in the forces of production, including, but not limited to, the introduction
of new food crops, new crop rotations, improvements in livestock breeding, and the
introduction of machinery (Overton 1996). Included within this definition, are the
relations of production, such as private property rights in land, changes in the size of
farms, and changes in which people are employed by others on the land (Overton 1996).
Agricultural revolutions, then, are fundamental breaks in the conditions of production and
reproduction—new ways of organizing farming and agrarian households.
If agricultural revolutions are fundamental breaks in the organization of farming
and agriculture, what do these revolutions do? Above all else, agricultural revolutions are
productivity revolutions that deliver a “quantum leap in the food surplus” (Moore 2015:
243). For example, prior to the English agricultural revolution the typical family
produced an average surplus of 25 percent. During the English agricultural revolution,
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agrarian families were produced an average surplus of 50 percent (Bairoch 1973: 453).
Agricultural revolutions, then, are productivity revolutions that deliver cheap food so as
to lower the “system-wide cost of reproducing labor-power” (Moore 2015: 243). The
value of labor-power is strongly conditioned by the price of food such that cheap food
increases the rate of exploitation, even in the absence of transformation in the technical
composition of capital (Moore 2015). Agricultural revolutions, then, play no small role in
the origins and development of a world proletariat.
Agricultural revolutions not only deliver cheap food, they also entail the
displacement of “uncompetitive” agrarian producers. Those producers turn into rural and
urban wage laborers that ensure a cheap supply of labor for industrial capitalists.
Successive agricultural revolutions form the foundation of successive industrial
revolutions (Bairoch 1973; Moore 2015). 7 However, this is no one-street. Industrial
manufacturing supplies agrarian producers with the tools and equipment that further
advance labor productivity. Agricultural development, with its surplus and demand,
fueled industrialization:
“Agriculture not only set free the food resources and workers needed for
that big adventure that was the industrial revolution; it not only made possible or
even fostered the demographic revolution and generated the birth of the modern
textile and iron industries; but it also provided in the early stages a large part of
the capital and entrepreneurs that animated the motive sections of that revolution”
(Bairoch 1973: 498).

7

For Bairoch (1973), agricultural revolutions developed roughly fifty years prior to
industrial revolutions.
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The historical agricultural and industrial revolutions formed a unity expressed in agroindustrialization or agro-industrial complex – “the progressive integration of agricultural
and industry via enhanced market imperatives” (Bauerly 2016: 3-4; Headlee 1991; Page
and Walker 1991; Post 2011).
Finally, agricultural revolutions have been crucial to the rise of world
hegemonies. The Dutch, English, and American hegemonies constructed their own
unique agricultural revolution that became the world model of cheap food. The
uniqueness of each agricultural revolution is a product and producer of world
accumulation. The limits and demands of world accumulation structure and enable new
forms of production, transportation, and exchange of world agriculture. The historical
limits of world accumulation and the demands of ascending hegemonies condition,
indeed necessitate, socio-ecological transformations far and wide. The material demands
of nineteenth century British hegemony propelled a global railroad revolution,
incorporating fresh frontiers to deliver cheap food faster. Hegemonic ascent has unfolded
through delivering cheap food to its industrial proletarians first, and then, delivering
cheap food to other world centers of industrialization. Hegemonic-led agricultural
revolutions have been a central pivot for restructuring and expanding the world division
of labor. Agricultural revolutions are world-ecological revolutions, fundamentally
accelerating world accumulation, world time, and world nature.
Moore (2010, 2015) argues that each phase of capitalist expansion is constituted
through successive agricultural revolutions that in turn produces a historically unique
cheap food model. In the United States the Midwestern family farm has been the crucial
social form for successive agricultural revolutions. Moore suggests that since the
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nineteenth century there have been three agricultural revolutions in the United States.
While Moore provides a broad-historical interpretation of the agricultural revolutions,
less explicit are the interconnections of gender, class, and ecology of petty commodity
production in the Corn Belt Midwest. Corn Belt petty commodity production formed a
unique position in the origins and development of successive agricultural revolutions in
the United States.
In sum, the world-ecological framework is a synthesis of world-systems analysis,
environmental history, and radical feminism. The framework enables us to discern how
the patterns of world accumulation and power are constitutive of and constituted by
agrarian households and environmental transformations. Taken together, these constituent
parts, as interpenetrating and mutually conditioning one another, form the proceeding
historical analysis so as to reconstruct Corn Belt petty commodity production in the
totality of capitalism. A world-ecological reconstruction of the American agrarian
question can improve our world-historical explanations of American capitalism in the
world-system.
Historical Capitalism
We start with the “organic and historical movements” (Ollman 2003: 17) of
capitalism. Capitalism, like previous modes production, is a historical social system with
an origin and “a history of “conjunctures” and economic crises” (Braudel 1977: 5).
Capitalism is a way of organizing social property relations, patterns of work, labor and
commodity markets, and nature. As a world-historical mode of production capitalism’s
law of value has structured the world market, while penetrating the everyday existence of
households. The logic of capitalism is the endless accumulation of capital, and its history
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is the “commodification of everything” (Wallerstein 2011: 16). I discern three major
interconnected themes or patterns of capital accumulation and capitalism: the
concentration of capital accumulation, the pace of proletarianization and housewifization,
and frontier civilization. 8
Proletarianization and Housewifization
Capitalism’s tendency towards the commodification of everything has resulted in
an increase in proletarianization in the world-system. By proletarianization, I mean when
individuals no longer own the means of production and depend on selling their laborpower for wages. Tilly (1984) argues that the most significant change in the modern
world is proletarianization. Primitive accumulation beginning in the long sixteenth
century expropriated poor peasants from the means of production, effectively turning
them into rural and urban wage workers. A long-standing debate discusses whether
primitive accumulation is simply the historical origins of capitalism or that it has been an
ongoing process throughout modern world-system. In any case, the development of
historical capitalism has witnessed a growing world population who lack ownership of
the means of production. Capitalist social-property relations are foundational for the
‘rules of reproduction’, class conflict, and economic development (Post 2011). The
balance of class forces and the strength of the state are crucial forces of excluding classes
and groups from land, reinforcing the law of private property. For capitalists, the
conditions of existence depends on a class of wage labor to exploit, but much more than
this as we will see. For workers the conditions of existence depends directly on the wage
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These three themes and patterns are largely derived from Wallerstein (2011), Dunaway
(2001, 2012), and Moore (2015).
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relationship, but, again, much more than this. Capital and labor form a contradictory
mutual dependence. No other process has influenced the quality of life on individuals
than proletarianization (Tilly 1979).
The uneven development of proletarianization has been an ongoing process
emerging from the origins of capitalism. In this unevenness two relationships can be
discerned: 1) the pace of proletarianization and 2) the degree of proletarianization. First,
the pace of proletarianization has had fits and starts, depending on the cyclical patterns of
economic expansion and contraction, balance of class forces, and the strength of the state
in the hierarchy of the capitalist world-system. The pace of proletarianization depends on
also upon the regional patterns of production and reproduction, along with timing of
incorporation of that region. Wallerstein (2011) and others have argued that the pace of
proletarianization over the longue durée of capitalism has been slow, evidenced in that
just half of the world’s population is considered proletarian.
What historical developments can we discern that may hasten the pace of
proletarianization? For this study, the development most relevant is agrarian capitalism.
Again, primitive accumulation, a rural-based process, dispossesses peasants, independent
household producers, etc. from the land, creating a reserve army of labor for capitalist
industries. Remaining rural producers were compelled by the law of value to ‘sell to
survive’. Competitive producers were successful to the extent that they could advance
agricultural productivity, a process usually linked to greater market-dependency. The
historical road of proletarianization has been paved with cheap food, unleashed by
successive world-historical agricultural revolutions. Moore (2010, 2015) argues that
world hegemons over the longue durée of capitalism have generated agricultural
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revolutions, accelerating the pace of proletarianization worldwide. While we cannot deny
the importance of the state in the process of proletarianization, for our present study we
are most concerned about the role of agrarian capitalism in the making of
proletarianization.
The degree of proletarianization is also central for the purpose of our study.
Today, only a small fraction of the world’s population is fully proletarianized. As might
be expected this population resides primarily in the core. However, many households
even in the core would not be considered fully proletarianized. Much of the world’s
population is semi-proletarianized, and has been the statistical norm in the modern worldsystem. That is, they derive more than half of their resources and income from nonwaged labor (Wallerstein 2011: 26). The semi-proletarian household has been the
mainstay in the longue durée of the capitalist world-system (Dunaway 2012). The
persistence and durability of the semi-proletarian household will be explained shortly.
How do we explain the degree of proletarianization in the modern world? Part of
the explanation is found in what Wallerstein (2011: 26-7) calls the “minimumacceptable-wage threshold” which can be understood as the minimal levels of wages
required to “cover the minimal costs of survival and reproduction”. Fully proletarianized
workforces tend to increase the level of wages, cutting into the profits of capitalists.
There is a temporality (and spatiality) to the pattern of proletarianization and increased
level of wages. The longer and more established workforces exist the more they are
organized politically to demand a greater share of the surplus. Newly established
workforces are not well organized and are unable to demand higher wages, more benefits,
etc. On the whole, fully proletarianized households and workforces tend to have a higher

35

minimum-acceptable-wage threshold than semi-proletarian households and workforces.
The reason for this difference beyond the political organization and representation of
associations and unions, are that semi-proletarian households engage in multiple nonwaged labor activities that make them less dependent on waged labor. Capitalists can
realize higher rates of profits with a semi-proletarianized workforce that has a lower
minimum-acceptable-wage threshold. Semi-proletarianized households are more likely to
emerge in rural regions undergoing significant transformation. Thus, rather than
categorizing the expropriated as proletarians, it makes more historical and analytical
sense to view the workforce in terms of degree, not kind. The advantage of differentiating
between semi-proletarian and proletarian are threefold: first, we can explain the changing
household composition of waged and non-waged labor, second, the distinction explains
household decision-making regarding time spent on waged and non-waged labor, and
third, it is one indicator “of the ways in which capital accumulation is proceeding in
different parts of the world economy” that effects patterns of migration and labor and
commodity markets (Collins 1990: 7-8; Wallerstein et al. 1979; Wood 1981). A
somewhat similar pattern has developed in agrarian capitalism that will be detailed
below.
If the history of capitalist development has been a long, uneven process towards
proletarianization it has also been a long, uneven process of housewifization.
Housewifization is defined as the “process of through which capitalists obscure the
economic value of nonwaged and nonmonetary contributions of capital accumulation”
(von Werlhof 1983: 356, cited in Dunaway 2012: 101). As one part of the double
dialectic, proletarianization and housewifization form an organic whole within the
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household. Proletarianization is only possible to the degree that housewifization can
counter capital’s cost of production. That is, to the extent the unpaid work (domestic or
otherwise) reproduces the daily needs of the worker and intergenerational needs of the
household. In Patriarchy & Accumulation on a World Scale Marie Mies (1986: 38)
argues that “capitalism cannot function without patriarchy” and capital accumulation
turns on the ability to maintain “patriarchal man-woman relations” and to recreate those
forms through time and space. The reproduction of capitalist relations of production has
been made possible through a dialectical contradiction between proletarianization or
semi-proletarianization and housewifization (Dunaway 2012). Capital accumulation
works at once to dispossess people from the means of production, thus requiring a
growing population of wage workers, while externalizing the costs of reproduction onto
households, predominately women. While proletarianization has swept across the worldsystem, housewifization, too, has perhaps been equally as powerful in shaping the
everyday existence of people and their households.
The process of housewifization has been a powerful force in shaping familial
relations and households and contribution to capital accumulation. Housewifization
works for capital accumulation to the extent that women’s domestic and non-waged labor
is rendered invisible on the balance sheet. Women’s contribution to the resource-pooling
household has always been essential for daily and intergenerational reproduction (Smith
et al. 1984; Mies 1986; Dunaway 2012). Capital has extracted surplus from the
household, while externalizing the costs of production onto the household. When women
work in the formal labor market housewifization justifies low wages and precariousness.
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Low wages paid to women justify the ‘male breadwinner’ and the ‘family wage’ that
have reinforced the patriarchal dominance of husbands over their wives and families.
Proletarianization and housewifization are close proxies for production and
reproduction/non-productive work. Under capitalist relations of production productive
labor or waged labor were most associated with men’s role. Men’s productive labor was
performed “outside the household in the work place” (Wallerstein 2011: 24), where
capitalists extracted surplus-value. Social reproduction and non-waged (subsistence)
labor were most associated with women’s role. It was believed that these forms of work
produced no surplus-value that could be appropriated by capitalists. And so did begin the
process of valuing men’s work and de-valuing women’s work, a relationship expressed in
the male ‘breadwinner’ and his ‘housewife’ (Wallerstein 2011). The de-valued work of
women in and outside the household countered the rising costs of production for
capitalists, namely adult males’ wages. Male breadwinner and female housewife was
geographically constituted through the separate spheres of the work place and household,
corresponding to production and social reproduction respectively.
To be sure, women have historically performed productive labor in factories,
mines, and fields. Women and children constituted a large portion of the labor force in
the industrial factories during the Industrial Revolution (Seccombe 1993). As this study
points out, farm women performed all the major farming tasks of their male counterparts
on top of domestic chores and non-waged labor. Without a doubt agrarian women were
farmers. However, according to national statistics and gender roles and expectations
women were merely “helping out” i.e. women were “invisible farmers” (Sachs 1983). In
agrarian households the separate spheres of production and social reproduction labor was
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not so distinct, especially in poor and middling farm families. The de-valued work of
farm women had real material consequences expressed in women’s conditions of work on
and off the farm. This will be explored in detail throughout the course of the study.
For the purpose of this study we are most concerned about dialectical unity of
production and reproduction within the agrarian household as a changing dynamic of
proletarianization and housewifization. As we have already briefly noted, agricultural
revolutions have been a historical mechanism in the process of proletarianization in the
world-economy. As I will argue throughout the course of this study, proletarianization
and housewifization not only became generalized throughout the economy, but within the
agrarian household itself. In this way, we can observe the results of the double dialectic.
Concentration of Capital
Today, when we speak of the concentration of capital we are generally referring
to the period of late capitalism, sometimes referred to as monopoly capitalism. Some of
largest monopolies are in the agro-food sector (e.g. Monsanto, Cargill, Smithfield). Far
from being unique to late capitalism, monopoly power has characterized the longue durée
of historical capitalism. From the “chartered companies of the sixteenth to eighteenth
centuries, the greater merchant houses of the nineteenth, the transnational corporations of
the twentieth,” (Wallerstein 2011: 29) capitalists primarily from the core have gained
monopoly power over particular commodity chains. Such practices engendered unequal
exchange between empires and colonies, resulting in the polarization of wealth in the
core and periphery. The increasing concentration of capital refers to fewer capitalists
owning the means of production and thereby a greater “command over labor” (Marx
1990: 777). Therefore, the increasing concentration of capital accumulation is the
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limiting of competition, resulting in an increase control over the market. Super-profits are
realized when fewer capitalists or companies control a greater share of the market. While
there is an underlining tendency of competition among individual capitalists, there is also
another tendency of the class interests of capitalists. There are fundamental class
contradictions that constitute the totality of capitalism. One fundamental contradiction
that speaks to our second theme of the concentration of capital accumulation is the
interests of individual capitalists and the collective interest of the capitalist class.
The concentration of capital accumulation in a manifold process objectified in
individual capitalists and capitalists as a class. The ‘dull compulsion of economic forces’
requires that individual capitalist or companies compete over the extraction of surplusvalue and greater control of the market. Increased competition among capitalists tends to
cheapen the commodities, requiring an increase in the rate of exploitation. To beat the
competition the individual capitalist incorporates innovative technologies in the
production process so as to advance productivity, or may exert more control over their
workforce. If the competition fails to emulate the successful capitalist they are likely to
be driven out of the market. Revolutions in the forces of production and control over
technological rent has often meant the elimination of competitors and the increased
concentration of capital. For individual capitalists, the objective is to accelerate the rate
of capital accumulation faster than his/her competitors. In doing so, they may eliminate
their competitors and gain a greater share of the market, increasing the likelihood of
higher profits. While the extraction of surplus-value is the primary objective for
capitalists, the increased concentration of the market can increase the concentration of
power that operates and acts as a dynamic feedback loop.
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The tendency of capitalist competition is in contradiction with the
countertendency for the reproduction of the capitalist class. While the interest of
individual capitalists is to increase the rate of exploitation, and thereby, extract more
surplus-value, the interest of the capitalist class is to reduce the costs of production,
namely labor and inputs. Wallerstein (2011: 17) states that reductions in the costs of
production “frequently favoured particular capitalists against others, and some therefore
preferred to increased their share of a smaller global margin rather than accept a smaller
share of a larger global margin”. Wallerstein continues, contending a second
contradiction arises between individual and class interests, namely that the
commodification of everything increases capitalists dependence on creating more
consumers to purchase commodities. Capitalist competition, however,
Frontier Civilization
Our third theme and pattern emerging from capital accumulation is frontier
civilization. The internal contradictions of capital accumulation and its growth imperative
necessitate the geographical movement of capital. Moore (2015) has gone the furthest in
conceptualizing capitalism as frontier civilization, suggesting that capitalism does not
have a frontier, but is a frontier. Commodity frontiers are regions where low-levels of
capitalization exist, including proletarianization and the concentration of capital. These
frontiers renew capital accumulation through a wave of Cheap Nature, including food,
energy, labor, and raw materials. However, capitalism expansionary nature requires an
ever-expanding flow of cheap inputs to increase the rate of accumulation. Commodity
frontier’s remake regional political economies and political ecologies while contributing
to world accumulation and world nature. Moore’s world-ecological analysis historicizes
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the origins, development, and crises of historical capitalism through its relationship to
commodity frontiers.
Great waves of capital accumulation are made possible through great
incorporations of frontiers. In the long sixteenth century Spain’s “discovery” of Potosí in
the long sixteenth century was foundational to the origins of modern capitalist worldsystem. The wealth flowing from the largest mine in the world incorporated a steadysupply of low-cost labor sanctioned by the state’s mita system. Land and labor were
reorganized around the needs of mining silver and producing wealth for the Spanish
empire. Empire and colony were formed through the production of nature, the pursuit of
power, and the accumulation of capital. Importantly, though, as Moore (2010) argues,
that empire building was not simply built on pillage and plunder in the New World, but
exhaustion and crisis in the Old World. Silver mines in Central Europe were in rapid
decline that when combined with successive fiscal crises compelled colonial projects far
and wide. “The commodity frontier therefore represented an epoch-making strategy of
appropriation that was, at once, crisis-creating and crisis-fixing” (Moore 2010: 61).
Capitalism’s frontier civilization is both historical and analytical. Historically,
great waves of accumulation have proceeded through profitable frontiers. Most pertinent
to our study is the western agricultural frontier of the United States, that was made
possible through the violent displacement of Native American tribes and the
reorganization of land and labor. Analytically, commodity frontiers enable us to explain
moments of the concentration of capital, waves of proletarianization, and socioecological contradictions between and within regional production complexes.

42

It should be clear that the three themes and patterns of
proletarianization/housewifization, concentration of capital, and frontier civilization are
interpenetrating and interconnected through capital accumulation. They are “mutually
supporting and mutually undermining” processes, with the “undermining activities that
invariably prevail” (Ollman 2008: 18). How did these processual patterns emerge,
develop, and transform in the case of the American agrarian question? What are the
prospects for family farming today?

Historical Sociological Method
Unlike historians, “historical sociologists,” Sewell (2005: 15) states, “have
traditionally been willing to address the biggest questions: the rise of capitalism, the
nation-state, or modernity; the dynamics of revolutions; the governance of empires; the
rise and fall of civilizations”. The goals of the historical sociologists are to address the
questions by discerning the variety of forces, trends, and patterns constituting social
change. Like most historical sociologists studying long-term, large-scale social change, I
draw a several kinds of data sources. The research performed for this study occurred over
several years. In the main, I utilized a combination of primary and secondary research.
Primary research consisted of archival material the Illinois State Historical Society,
Illinois Digital Newspaper Collections, State Historical Society of Iowa-The Annals of
Iowa, the USDA collections, including the National Agricultural Library, National
Agricultural Statistics Service, and Apron Strings and Kitchen Sinks: The USDA Bureau
of Home Economics, University of Richmond’s Digital Scholarship Lab, and United
States and state censuses. These archives were an invaluable source for digging deeper
into the depths of historical change.
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In terms of secondary sources, I drew a combination of regional specialists and
world-historians. As stated above, there are a great many scholars that have studied
Midwest agriculture, and from a variety of perspectives. Such specialists are able to detail
the economic, social, and ecological chances specific to the Midwest like no other. The
inherent limitations of strictly regional studies are just that, an unduly focus on the
region. World-historians have provided sufficient accounts of historical capitalism that
necessitates that we reexamine regional studies in a new light. In the main, secondary
sources are viewed as inferior to primary sources. However, as Skocpol (1984: 382)
explains, “if a topic is too big for purely primary research—and if excellent studies by
specialists are already available in some profusion—secondary sources are appropriate as
the basic source of evidence for a given study”. The historical sociologists, then, must
have “‘an enormous appetite for reading’” and a “‘notable capacity for synthesis’”
(Hobsbawm 1975: 177 and 178, cited in Byres 1996: 15).
Chapter Overview
The next chapter historicizes the transition from feudalism to capitalism through
British hegemony. The origins of the capitalist world-ecology, and the debates therein,
can shed light on the origins of petty commodity production in the American Corn Belt.
In particular, I examine agrarian change, regional and global transformations, and crisis
and renewal. Chapter three focuses on the transition to petty commodity production in
Illinois and Iowa. The objective is to explain the unique position of Illinois and Iowa
agrarian households in the capitalist world-ecology. I argue that while Illinois and Iowa
agrarian producers engaged in commercial wheat production on an extended scale,
signaling the transition to petty commodity production, they quickly shifted away from
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commercialized wheat to specialized corn-hog farming that resulted in dynamic stability,
increased flexibility, and advancement in prosperity. The transition to petty commodity
production, however, did not simply unfolded through the differentiated demands and
opportunities of commodity crops. The transition also unfolded through the paid and
unpaid work of women. I further argue that Illinois and Iowa were the epicenter the first
agricultural revolution, 1840s-1900. In historicizing the origins of petty commodity
production in Illinois and Iowa, I challenge and extend the current consensus of the
American agrarian question.
Chapter four examines the transition period between the first and second
agricultural revolutions, 1900-1930s. The focus is on the process of agrarian
housewifization as a co-production of farm prosperity and farm women’s demand for
improved working conditions. A little known historical development called the “farm
woman problem” is analyzed to explain the relationship between the structural forces of
capital, the state, and science and farm women’s agency. While the process of agrarian
housewifization began in the transition to petty commodity production throughout the
nineteenth century, it was only during the first half of the twentieth century that it became
a systematic project to remake the household in the web of life. It was no coincidence
that relatively wealthier farms in Illinois and Iowa received the most benefits from home
economists, farm groups, and capital. I explain why wealthier farm households were the
target of housewifization and the attendant results.
Chapter five examines the second American agricultural revolution, 1933-1970s.
Like the first, Illinois and Iowa were once again the epicenter of the second agricultural
revolution. The twentieth century productivity revolution was a complex of hybrid corn,
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tractors, and a new miracle crop—soybean. The new complex appropriated a greater
share of unpaid work of nature than had been accomplished in the nineteenth century.
However, the productivity revolution was not simply a product of technological
innovations, but was also a product of the demands of agrarian housewifization and
American hegemony. At the turn of the twentieth century petty commodity production
had been generalized. By the end of the second agricultural revolution, occurring no later
than the 1970s, culminated in the 1980s-farm crisis.
In the final empirical chapter, I explore the renewal Corn Belt farming in the
development of agrofuels. As the heart of the Corn Belt, Illinois and Iowa farm families
were well positioned for the revolution in agrofuels. To what extent did the agrofuels
boom of the 1980s to the present lead to the survival or demise of the family farm? What
role did women play in this development? These questions are addressed in this chapter.
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Chapter 2: The Longue Durée of Agricultural Revolutions, Proletarianization, and
World Accumulation
Introduction
The rise of British hegemony unfolded through several world-systemic forces,
beginning in early modernity. Competitive empires, namely Britain, France, and Holland,
but also Spain and Portugal, vied for control over the emerging capitalist world-economy.
The competitive struggle for hegemony unfolded through strategies of appropriating and
exploiting cheap natures near and far. Each ascending nation-state faced socio-ecological
limits and challenges to capital accumulation and political power, requiring the
reorganization of an international division of labor, restructuring domestic production in
both agriculture and industry, reinforcing colonial-based unequal exchange, and finally,
restructuring the gendered household division of labor.
The following chapter is organized around the transition from feudalism to
capitalism in the nineteenth century. I examine the socio-ecological limits to capital
accumulation in early modern era, who were the key competitors of world hegemony, the
changing production relations in the core and periphery, but also in agriculture and
industry, and contradictory class and gender dynamics. The objectives of the chapter are
the following: demonstrate world-systemic processes constituting the capitalist worldecology of early modernity, the role of agrarian change in that development, and how
Britain, facing a developmental crisis, renewed accumulation through housewifizationproletarianization at home and cheap food from the United States. In so doing, I
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demonstrate the interdependent nature of the capitalist world-ecology between hegemons
and ascending powers. Contrary to agrarian question scholars, this methodological
procedure seeks to reconstruct agrarian change through the totality of capitalism, and the
totality of the capitalism through agrarian change.
The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism
The capitalist world-ecology of early modernity emerged and developed though
dialectical unity of the production of nature, pursuit of power, and world accumulation
centered on the epoch-making innovations of shipbuilding and trade in the early modern
era. Each hegemonic cycle of accumulation has emerged through the forests of the
modern world. Pivoting on world-systemic processes of power and exchange,
competition between ascending hegemons pressed colonial projects to appropriate forests
near and far. Timber was one of the most voluminous traded commodity in the early
modern era (Bunker and Ciccantell 2005). Industry, the state, and household all depended
on access to cheap timber for their reproduction. Nearly all commodity production in the
modern world, and certainly prior to, depended on access to timber, but especially cheap
timber. From processing sugar in Madeira to building ships in Europe to making glass,
furniture, iron, and more, all derived from forests. Forests resources were “essential to
imperial and industrial expansion” (Mosley 2010: 33). However, as deforestation
advanced, and with it the increased cost of production and transportation, new sources
were appropriated from colonial hinterlands, from Asia to the Americas.
By the fourteenth century Britain’s forests had regenerated from the exhaustive
projects of Roman smelting works. By the sixteenth century with Dutch ascendency,
southern England was exporting six hundred shiploads to Holland each year, especially
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oak (Chew 2001: 122). A ‘timber famine’ intensified with the enclosure movements
(16th-18th century) that turned feudal peasants into market dependent yeoman farmers and
tenants who relied on marketing short-term annually crops like corn and wheat over the
long-term nature of planting and harvesting timber. 9 Britain’s dependence on military
force and mercantile capitalism only advanced the timber famine as high import
(transportation) costs cut into profits. Competing demands over the forest resources
existed between the ironmasters who sought to supply armaments for naval ships and
farmers who needed timber for fuel and building materials (Bunker and Ciccantell 2005:
127). The demands of naval vessels won out because Britain’s military strategies would
become the solution to securing cheap natures globally.
The ability of Dutch to develop a superior shipbuilding industry was a product
and producer of its socio-ecological obstacles. World-renowned for its knowledge of
hydrological projects, the Dutch constructed a network of canals connecting hinterlands
with its agriculture, industry, and transportation (Mumford 2010: 122). While the Dutch
began exporting timber to Portugal and Spain early on, by the sixteenth century they had
developed a dynamic shipbuilding industry that created forward and backward linkages
throughout the economy, becoming what Bunker and Ciccantell (2005) call a “generative
sector”. Dutch shipbuilding was superior to that of Britain and other major powers in that
access to cheap natures of initially Germany and Poland, and then later, the Baltic
combined with skilled labor that overcame obstacles to shipping large volumes of
commodities. Supported by state infrastructure projects that eased the burden of moving
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Farmers did not harvest wood for market exchange. Rather, they use the resources of
forests for fencing, buildings, tools, etc.
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bulky inputs, Dutch shipbuilders, more than its competitors, knowledge of turning a
variety of different kinds of timber into different parts of the ship that could overcome the
obstacles of weight-volume ratio in transporting bulky low-valued commodities was
revolutionary. Competing with the Portuguese in Asia, colonial expansion exemplified in
the Dutch East India Company (VOC) appropriated teakwood in Java, along with bullion,
cotton, and coffee (Chew 2001). The VOC also expanded intra-Asian trade when
“between 1633 and 1663” over “160 tons per annum” of brazilwood was “shipped to
Japan” (Chew 2001: 125). Over that same period the VOC shipped over 400 tons from
Siam (modern day Thailand) to Europe. The whole production of cheap natures was
underwritten by access to silver and gold in the Americas, but also southeast Asia (Chew
2001). The ability of the Dutch to procure cheap natures in the form of wood, grains, and
textiles allowed states and firms to offer cheap shipping globally, thereby undercutting
their competition.10 Unlike the Portuguese or the Spanish who shipped primarily luxury
items, the Dutch shipbuilding industry revolutionized shipping via standardization that
would permit profitable exchange of low-value bulk goods (Bunker and Ciccantell 2005).
Cheap timber was the foundation of cheap trade, industrial expansion, and Dutch
hegemony (1625-1675) (Wallerstein 1982: 96).
“The Dutch opening of bulk trade with the Baltic societies constituted the
first instance of long-distance trade in industrial inputs and in cheap
foodstuffs; it was a major and revolutionary step toward capitalist industry
as opposed to mercantile trade…In this sense, Dutch technological and
organizational innovations to enable cheap bulk transport constituted the
pioneer instance of the factory system that was to revolutionize European
industry, agglomerating laborers around machines to produce more goods
with fewer workers in ways that produced additional capital that could
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The Dutch could build ships for less than a third to half of the cost of British
shipbuilding (Bunker and Ciccantell 2005: 111).
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then be invested in other, similarly labor-saving and productioncheapening industries” (Bunker and Ciccantell 2005: 107-108).
For Britain to compete with Dutch hegemony required access to new forms of
cheap nature, as its dwindling sources of timber served Dutch accumulation early on.
State conservation strategies were ineffective due to competing demands of farmers,
industrialists, and the military. Britain’s strategy for competing against the Dutch was not
industrial or commercial but military supremacy. To access cheap timber and other raw
materials, British capitalists constructed trading houses in Germany, Scandinavia, and
Russia that increased trade throughout the seventeenth century. The voracious demands
of Britain’s economy, as its military force strengthened and metallurgy was
revolutionized, the cost of importing timber for Britain increased. Inter-state competition
and profit-driven capitalists forced Britain into a seemingly intractable timber famine.
The cost of importing wood continued to rise even with the increased trade. Britain’s
reliance on military force for securing raw materials led to an increase in the use of raw
materials, which, in turn, facilitated the expansion of the further penetration of its
colonies globally.
The solution to Britain’s timber famine rested in its colonies. In North America,
New England’s vast forests supplied high quality timber and a booming shipbuilding
industry in the United States supplied a sixth of the total British fleet prior to the
American Revolution (Bunker and Ciccantell 2005: 132). Throughout the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries New England was one of several of Britain’s timber frontier. In the
late eighteenth century France blocked Britain’s timber trade in the United States,
impelling Britain to expand trade with Baltic, increasing to two-thirds of all Baltic trade
(Peet 1972: 3), and intensifying timber extraction and the creation plantations of tea,
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coffee, cotton, and sugar in India (Mosley 2010). The production of nature unfolded
through the knowledge and power objectified in British botanists, who ‘bio-prospected’
hundreds of varieties of trees and other plants that would suit Britain’s commercial and
military demands (Brockway 1979). Britain’s botanical knowledge, then, was essential
for appropriating the unpaid work of India’s cheap timber while waring with France in
the United States and the Caribbean. The search for cheap natures was constituted
through European conflict between Britain, Holland, and France that came to a head after
a century and a half of war. Britain’s establishment of economic ascendency and
dominance was conditional on securing cheap natures from its colonies around the world.
The production of nature of early modernity, however, was not limited to earthmoving activities, but also emerged with and through idea-making that reconstituted
privilege, power, and domination. The production of Dutch and English botanical
knowledge centered around appropriating and transferring the genetic resources like plant
germplasm from its colonies for its own uses (Brockway 1979). Intense competition
between the Dutch, English, and French over colonial genetic resources entailed
protectionism at home and eco-cide abroad (Kloppenburg 2004). Environment-making in
the colonies principally centered on dualist notions of subjects and objects. Western
ontology became a powerful force of science and empire-building that reconstituted
privilege, power, and domination. In the emerging western ontology hierarchal dualism
prevailed, privileging society over nature, man over woman, and civilized over
uncivilized (Plumwood 1993). White men of privilege and power, including some
working-classes in the core, were part of civilized society, where most women, nature,
and colonies were part of an uncivilized and unproductive nature. Such hierarchal
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dualisms expressed in the discourse of colonial projects were a justification for
plundering the unproductive natures of colonial subjects. Human exceptionalism and the
domination of nature went hand in glove with the colonization of the Americas. The
totality of the production of nature in the colonial projects of early modernity was no less
earth-moving activities as it was also idea-making and power-creating activities (Moore
2015).
The production of nature in the colonies of the ascending economies of the
emerging capitalist world-ecology centered around appropriating cheap natures as they
actively constructed “nature” as external, fungible, and “subordinat[ed] it to new
‘measures of reality’” (Moore 2017: page). From the Columbian Exchange to the Dutch
and British trading companies, competition for cheap natures pivoted the unequal
exchange of commodities and diseases, the transformation of indigenous agricultures into
monocultures, and the exploitation of indigenous populations as silver miners. The
“biotic transmission” (Williams 2016: 100) of Eurasian diseases like small pox and
insects transported via European ships wreaked havoc on indigenous peoples of the New
World. Demographic collapse in the New World was indeed worse than Europe’s Black
Death (Federici 1998).
In world-historical terms, wood was an absolutely necessity to economic
ascendency for both the Dutch and later Britain, but it was not sufficient. Dutch and
English agricultural revolutions were crucial for advancing state power and world
accumulation, a process that gave rise to successive hegemonies. Agrarian change, then,
took center stage on the transition from feudalism to capitalism (Wallerstein 1974;
Brenner 1976; Wood 2002; Moore 2015). As class conflict intensified between lord and

53

peasant, and the already thin margins of peasant subsistence continued, peasants brought
marginalized land under cultivation. Stagnating agricultural productivity throughout
feudal Europe undermined seigneurial rents and limited economic growth (Wallerstein
1974; Brenner 1976). Feudal lords’ inability to extract more surplus from the peasantry to
support luxurious consumption and military defense against other lords resulted in lords
enacting strategies of absolute surplus extraction, which rarely register productivity
revolutions. Central to the crisis of feudalism, that is, the ability for the system to
reproduce the conditions of surplus extraction was a demographic collapse which was coproduced through the Black Death, peasants autonomy and power, but especially peasant
women, and harvest failures due to warming climates (Federici 1998; Mosley 2010).
Concomitantly, wages for urban workers increased with the price revolution. Although
trade occurred throughout the Middle Ages, transportation costs were prohibitively high
for non-luxury commodities. The socio-ecological contradictions emerging from
feudalism as a way of organizing nature, but especially production and reproduction
relations, became untenable as lords were unable to maintain incomes even as they
enacted harsh strategies of absolute surplus extraction, a process that merely exacerbated
the crisis of feudalism.
The solution to the epochal crisis of feudalism, and thus, the transition to the
capitalism, was twofold. First, frontier movements both internal and external to Europe
were carried out, centering around food, fuel, and resources, notably, gold and silver
(Moore 2010a). This moment necessitated the expansion of space in the world-economy,
generating a world division of labor premised on different modes labor regulation
dependent on the socio-ecologies of different commodities (Wallerstein 1974). Second,
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the class contradictions arising from the relationship between lord and peasant around the
means of production and subsistence gave rise to stagnating agricultural productivity
(Brenner 1976). The “rise of sheep farming” led to the great enclosures of the long
sixteenth century in England. Eastern Europe turned into Western Europe’s breadbasket,
expressed in the “second serfdom” or what Wallerstein (1974: 91) calls “coerced cashcrop labor”. In the emerging European capitalist world-economy Western Europe’s
economy had variety and specialization, engendering dynamic development, while
Eastern Europe and the economies of colonies of the New World were monoculture in
nature, resulting in disaccumulation (Wallerstein 1974: 102).
For centuries, European peasant-lord relations and patterns of production
developed through stable weather patterns. Climatic conditions began shifting in the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries with increased severe winters with the coming of the
Little Ice Age, posing an obstacle to advancing agricultural productivity, a problem that
exacerbated the low levels of productivity on marginalized lands (Wallerstein 1974;
Moore 2000).11 As Wallerstein (1974) suggests, when crisis conditions prevail minor
changes in ecological relations, including climate, can be powerful levers of social
change. The severe winters of the late feudal period gave way to mild winters in the long
sixteenth century, reconstituting new relations and patterns of agricultural production
(Wallerstein 1974).
In this context, the Dutch agricultural revolution emerged through the epochal
crisis of feudalism, registering a regional socio-ecological crisis. In the fifteenth century,
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Cooler temperatures in the first half of the seventeenth century also affected
agricultural production, leading to higher food prices, a development that exacerbated the
socio-economic crisis of the century (Parker 2013).
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peasants pushed to their subsistence limits reclaimed the water-logged peatlands that they
in turn drained while attempting to protect fields from flooding. The continually
subsidence of peat soils posed an obstacle to arable farming and feudal lords surplus
extraction. The effect was revolutionary. Supported by cheap grains from the Baltic,
market dependent peasants, if seeking to eke out a living on the land, had no other option
than to shift from subsistence arable farming to commercial pasture farming, including
dairying and cattle raising (Brenner 2001). Where stable ecological conditions prevailed,
peasants raised summer grains for the nascent beer market (Brenner 2001). Subjected to
competitive markets, farmers from maritime Netherlands specialized, invested, and
innovated, advancing labor productivity and supplying cheap food to European markets.
Beyond dairy and cattle specialization, the Dutch replaced fallow fields by growing a
variety of legumes as feed for livestock and improving the soil through increased
manuring (Tauger 2011). 12 Improved animal breeding soon thereafter followed in a
dynamic process that added more manure that in turn facilitated a greater appropriation of
the unpaid work of soils (Mazoyer and Roudart 2006). Dutch farmers export-led
development and concomitant dependence on European markets turned economic
expansion into contraction when competition intensified during the seventeenth century.
Markets became saturated, turning peasant prosperity into a reproduction crisis. The
Dutch agricultural revolution had emerged through the socio-ecological contradictions of
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With the new rotation of fodder crops, but especially fodder legumes, and grains there
is a lessening of leaching and denitrification. In part this is due to the ability of the roots
of said crops to expand “widely and deeply” allowing to absorb great quantities of
fertilizing minerals. “It is precisely these minerals, shielded from losses resulting from
drainage and denitrification, that are incorporated into the biomass from the fodder crops,
consumed in the stables by an increased number of livestock, and found, for the most
part, in the additional manure produced” (Mazoyer and Roudart 2006: 320).
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feudalism, enabled through a transportation revolution and the simplification of wetlands,
allowing the majority of Holland’s population to work outside of agriculture. 13
Proletarian wages in Holland were highest among other comparable European countries,
including Britain (Brenner 2001). Industrial productivity, too, was among the highest in
Europe. Advances in labor productivity in agriculture, then, became a powerful force in
the process of industrialization.
The Dutch became the first true world hegemon reorganizing world nature and
world accumulation with Amsterdam as the world entrepôt. The city-states of Italy, nor
the Spanish or Portuguese had transformed the world-economy in such a manner (Arrighi
1994). The Dutch had turned obstacles of a fundamentally socio-ecological kind into
strategies of accumulation, most notably around agrarian class conflict, timber frontiers
for its shipbuilding industry, and specialization in pasture farming. The Dutch
agricultural revolution, dependent on the appropriation of cheap natures from home and
abroad, emerged from the epochal crisis of feudalism and its own socio-ecological crisis
experienced most directly by peasants. By the second half of the seventeenth century,
however, economic expansion turned to contraction, opening the door for ascending
competitors.
Britain’s agricultural revolution, like the Dutch, was a world-ecological affair, a
product and producer of the production of nature, the pursuit of hegemony, and world
accumulation. Britain could not have advanced agricultural productivity without several
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During the sixteenth century probably more than half of the population worked outside
of agriculture (Brenner 2001: 215; Moore 2015: ).
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underlying forces at work. Moments of primitive accumulation joined together with
moments of colonial expansion, remaking households worldwide.
Three agrarian classes of producers made up Britain’s agricultural sector. The
landlord, capitalist or yeoman farmer, and the landless agricultural labor (Takahashi
1952). It was the yeoman farmer that took center stage in Britain’s agricultural
revolution. Prior to the transition to capitalism, with the decline of the manorial system
wealthier peasants began money rent, as opposed to labor rent, to lords. The effects of the
change in kinds of rent combined with private property resulted in fundamental
transformations in the relations of production, leading to class differentiation. Takahashi
(1952: 328) explains the results:
“As rent in kind gives way to money rent, these small-scale peasant
farmers, the petty mode of production in agriculture, become more and
more clearly independent…As money rent establish itself, not only do the
traditional personal relations between lord and peasant change into more
objective impersonal money relations, but…the part of the surplus labor
which is set as fixed money rent becomes relatively smaller, with the
advance of labor productivity and the consequent fall in money-value…its
value became so low that in effect the peasants were released from the
obligation of paying it.”
Takahashi (1952: 329) continues:
“The formation of this sort of independent self-sustaining peasants—
historically, the typical representative is the English yeomanry—resulted
from the disintegration process of feudal land property and established the
social conditions for money rent…The peasants were in the position of
commodity producers who simply had to put themselves always in contact
with the market, and whose position as commodity producers brought
about the inevitable social differentiation of that condition, the petty mode
of production.”
These better off independent yeoman farmers of northwest Europe were in a
unique advantageous position in the emerging capitalist world-economy. In the context of
high urban density, the intensification of farming was characteristic of the medium-sized

58

yeoman farmer who could take advantage of those markets (Moore 2000). Wallerstein
(1974: 128), drawing on Takahashi (1955), explains that although it may be an
exaggeration that the yeoman farmer was the catalyst for the end of feudalism, “it is
doubtful that one could have had a capitalist system without him”. Wallerstein (1974:
116) explains their position:
“Given the increase in population and the decline in wages, it would then
follow, as Marx said, that these yeoman farmers “grew rich at the expense
both of their laborers and their landlords.” They usurped (by enclosure)
the lands of the former, arguing publicly the need to guarantee the
country’s food supply and then hired them at low ages, while obtaining at
fixed rentals more and more land from the owners of large
demesnes…they became a significant economic, and hence political,
force. Their economic strength lay in the fact that they had every incentive
to be “entrepreneurial”. They were seeking wealthy and upward mobility:
the route to success lay through economic efficiency. But they were not
yet burdened down either by traditional obligations of largesse or status
obligations of luxury spending or town life.”
Class differentiation advanced under the crisis conditions of feudalism, allowing
yeoman farmers to possess their own land while employing wage laborers. Yeoman
farmers increased their possession of land from 20 percent in the fifteenth century to over
30 percent in the seventeenth century (Kriedte 1983: 60). Poorer peasants, however, did
not have the luxury of owning larger plots of land, a difficult problem when dues in
money and tax exaction were imposed upon them. Poorer peasants became wage laborers
for yeoman farmers, large capitalist agrarian estates, and/or joined the ranks of the urban
proletarian.
As a class, yeoman farmers became foundational to the English agricultural
revolution, focusing primarily on sheep and cattle farming. Unable to meet its means of
survival as commons were eliminated, yeoman farmers relied on cheap grains from the
Baltic and beyond. Market-dependence on the means of subsistence, as well as rises in
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wool prices and meat consumption, was a pre-condition for yeoman farmers specializing
in sheep and cattle. Wool became a cheap input for Britain’s textile industry, a leading
sector of economic growth. The conversion of arable to pasture land ensued throughout
northwestern Europe, eliminating large tracts of land. Agronomic thrusts of specialization
in livestock and wheat necessitated more frontier land, impelling ecological imperialism
far beyond the English farm that registered successive bouts of soil exhaustion and
deforestation (Wallerstein 1974; Moore 2017). 14 Advancing deruralization occurred as
the “sheep ate men”, giving rise to a shortage of food that necessitated the imports of
Baltic grains. Emerging from a combination of feudal property relations, economic
opportunities to serve towns, and class differentiation the yeoman farmer has been a
historic figure of historical capitalism that has left a lasting legacy on the development of
capitalist agriculture. If northwestern European yeoman farmer met his counterpart the
coerced cash-crop labor in the periphery, what of his wife and the household?
It is not clear of the transformation of the yeoman’s farmer’s wife, but as a
property-owning class they commanded the labor their wives and children. The state and
church targeted poorer peasant women who had been central to large-scale peasant
movements around Europe during the feudal crisis. Prior to the transition to capitalism,
women’s autonomy over their sexuality and reproduction posed an obstacle to landlords
and the state who were struggling to secure income due to the demographic collapse
(Federici 1998). Prior to capitalism, women had acquired knowledge on contraception
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Capitalist commodity production, both agricultural and industrial, cleared forests on an
unprecedented “scale, speed, and scope” (Moore 2015: 182). What took feudal Europe
centuries for large tracts of forest clearance, took merely decades for capitalism (Moore
2015).
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through generations, which ensured autonomy over their bodies. During the transition to
capitalism, and for two centuries after, the state, church, and medical profession began
early modernity’s witch hunt, which sought to discipline women’s bodies, specifically
their sexuality and reproduction. The witch hunt, where thousands of women burned at
the stake throughout Europe, became an important development in eliminating women’s
autonomy, while giving men who had lost access to land, women’s surplus. Women in
cottage industries produced for merchant capitalists, but the income they generated was
reserved for their husbands (Mies 1986). To be clear, the witch hunts, an important
process of primitive accumulation and gendered differentiation, was part of modernity,
not a pre-capitalist order (Mies 1986; Federici 1998). Large-scale violence at “home and
abroad” was essential for remaking women as “unproductive” domesticated housewives
in the modern world. From then on, an asymmetrical exploitative gendered division of
labor was solidified and later generalized.
During early modernity “women, nature, and colony” were designated outside of
the civilized world. While prior to capitalism, there was a partial belief in separation of
nature and society, during early modernity the small civilized population, namely
property owning white Big Men and Small Men, generalized the belief that the rest of
population was uncivilized. This was a highly uneven process both in terms of space and
time. Women in the centers of accumulation became domesticated through marriage and
family as part of a new gendered division of labor that further obscured their forms of
paid and unpaid. This was violently produced through the criminalization of infanticide
and sexuality before and outside of marriage. While women in the peripheries became
forced or enslaved labor. Designating “women, nature, and colony” outside of capitalist
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civilization justified violent raids, rural expulsion, and slavery as a means of
appropriating surplus. The appropriation of non-valued forms of work performed by
“women, nature, and colony” made possible the production of value and world
accumulation (Mies 1986; Federici 1998; Moore 2015).
Importantly, the origins of housewifization are to be found in the origins of
capitalism. That is, primitive accumulation and the rise of a proletarian class was made
possible through the disciplining and regulating of women’s bodies. Maria Mies (1986)
outlines two major stages of housewifization in the history of capitalism. The first stage,
during early modernity, entailed the colonial appropriation of luxury items for the ‘ladies’
of elite classes of the core. The second stage occurred in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries where housewifization was generalized to the proletarian class. What is missing
from Mies (1988) formulation of the history of housewifization-proletarianization is the
town-country dynamic within core countries. One of the central objectives of this study is
to explain this dynamic in the United States in nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
The reorganization of the capitalist world-economy in the early nineteenth century
emerged through the competitive colonial empires of Britain, France, and Holland.
Following the collapse of the French empire, Britain’s commercial, financial, and
industrial supremacy consolidated the world market around the demands of state power
and world accumulation. Britain’s financial supremacy was evident in the expansion of
loans across the world-system and London’s ability “settle trade balances among states
indirectly” (Tomich 2016: 61), permitting a transformation in world division of labor and
global exchanges. British hegemony would impose a new way of organizing the capitalist
world-ecology through the production of nature, state power, and world accumulation.
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Britain’s production of nature and accumulation strategies, financed through
British banks, unfolded through a qualitatively different world division of labor than that
of the Dutch who were losing control of the world-economy. While population continued
to rise in the eighteenth century agricultural productivity stagnated in Britain. The
transition from a political-colonial controlled world market of exchanged shifted to an
economically structured world market, whereby Britain enforced free trade globally and
unevenly. Even during periods of protectionism Ireland, in part an exception, remained
an important source of agricultural imports. In part, this was due to the nature of semiperishable agricultural goods that could not be imported from longer distances (Peet
1972). In the British West Indies sugar production increased significantly throughout the
late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and by the first quarter of the nineteenth century
British colonies accounted for almost half the world’s supply of sugar (Tomich 2016: 63).
However, slave emancipation in the British Caribbean would undermine the strength of
its colonies, opening the door to its competitors who were reconstituting a “second
slavery” (Tomich 2016). As the requirements of British capital accumulation emerged,
competition between Caribbean sugar frontiers intensified, leaving older uncompetitive
sugar islands behind while new sugar frontiers reigned. Not only was Britain the greatest
consumer of sugar, but it also controlled “the reexport sugar market”, a process that was
enabled through its economic strength in its ability to “penetrate the market of other
colonizing powers” (Tomich 2016: 63). British hegemony unified and restructured sugar,
slavery, and colony, increasing riches for planters, who suffered with intractable debt,
while exploiting African slaves and pressing the physical limits of sugar monoculture in
succeeding frontiers.
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Cotton-hungry British manufactures linked cotton producers around the world. No
later than the 1820s, and surely by the 1840s the Unites States plantation South was
producing more cotton than any region around the world, outcompeting producers in
India and Egypt (Ponting 1991). One observer noted that 3.5 million people in the United
Kingdom were employed in the cotton industry, and that the system depended on the
political economy of the United States cotton South (Beckert 2014: 121). In 1860 cotton
accounted three-fifths of all United States exports as cotton production increased over
170 percent over the previous two decades (Bauerly 2015: 104). By all measures the
United States was the main supplier of cotton for Britain’s textile industry, which was the
leading sector of the economy (Hugill 2009: 45). 15 In the mid-nineteenth century the
plantation South was producing two-thirds of the world’s cotton supply (Mosley 2010:
64). Mexican cotton hybrids proved superior for growing in the Mississippi Valley and
the Atlantic states as daily picking rates dramatically increased and were more disease
resistant (Olmstead and Rhode 2008). In the United States South, cotton plantations were
organized to feed Britain’s expanding textile industry.
First in the Netherlands, and then in Britain, did agricultural productivity double.
Throughout feudalism agricultural surplus was minimal. From the sixteenth through the
eighteenth century agricultural productivity doubled in the centers of world
accumulation, starting with the Netherlands in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
and then Britain in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Market-dependent farmers
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America’s total exports in 1860 were worth $400 million, which nearly half of went to
Britain, and of that half almost all was from cotton (Hugill 2009: 45). United States
exports rose from “3,000 bales in 1790 to four-and-a-half million bales by 1860”
(Ponting 1991).
64

turned to specialization and innovation to stay competitive, a process that was enabled
through monocultures abroad. Agricultural surpluses supplied cheap inputs to
industrialization, especially in the growing textile industry in Flanders and England.
Agriculture also supplied a redundant population to industrialists seeking cheap labor.
However, as has been suggested here, agricultural revolutions unified and transformed
ecologies near and far, itself made possibly through a revolution in transportation.
Agricultural productivity advanced all the while an increase in the global population
proceeded throughout the early modern era of capitalist world-system.16
A Developmental Crisis in British Hegemony
By the end of the eighteenth-century Britain’s agricultural revolution was
showing signs of decline. Much of Europe, too, was experiencing decline in yields. Yield
growth stagnated that when combined with lack of viable land threatened English
industrialization (Moore 2010b). To be sure, British industrialization was tenuous until
the 1840s (Hobsbawm 1968). The relative exhaustion of agriculture in Britain would
limit industrialization by lowering the rate of exploitation and increasing the household
food bill. Productivity declines in agriculture resulted in higher prices for farmers and
landlords at the expense of industrial capitalists (O’Brien 1977). At the same moment that
English agriculture was in decline, several of its colonies were being tapped.
Compounding the problem was the “major balance-of-payments deficit” (Duncan 1996:
84) Britain experienced after 1822 (Hobsbawm 1968: 54-55). While England had
dominated agriculture in the eighteenth century, by the end of the century they had
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In Europe the population increased from “71 million in 1600 to 145 million in 1800”
(Chew 2001: 134).
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become a major importer of meats and grains. In 1812, the price of wheat in England was
twice the price it had been a decade earlier (unlocking the agricultural economics if the
19th century). “Food prices increased over 200 percent, four times faster than the
industrial price index” (O’Brien 1985: 776, cited in Moore 2011: 125). Stagnating
agricultural productivity, then, served as a brake to industrialization.
While incomes and rents increased for capitalist farmers and landlords in Britain,
enclosing commons continued apace, forcing landless peasants into mills and mines. As
with each round of dispossession and displacement food shortage became a social
problem that came to a head with a working-class reproduction crisis in the 1830s-1840s.
Deruralization coupled with food and raw materials imports fueled Britain’s first phase of
industrialization. Although imports had increased, they were not cheap enough for an
expanding proletarian class. Part the problem of Britain’s standing in the world-economy
was that while the production of capital goods expanded there was a corresponding rapid
decline in returns in the domestic market (Arrighi 1994).
By the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the British centered capitalist worldeconomy faced a developmental crisis (Braudel 1992: 77). The cotton boom of the early
1820s, linked to slaved produced cotton and a series of cotton-based innovations in the
Arkwright era, enabled mill-owners to realize profits of 50 percent or more (Malm 2016:
175). The realization of massive profit margins from export markets allowed mill-owners
to obtain cheap money from British banks to build and modernize existing cotton mills.
By 1825, however, what became the first structural crisis of industrialism capitalism
centered on cotton, soon spread throughout the rest of British economy (Malm 2016).
Cotton profit margins shrunk drastically as too many capitalists competed for their share
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of profits (Hobsbawm 1986: 54). The problem stemmed primarily from the
overproduction of cotton combined with a contracting export market (Malm 2016).
Sluggish domestic demand had also occurred, and was likely exacerbated with the
“hungry thirties and early forties” (Hobsbawm 1968: 54). The cotton crisis continued
through the 1820s, but by the 1830s the railroad boom had generated economic optimism
for mill-owners that the demand from export markets would return. However, economic
growth was slow as the cotton crisis transformed into a general industrial crisis reaching
its apex in 1841-42 (Malm 2016). A business paper, the Circular, “concluded that the
glorious era of manufacture and commerce was approaching a complete end” (Malm
2016: 174).
In the center of world accumulation, Britain’s working-class faced unsustainable
levels of exploitation that gave rise to social unrest. A wave industrial strikes unfolded in
the first quarter of the nineteenth century that included carpenters, colliers, rope-makers,
wool-combers, and more (Malm 2016: 181). The acceleration of rural to urban migration
led to a long-lasting housing crisis, in which families paid high rents for squalor
conditions, a breeding ground for diseases and an ensuing cholera epidemic. The
working-class in the nineteenth century were working roughly 500 more hours a year
than the working-class in the eighteenth century (Seccombe 1993: 27). In the industrial
centers life expectancy declined to record lows, unseen since the Black Death (Malm
2016: 184). As part of the semi-proletarian class, women and children of all ages were
employed in the ‘Satanic Mills’, a product of two overlapping processes—generalized
low wages and the gradual displacement of women’s putting out work by capitalist
manufacturers. The wages they earned were kept by their husbands and fathers.
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The limits of accumulation and the crisis of the reproduction of the working-class was
several decades in the making, coming to a head in the 1840s. “The immense rural
exodus of this century masked the underlying contradiction in the bowels of the new
mode of production. Strewn around the sites of its most dynamic growth, capitalism was
busy piling up the heaps of wasted humanity in teeming slums” (Seccombe 1993: 78). As
the name implied, the hungry decades fueled the resistance of the starving working-class.
The developmental crisis of the nineteenth century instilled fear in capitalists of
narrow profit margins compounded by working-class anger. The solution to advancing
industrialization-proletarianization and capital accumulation was twofold. A great
compromise between industrial capitalists and working-class men to exclude women and
children from industrial manufacturing ensured the political stability of the working-class
through increased wages and externalizing the costs of reproduction onto women as part
of the “patriarchy of the wage” (Federici 1998). Unions fought for a ‘family wage’
whereby the ‘male-breadwinners’ wage would cover the costs of the reproduction of the
family. While wages increased for men over the nineteenth century, they were never
enough to cover the full cost of reproducing the means of subsistence, forcing women to
scavenge, beg, and barter (Seccombe 1993). Women’s outwork disappeared by the 1850s
and were regulated to homemaking. “In this process, the sphere where labour power was
reproduced, the house and the family, was ‘defined into nature’, but private, domesticated
nature, while the factory became the place for the public, social (human) production”
(Mies 1986: 69). Compulsory education forced children into school longer. Capitalists
shifted from an “extensive to intensive mode of consuming labour-power, based on a
reduced work-week, and a quicker, steadier pace of work under close supervision”
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(Seccombe 1993: 82). Productivity gains advanced as cheap coal fueled industrialization
while tempering the growing cost of timber imports. In short, capitalists shifted from
relying on strategies of extracting absolute-surplus value to relative surplus-value. While
cheap energy was a crucial element of “fossil capital” (Malm 2016), the solution to the
limits of capital accumulation British hegemony and other industrialized countries was to
advance the process of proletarianization-housewifization.
The second solution to advancing industrialization was unilateral free-trade,
specifically to increase the flow of cheap food and fiber from colonies and settler
colonies. The Corn Laws and the Navigation Acts meant that Britain would sacrifice its
farmers to the world market and depend on food supply from overseas sources (Silver
and Arrighi 2003). Cheap grain from all over the world flowed into Britain, that enabled
the rate of exploitation to increase, ensuring Britain’s industrial supremacy. India, the
‘crown jewel’ of the British empire, turned into the “pivot” of Britain’s commercial and
financial power. Silver and Arrighi (2003: 336) explain, “India’s balance of payments
deficit with Britain and surplus with the rest of the world enabled Britain to settle its
deficit on current account with the rest of the world. Without India’s forcible contribution
to the balance of payments of Imperial Britain, it would have been impossible for the
latter ‘to use the income from her overseas investment for further investment abroad, and
to give back to the international monetary system the liquidity she absorbed as
investment income’”. From 1750 to 1800 Britain received £2 million every year from
India (Braudel 1992: 581). Surplus appropriation from India, then, enabled global
investments that strengthened Britain’s hegemony. In this way, the advancement of
industrialization in nineteenth century Britain necessitated proletarianization-
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housewifization and the recomposition of far-flung frontiers that could controlled the
flows of cheap natures.
Following world-systems analysts (Arrighi 1994; Bunker and Ciccantell 2005;
O’Hearn 2005; Moore 2015), this historical account suggests successive cycles of
accumulation necessitate the emerging hegemon to appropriate an ever-increasing surplus
in the phase of material expansion, a process that occurs internally and externally to
emerging hegemons. Under British hegemony the phase of material expansion was made
possible through the nineteenth century railroad revolution, a process that accelerated the
flows of cheap natures from Britain’s own hinterlands, as well as the world hinterlands.
By the 1830s British track laying began, a mere decade later rail infrastructure was
completed. In 1840, there were 1,491 kilometers in tracks across continental Europe. By
1860, there were 33,405 kilometers connecting western and central Europe (Seccombe
1993: 81). British hegemony initiated canal and railroad projects from Asia to the
Americas, forcing colonies and settler colonies to bear the cost of developing and
completing internal transportation infrastructure, itself a process that engendered
primitive accumulation and increased taxation and debt (Bunker and Ciccantell 2005).
Over the nineteenth century world accumulation and world nature unfolded through the
railroad revolution that constituted successive famines across Asia (Davis 2001) and
broad-based economic growth in the United States. The restructuring of the nineteenth
century world market centered around British hegemony, tempering the hardships of
proletarianization, and advancing world accumulation through world nature.
With declining profit margins, wealthy capitalists, including landlords who were
also facing declining returns, began investing in transportation infrastructure in the
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United States. British investments in the United States internal improvements ensured the
successful completion of canals, but especially railroads. During the early 1830s of rising
agricultural commodities, “40 million dollars of American state securities were purchased
abroad…After 1834 the pace increased…more than 107 million dollars in state securities
went abroad and the state pursued an unrestrained expansion in internal improvements,
with their bonds finding a ready market among English investors” (North 1956: 502).
Investment slowed in the 1840s, but when agricultural prices began to rise again British
and German investors purchased railroad securities.
The fits and starts in the construction and development of Illinois Central Railroad
was a result of lack of capital. British and international investors enabled the further
construction of the Illinois Central to penetrate the agrarian heartland of the Grand
Prairies. While the state of Illinois had failed to service its debts to international creditors
from the 1830s internal improvements, leaving many investors infuriated, promotors of
the Illinois Central Railroad convinced British investors of Devaux & Company to loan
£1,000,000. British investors acquired $5,000,000 in bonds between 1852 and 1854.
European investors also purchased stocks in the Illinois Central so that in 1856 over
840,000 shares of stocks were held in Europe, “while $12,000,000 worth of the bonds
was held abroad, mostly in Great Britain” (Gates 1934: 76). The Illinois Central in turn
offered credit to would-be settlers, usually with higher interests, a justification for the
higher quality land owned the company.
International capital investments were not exclusive to the railroad revolution.
During the settlement period, international investors supplied capital to Midwestern
merchants in operating small meatpacking houses in the Midwest. Meatpacking quickly
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became a leading industry throughout the Midwest, as local merchant-packers and
farmers worked cooperatively. More than wheat and corn, pork products brought the
greatest returns to farmers (Hudson 1994). Although early pork packing houses required
little capital investment, large sums of capital were required to purchase hogs, pay wages,
and to ship pork products to distant markets (Walsh 1977). Midwestern merchant packers
with limited capital obtained loans from eastern and international investors. The
transition from merchant packers to industrial packers was facilitated through much
needed capital and expertise of international packers, especially from Britain and Ireland
(Walsh 1977). Importantly, during the mid-nineteenth century international capital
investments fueled the transition from small rural packing plants to large industrial urban
packing plants. To be sure, this was a joint effort with eastern capitalists, but it is
doubtful that without international capital investments that the origins and transition in
the Midwestern meatpacking industry would have occurred as rapidly. The next chapter
will examine the role of American merchants in the transition to petty commodity
production.
The renewal of capital accumulation in Britain had occurred in the mid-nineteenth
century as Britain became the workshop of the world and London the world’s entrêpot.
Britain had successfully transcended capital’s developmental crisis through frontiermaking projects at home and abroad. At home the proletarian household was transformed
into the modern form with the man as the breadwinner and the woman as the housewife.
Abroad, there was a corresponding increase in the flow of cheap food from colonies and
the United States. Britain’s economic ascendance was interdependently produced through
exchange relations resulting in a growing demand for United States commodities. The
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United States could fulfill that demand with its expansive ‘fresh’ frontiers. Indeed, as we
will see in the following chapter, it did just that.
Conclusion
The transition from feudalism to capitalism marked an epochal transformation in
the organizational development of civilization. There are several insights to glean from
the transition debate. Namely, what were the principle forces that gave rise to a new
system of surplus appropriation, what were the pre-existing historical conditions, what
are the life-making and environment-making areas of human organizations animating
civilizational change, and in what ways do inequality operate as a cause and consequence
for explaining long-term, large-scale social change. Perhaps equally important the
transition debate may tell us the nature of the crisis of our times. The object of this
chapter was to explain from a world-ecological perspective the historical origins of
capitalism, agricultural revolutions as a product and producer of global socio-ecological
change, and the developmental crisis and renewal of British hegemony.
Our concern here going forward is the origins, development, and crisis of the
Midwestern family farm. If we are to understand the transition to petty commodity
production in the Midwest, then, we need to understand historical capitalism as a
patterned process of agrarian change and proletarianization-housewifization over the
longue durée of the capitalist world-ecology. In doing so, I seek to move beyond ideal
type conceptions of capitalism. Federici (1998: 98-99) makes clear that “It was only in
the nineteenth century – in response to the first intense cycle of struggling against
industrial work – that the “modern family” centered on the full-time housewife’s
reproductive labor was generalized in the working class, in England first and later in the
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United States”. World accumulation and world nature enjoined the transition to petty
commodity production in the United States, working through the plurality of time. In
turn, the transition to petty commodity production in the United States would
fundamentally transform world accumulation and world nature over the nineteenth
century.
While primitive accumulation, both in terms of coerced displacement and
dispossession via class differentiation, was pivotal to the rise of capitalism, we must
understand how the pursuit of power, the production of nature, and capital accumulation
operated dialectically beyond the origins. This permits us to reconstruct historically how
state powers and capitalists sought to remake nature (including humans) into cheap
nature, as parts reconstituting the varied forms and patterns production and reproduction
forming the totality of the capitalist world-system. Such a historical reconstruction
requires that we take seriously the different phases of accumulation, competing world
powers, and varied geographies and natures of the gendered household.
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Chapter 3: The Making of the Modern Corn Belt in the First American Agricultural
Revolution
Introduction
By the 1890s the Slemmons family had been farming in Johnson County, Iowa for
nearly half a century. A year in the life John W. Slemmons is detailed in his diary. Just
six miles outside of Iowa City, they worked, socialized, and lived like many nineteenth
century farm families. At the “Terrace Mound Farm”, the Slemmons were the typical
diversified farm that raised corn, wheat, oats, hogs and cattle. While John W. Slemmons
details the comings and goings of friends and family, grinding corn and oats as feed,
working with his sons in the field, regularly attending church and agricultural meetings,
and visiting town to market hogs and butter and purchase household items, his wife
Agnes Slemmons is only mentioned half a dozen times in the entire year of 1892. Aside
from cleaning the coal house, Agnes, known as “Ma”, was mentioned only when visiting
town to market butter and purchase household items. Marketing butter occurred several
times each month throughout the year. Prices received for butter, however, are not
detailed. When John, with the help of Frank Danner, marketed 32 hogs in January he
received $282. The absence of Ma in John’s diary reflects how women’s daily labor was
invisible. Ma showed up when marketing and purchasing commodities or attending
parties. Interestingly, John knew exactly how much money he received for his hogs, yet
no account was detailed for the prices received for Agnes’ butter. The Slemmons were a
middling farm family, or in Marxist terms petty commodity producers, who owned 160
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acres, “shorthorn cattle, Poland China swine, and Percheron horses” (Slemmons 1892).
According to John’s diary, “his” gross income in 1892 was $2,169.19 with a net total of
$328.24, which was “well above the national farm average” (Slemmons 1892). It is not
clear whether Agnes income was included in the gross income of the household.
In 1858, the St. John’s moved from Walton, New York to Osage, Iowa. Isaac St.
John, the patriarch of the family, had a failing tannery and decided to move the family to
the land of milk and honey. The St. Johns were also a middling farm family. Twentyyear-old Mary St. John, the second eldest daughter of five children, received a teaching
certificate almost immediately arriving in Iowa. We examine a day in the life of Mary.
Schwieder (1977: 157) notes a typical day for Mary: “Baked two pies, two loaves of
bread and a fowl and 2 Johnycakes [sic], churned, mopped, Mary washed some calicoes,
rinsed our white clothes, iron[ed] some of them.” A month later, Mary notes another
typical day: “Finished ironing, baked bread and a cream pudding, cooked a chicken pot
pie, corn and potatoes for dinner, mopped, etc. Mrs. Seeley came early in the
morning…Have dressed 12 pigeons and 18 chickens today.” Aside from the endless
domestic work and household production Mary engaged in on a daily and seasonal basis,
what stands out in her diary is that in more than half of all the entries she mentioned the
work of her father and brothers.
What can be gleaned from the diaries of John W. Slemmons and Mary St. John
given that both were part of middling farm families in Iowa? First, while farming and
householding in Iowa involved relentless work to ensure success, families regularly had
visitors and they themselves visited neighbors and family. For agrarian households
socializing was usually mediated through work exchanges. Second, men and women’s
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work was differentially valued. John W. Slemmons failed to acknowledge the work of his
wife and daughters, only mentioning when marketing and purchasing commodities.
While annotating her daily work patterns, Mary St. John regularly acknowledged the
work of her father and brothers. To put it bluntly, men’s work was valued over women’s
work.
The daily and seasonal work patterns of nineteenth century farm men and women
were not bounded exclusively to the spatio-temporalities of the household and farm. The
Midwestern agrarian household was also bounded to world time and world accumulation
that centered on British hegemony. As the previous chapter argued the crisis and renewal
of capital accumulation of British hegemony found its solution in the frontiers of the
United States. To further explain the origins and development of petty commodity
production in Illinois and Iowa we need to analyze the ways in which the socio-ecology
of farming and householding developed in relation to American capitalism in the
capitalist world-economy.
The following chapter explains three interrelated developments. First, I explain
the origins of the transition to petty commodity production as product of world-ecological
transformations that included the consolidation of British hegemony (discussed in chapter
2), farm-making, deepening of market-dependence, and householding. Second, the
epicenter of the first American agricultural revolution was in northern Illinois and eastern
Iowa, along with southern Wisconsin. The origins of the agricultural revolution are found
in the Midwest prairies but found its fullest expression in the Great Plains. Finally, I
explain the origins of the modern Corn Belt and its attendant outcome of the petit
bourgeois yeoman farmer that centered in central and northern Illinois and the eastern
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half of Iowa. I argue that the outcome of the nineteenth century agricultural revolution
was a relatively prosperous, dynamic, and stable farming region in the heart of the Corn
Belt.
While chapter two centered on the transition from feudalism to capitalism and the
rise of British hegemony, chapter three examines the “transition to American capitalism”
or what might be called the American agrarian question. While scholars have focused
primarily on the northeast with their explanation of the transition (Merrill 1990; Vickers
1990; Clark 1991; Kulikoff 1992; Osterud 1993), another group has focused on the
Midwest in their explanation (Headlee 1991; Byres 1996; Post 2011; Bauerly 2016). I
seek to contribute to the transition debate by incorporating a world-ecological framework
for analyzing questions of gender, class, geography, and ecology. A world-ecological
framework moves beyond ideal-type conceptions of capitalism in favor of explanations
that explain cumulative and cyclical configurations of humans and the rest of nature over
the longue durée of historical capitalism. World-ecological agricultural revolutions
fundamentally transformed the spatio-temporalities of the capitalist world-system. World
time, world space, and world nature formed an organic whole constituting the American
agrarian question.
In this chapter, I explain the origins and development of the Corn Belt family
farm in the nineteenth century. It begins with the obstacles to advancing industrialization
in the United States. This fundamentally turned on the land question or the ‘Indian’
question. Resolving the land question resolved Britain’s developmental crisis while also
advancing industrialization in the United States through the violent construction of a
fresh frontier to produce cheap natures in the form of food and raw materials. Although

78

technically no longer a colony of Britain, the United States and Britain were inextricably
linked through economic interdependence, first in the in the South and Northeast and then
in the Midwest. Capitalist development moved beyond the stage of early modernity,
advancing the scale, speed, and scope of socio-ecological change. What took centuries to
transform independent commodity producers to petty commodity producers in the
northeast, took only several decades in the Midwest. Farm-making was an extraterritorial affair, incorporating cheap natures into the agrarian web of life. Next, I explain
farm women’s double burden that advanced the transition to petty commodity production.
The unpaid work of women, children, and the rest of nature enabled farm families to
purchase all the important mechanical reaper that made bread cheap again. Following
that, I examine the first American agricultural revolution originating in the Midwest and
finding its fullest expression in the Plains. The first American agricultural revolution, like
the Dutch and English revolutions, appropriated cheap natures from far and wide, and as
it developed transformed ecologies near and far. Lastly, I look at how the Corn Belt
emerged and its outcome for petty commodity producers. The Corn Belt family farm was
in a unique world-historical position that I characterize as dynamically stabile based on
the interrelations of household, work, and the market.
Frontier-Making as Environment-Making in America’s Midwest
Over the long nineteenth century both the world’s arable and pasture lands more
than doubled, increasing from “400 million to 950 million hectares” and “950 to 2,300
million” respectively (Cunfer and Krausmann 2016: 355). From the American Midwest
and Plains to South America’s pampas to the Russian steppes, these regions became
frontiers of cheap food. Cunfer and Krausmann (2016: 355) state that “the most important
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agricultural development of the nineteenth century was a massive and rapid expansion of
farmland in the world’s grasslands…feeding the nineteenth century’s 60 percent increase
in world population”. Such great transformations, however, did not occur in a vacuum.
Rather, there were part of the long-term, large-scale social change constituting the
capitalist world-ecology.
The ‘Indian’ Question
From the long sixteenth century to the nineteenth century European colonizers
and settlers violently dispossessed Native American tribes. For the first centuries of
contact Europeans exposed Native Americans to a variety of diseases, including cholera,
smallpox, and measles that led to demographic collapse, reducing populations anywhere
from a third to a half (Byers 1996: 193). As with the crisis of feudalism, the demographic
collapse in the New World became a force in the reorganization of work, reproduction,
and society. Successive waves of dispossession of Native Americans were followed with
waves of broken treaties and land policies that primarily benefited capitalists and the
state. Native American tribes were an obstacle to capital accumulation, necessitating their
removal. While primitive accumulation in the United States did not occur as it had in the
transition from feudalism to capitalism in Europe, primitive accumulation proceeded
nonetheless, with the principle target Native Americans.
Even after centuries of disease and unequal exchange, the land question still had
not been resolved. While disease ravaged Native American populations for nearly three
centuries, the techniques of expulsion became more deliberate and brutal in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In 1803, President Jefferson added over a million
square miles to the United States with the Louisiana Purchase. The newly purchased land
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became a dumping ground for dispossessed tribes. In 1830, the Removal Act was signed,
giving President Andrew Jackson the green light to deploy troops to systematically force
the “Five Civilized Nations of Indian tribes” onto a designated territory (Byers 1996).
Thousands of died on the journey alone in what became known as the ‘Trail of Tears’.
President Jackson, perhaps more determined than any prior president, sought to eliminate
natives and achieve manifest destiny. By way of the federal government the Black Hawk
War (1828-1932) had signaled the expulsion of Native Americans and the opportunity for
capital accumulation to proceed in the Mississippi Valley. No later than the 1840s had
most tribes been removed from the Midwest and exiled onto the Plains (Prince 1997).
While Native American populations were removed from the Midwest, the region
experienced an 85 percent increase in population between 1820-1830 (Prince 1997: 151).
Rough estimates suggest that the Native American population stood around 3-4 million in
1492; by 1860 the population had been reduced to 300,000 (Byers 1996: 207). The land
and “Indian” questions would be resolved with the violent force of the state and capital’s
need to accumulate.
The origins of the settler frontier were a clash of forms of living, knowing, and
doing. In 1887, the General Allotment Act or what is more commonly referred to as the
Dawes Act, institutionalized the elimination of property held in common. Tribal land that
was once held in common was now deemed to be owned by individual families. While
the Cherokee resisted individual ownership of land, the state enforced the new law of the
land to transform “reservation ‘Indians’ into individualistic farmers” (Byers 1996: 203).
This was not simply a solution to the land question, but it was a project to eliminate tribal
authority and native religions. In short, the Dawes Act signified the final chapter in
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resolving the land question in a long history of lies, deceit, dishonesty, and violence. The
federal government had resolved the land question by fundamentally restructuring social
property relations.
We will return to the important role of Native American tribes transforming
environments that enabled white settler colonialism to develop on the frontiers. For now,
the point remains that the origins of capitalism and capital accumulation in new territories
has been premised on the violent acts of the state and elite classes. As discussed in
chapter two, the transition from feudalism to capitalism entailed a fundamentally new
way of organizing nature, both in its perceptual and material forms, and concomitantly
who’s lives and forms of work were valued. Capitalist development, then, unfolds
through the interpenetration of opposites, ‘progress’ and ‘retrogression’ (Mies 1986) as
constituting the co-production of nature, the pursuit of power, and capital accumulation.
State, Capital, Nature, and the Labor Question
Remaking the American landscape was an environment-making project to
exclude certain forms of nature (Native Americans, bison, fire regimes, commons) as
emerging forms of nature (capitalists, land, and white settlers) were put to work with the
incorporation in what would become the Midwest frontier. To restructure the social
relations of property, federal land offices were set up around the growing nation-state to
auction off land to pay down debts incurred from the American Revolution. Under the
Land Ordinance of 1785, land throughout the young nation was surveyed and mapped in
order to create a system of private property. Surveyors were instructed to note property
boundary lines, soil qualities, forest cover, location of mines and salt licks, intersecting
waterways, etc. (Prince 1997). Surveying required highly skilled professionals that could
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navigate harsh environments while measuring to the best of their abilities the uneven
development of land and resources. The control and simplification of nature unfolded
through the zone of abstract social nature whereby the state, capital, and science
rationalized, delineated, and made legible land and resources. The great colonizing
projects of world-history have required map-makers and surveyors. It was also the case in
the Midwest.
While surveyors mapped the qualitative differences of the American landscape,
the commodification, and thus quantification, of land functioned as a strategy of debt
repayment and capital accumulation. In the nineteenth century land sales were primarily
used as a strategy for revenue generation. Between 1800 and 1820 Congress mandated
that public land sold be sold for at least two dollar per acre with a minimum purchase of
320 acres. The minimum acreage declined to 80 acres by 1817, but at two dollars per acre
was well out of the reach for most would be farmers (Gates 1960: 55). With no limit on
the amount of land one could purchase, land officers were incentivized to sell to fewer
wealthy investors who would purchase hundreds and thousands of acres compared to
many poor investors as revenues were based on the proportion of land sold (Gates 1960).
While state surveyors continued to map and actively construct the frontier, capitalists and
landholding companies were not far behind, in some cases were taking the lead, seeking
to profit from landholding (Bogue 1963a). Aided by cheap credit from banks and high
agricultural prices successive land booms emerged in 1818-1819, 1836, and 1855-1856
(Gates 1960). A recurring pattern of cheap credit and high agricultural prices went hand
in hand with land booms that were followed with severe contractions in farming. By the
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1830s, 28 million acres of public land was sold off to private individuals and companies
(Bauerly 2016: 38).
The government’s wholesaling of public land continued apace as a process of
defining nature. With the 1850 Swamp Land Act the federal government gave over
64,000,000 acres to states in the hope that they would drain marshy and flooded lands for
internal improvements and agricultural purposes (Gates 1960: 78). Wetland prairies were
said to breed malaria, mosquitoes, severe fevers, and were generally seen as unhealthy
environments (Prince 1997). They were problematic for farmers whose fields could be
flooded for long periods. The struggle to define nature was expressed in the conflicting
interests of the states and the federal government. States employed surveyors to map out
swamplands that then had to be approved by federal government officials. States often
claimed there was more swamp land than the federal government would designate under
the act. Land offices sold most of the designated swamp land to speculators for as low as
.10 cents an acre (Gates 1934: 102). States eventually used proceeds to build roads, create
schools and colleges, and reduce debts. While the intended purpose of the act was to
drain the wetlands to make farmers more productive, most did not have the capital or
were willing to pay for drainage. However, proceeds from the sales enabled the
development of community institutions. In this way, debt-led development compelled the
drive to map, measure, and quantify land, which in the case of swamp land, entailed
revenue generation to construct communities throughout the wetlands of the Midwest.
Cheap land was almost given away to speculators. To induce men to enlist in the
War of 1812, Congress passed acts to give land to those men returning from war in the
hopes they would farm. Congress guaranteed 160 acres to each man who fought in the
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war. These “military tracts” existed in Michigan, Illinois, Arkansas, and elsewhere. In
Illinois, there were 3,500,000 acres of military tracts set aside for veterans (Bogue 1963a:
39). Many of the veterans did not bother to cultivate the land they were assured and
eventually sold to speculators for well below the government minimum. John Tillson,
from Illinois, purchased more than 290,000 of military tracts, while two wealthy
speculators from New York acquired over 130,000 acres in Illinois (Bogue 1963a: 39).
Evidence suggests that most of the military tracts were not developed by veterans of the
war, but were purchased cheaply from speculators (Gates 1960; Bogue 1963a). The two
decades prior to the Civil War over a half million veterans were offered “40 to 160 acres
each and totaling more than 57,000,000 acres” (Danhof 1941: 330). Most of the military
tracts were sold below the government minimum of $1.25 through brokerage houses in
New York and Washington.
Mercantile capitalists turned speculators appropriated large landholdings through
their fortunes on the world cotton market. New York merchants facilitated southern
slave-produced cotton trade with Europe. By 1820, the United States had surpassed
India’s as the world’s leading cotton producer, fueling Britain’s ‘empire of cotton’
(Ponting 1991; Beckert 2014).17 American merchants accumulated wealth of the world
cotton trade, and built sound international credit, that they in turn invested in land
speculation in the Midwest (Post 2011). Slave produced cotton in the plantation South
linked to British and continental European industrialization and proletarianization
through American merchants spurred economic development in the Midwest. In this way,
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Cotton accounted for 54 percent of the total value of American farm exports
(Schlebecker 1975: 74).
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we can see how historical patterns of production and investment concentrated in the
centers of accumulation facilitate the incorporation of new frontier spaces constituting the
world-economy. The building of international credit enabled vast amounts of capital,
particularly from Britain and Germany, to fuel infrastructural growth, particularly in
railroading building and meatpacking.
As agricultural commodity prices increased financial investments and lending
increased. Midwestern banks, whom themselves borrowed from banks in the northeast
and Britain, facilitated lending to capitalists and eventual settlers. In the 1830s, during the
peak of speculation, the Public Land Office sold more than 17.7 million acres, much of
which was sold to speculators (Post 2011: 84; Post 1997). In 1837, as part of the
developmental crisis in Britain, a massive contraction of credit from the Bank of England
facilitated a chain-reaction across the Atlantic that abruptly ended expansion.
Northeastern banks reduced credit and weaker banks in the Midwest collapsed. When the
bubble burst and the crisis hit in 1837, farmers who purchased land prior to the crisis
were left with large mortgages, large debts accrued from the purchase of livestock and
farm equipment, and were required to pay for rising state property taxes. Speculators and
landholding companies waited until land values bounced back from the crisis. When land
values did bounce back farmers purchased land from speculators at a much higher price
than the federal minimum of $1.25 per acre (Post 1997: 222). In Iowa in the two decades
leading up to the Civil War roughly 80 percent of farmers purchased land from
speculators, not the federal government (Post 2011: 85). By the 1862 Homestead Act
roughly two-thirds of privately held land was held for speculation (Swierenga 1968: 45).
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As we will see, cheap credit via banks and the state were a central force in reshaping
farming and agriculture in American capitalism.
Speculators purchased land with the intent of quick returns on investment, not to
improve land. Land improvement for agricultural purposes was a risky investment for
most speculators. As early 1840s, perhaps sooner, landowning speculators were forced to
pay property-taxes in most states. The state of Illinois facing growing debts, “increased
taxes 20¢ per $100 in 1841, to 58¢ per $100 in 1845, and 67¢ per $100 in 1848, a jump
of over 70%...In Iowa, property-tax rates increased 66%, from 76¢ per $1,000 assessed in
value in 1854 to $1.25 per $100 in 1860” (Post 2011: 89). Speculators sometimes evaded
taxes, but eventually they were obligated to pay. No longer able to avoid property taxes,
landholding speculators began lending credit to squatters and tenants that sought eventual
farm ownership. Assessors appraised settlers at a higher value due to improvements on
the land (Bogue 1963a). Squatters and other settlers received loans from speculators with
high interest rates. Data on how many speculators loaned credit to settlers is limited.
However, we can say with fair certainty that commodifying the land was a class project
initiated by capitalists and the state.
While speculation throughout the Midwest was generalized, it ran amok
throughout Illinois and Iowa. In Illinois, leading up to the 1837 depression, speculators
purchased large landholdings in an accelerated fashion, and again in the boom years of
the 1850s. In Iowa, speculators took advantage of the rising land values occurring in the
1850s, purchasing more land than in previous decades (Bogue 1963a: 41). 18 Between
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Iowa was the leading state in the United States for land purchasers. During the 1850s
more than 12,000,000 acres were sold in Iowa at or above the $1.25 minimum. Second in
land purchased was Missouri at 7,500,000 acres (Danhof 1941: 330).
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1849 and 1856 speculators purchased more than 6,000,000 acres of the 12,000,000 acres
of public lands in Illinois (Gates 1931: 228). In Iowa during the 1850s more than half of
the 25,000,000 acres of land that passed into the private hands were owned by
speculators, with many residing outside of the state (Gates 1964: 67). Eastern investors,
often associated with universities like Brown and Cornell, purchased great quantities of
land throughout the prairies. According to Gates (1964: 68), “Never had there been such
a concerted rush for land as occurred between 1853-1858 and never had speculators
acquired such a large volume of land within one state as they secure in Iowa in this
period”. At the closing of the frontier surveyors had surveyed and distributed over
71,500,000 acres, divided almost equally between Illinois and Iowa (Bogue 1963a: 29).
Under the famous Homestead Act of 1862 settlers “acquired little land in Illinois and less
than a million acres in Iowa” (Bogue 1963a: 30). The concentration of land ownership in
hands of wealthy investors and speculators would structure the historical trajectory of
farming in the Midwest.
Land speculation in the United States ran ahead of railroad development, but
railroads were transformative to the frontier. The land business was one of the leading
sources of economic growth in the nineteenth century in the United States (Gates 1934).
The Illinois Central Railroad, as Gates (1973) claimed, was the greatest economic
enterprise at the time, actively constructing markets to serve farmers and proletarians.
Unlike many of the early speculators in the Midwest, the Illinois Central Railroad sought
to create farming regions throughout the Midwest to serve domestic and international
markets. The long-term profitability of the Illinois Central, and railroad companies in
general, required the increased production and circulation of commodities. The Illinois
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Central ran the first north-south line through Illinois, opening the vast Grand Prairies to
farming where large areas were water-logged. In 1860, average population density for
Grand Prairie counties were around 11. By 1870 population density had doubled (Atlas of
the Historical Geography of America). The value of land increased significantly over the
1840s, but especially in the 1850s. Illinois Central was selling prime Illinois farmland for
as high as $20 an acre in a period when government sales of public lands were less than
half that (Gates 1934). In part, railroads realized available land was becoming scarcer, but
also that the development of rail tracks through the region would inevitably increase the
value of land.
Railroad development in the mid-nineteenth century was pivotal to the
transformation of Midwestern meatpacking. The restructuring of the meatpacking
industry is best illustrated through Chicago superseding Cincinnati as the livestock
butcher of the world, a classic case of an emerging frontier contributing to the exhaustion
of the premier frontier. Cincinnati, proudly named “Porkopolis” for being the largest pork
packing center in the United States in the 1830s, was situated near several major rivers
that connected farms from Kentucky, Ohio, and Indiana. 19 Porkopolis’s hinterland of
livestock was tied to the river-based system of transportation. In those early years’ pork
packing was done on a small scale by merchant capital. Pork plants were numerous
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What made Cincinnati special was the development of the “disassembly” line that was
to be the foundation of mass production manufacturing in the twentieth century. A highly
specialized division of labor, later improved on by Chicago packers, advanced labor
productivity for packers. Additionally, Cincinnati pork packers were able to process
traditionally unusable body parts into commercial products like lard, glue, brushes,
candles and soaps (Cronon 1991: 229). Chicago would later on mechanize the
disassembly line to increase productivity on a never before seen scale. Prior to the Civil
War the center of the pork packing world was Cincinnati.
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across the Midwest along the Mississippi and Ohio rivers because of the lack of
refrigeration and hogs poor disposition to travel long distance. While small packers were
handling a few thousands hogs a season (winter to early spring), Cincinnati packing
houses produced 230,000 hogs, which was 22 percent of the region’s total packing
(Walsh 1982: 48). Even in 1850 Chicago only processed 20,000 hogs compared to
Cincinnati’s 334,000 hogs (Cronon 1991: 229). Following the panics of 1857 and 1873,
the meatpacking industry went through an uneven process of concentration and
centralization, eliminating smaller merchants, and restructuring the industry which had
becoming the leading branch of American manufacturing (Walsh 1982). Following the
Civil War, the “Big Four Packers”—Swift, Morris, Armour, Hammond—had controlled
the industry, specifically retail outlets, livestock prices, and profit margins in which the
federal government ineffectively regulated (Fink 1998). Early meatpacking operations
were local and small and lacked economies of scale. The upcoming capital-intensive
packers, the “Big Four”, began to restructure how livestock were produced, marketed,
and traded. Railroads played no small role in this development. Chicago as the
meatpacking frontier was at the center of these developments.
Several factors undermined the dominance of Porkopolis. What made Cincinnati
the center of pork packing was its geographical advantages in its location to major
navigable rivers that connected Corn Belt families, predominately the old Northwest,
who supplied hogs from hundreds of miles away. This advantage was now an obstacle
with the coming of the railroad revolution, opening Cincinnati to greater competition out
west. Such transportation revolutions have been fundamental to displacing premier
frontiers and giving rise to new frontiers by way of incorporating fresh cheap natures
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(Marley 2016). A second element was that most leaders of the industry were merchant
capitalists who were less aggressive than industrial capitalists that would come to
dominate Chicago and specialize in meat processing. Industrial capitalists overall were
gaining greater control over the economy, and thus were restructuring economies and
ecologies to meet their profit needs. Lastly, farmers in the surrounding region of
Cincinnati shifted from livestock to grain farming, concentrating on selling cereals
(Walsh 1982). The new Midwest, Illinois, Iowa, and Missouri greatly expanded livestock
farming beyond the levels of the old Midwest. These farmers marketed to mid-size cities
and eventually to Chicago. Agro-industrialization, then, developed through rural and
urban inter-regional competition, producing cheap nature complexes from greater
distances while undermining older complexes.
While Post’s merchant capitalists were a crucial link in resolving the land
question and the determination of social property relations in the Midwest, it is not
sufficient for explaining the complete transition to petty commodity production. Recall,
from chapter two, the emergence of British hegemony and its limits to accumulation
necessitated, indeed constituted, geographical expansion, incorporating cheap natures far
and wide. In the process of securing cheap natures British infused capital initiated
economic development in the United States. During the nineteenth century Britain was
the most important international source of capital investments for the United States
infrastructural and agricultural development (Hugill 2009). This was no neo-Smithian
moment. Ascending hegemons, like Britain in the eighteenth century, required a
systemwide expansion in the appropriation of cheap natures. By the turn of the nineteenth
century British agriculture and concomitantly industrialization and proletarianization was
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showing signs of exhaustion. By the 1830s a developmental crisis had matured in British
hegemony. The exhaustion of Britain’s agriculture turned on its own agrarian class
relations and intensified the metabolic rift between town-country. Resolving the
developmental crisis of Britain’s hegemony and the renewal of world accumulation
pivoted on the geographical expansion of the capitalist world-economy. As American
merchants privatized the frontier, British merchants quickly capitalized on these
opportunities. The Midwest was never solely America’s frontier, it was one of many
world frontiers constituting the modalities of world accumulation and world nature.
A Frontier of Cattle Kings, Landlords, and Tenants
Before delving into the transition from independent to petty commodity
production, it warrants examining the role of capitalist “farmers” in Illinois and Iowa.
Wealthy farmers immediately purchased the best farmlands around central and northern
Illinois. This area contained high quality productive dark brown silty soil with brown
subsoils, access to nearby rivers, and a healthy supply of woodlands. While speculators,
railroads, and landholding companies were powerful forces in the making of the frontier,
capitalist farmers were pushing the limits of farming in new ways.
The most well-known group of capitalist farmers were the notorious ‘Cattle
Kings’. As early as the first quarter of the nineteenth century, cattlemen acknowledged
the “lush prairie grass” that made Illinois, and eventually Iowa, the ‘feedlot empire’
(Whitaker 1975: 19). As early as 1820s, feeders via merchant packers were shipping their
livestock to New Orleans and to eastern markets. The cattle feeding business has always
been a frontier-making project. In three successive stages a historical pattern had
emerged: range country, feedlot, and market (Whitaker 1975). Range country, always
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pushing westward onto fresh grazing areas, shifted from Ohio and Kentucky to Illinois
and Iowa, and then finally to the Plains. Likewise, feedlot had followed a similar trend,
moving from eastern to western states. Although, interestingly enough, Illinois and Iowa
were able to remain the feedlot empire for more than century, in part due to its favorable
ecological conditions for producing cheap feed—corn and oats. Feeders in Illinois could
fatten cattle on cheaper prairie grass and corn at a much lower cost than feeders in Ohio
and Kentucky. Land values in Illinois were lower than Ohio, incentivizing cattlemen to
move westward. While eastern and international markets were important, western
markets open with successive mining booms.
Cattle kings purchased large tracts of land for raising feed grains to raise
livestock, like cattle and hogs. According to Gates (1973), these feedlots of the 1830s and
1840s were the early bonanza farms. These farmers could not realistically farm thousands
of acres individually so they hired labor and leased land to tenants. Difficulties in
managing wage laborers encouraged stockmen to lease land to tenants. Tenants mostly
engaged in raising corn and small-grains as feed for the stockmen’s cattle and hogs.
Cattle king John Sudduth from Springfield, Illinois had three farms. On all three farms,
likely farmed by tenants and wage laborers, 3,000 acres of corn were planted. Sudduth
fattened between 600 to 1,000 cattle on the corn from the three farms, and imported more
feed from other farmers (Gates 1973: 196). By 1840 central Illinois had established itself
as a feed grain growing region for its wealthy cattle kings. With each successive frontier
shift from range country to feedlot there was a corresponding increase in the
appropriation of cheap natures. However, some cattle kings dominated the industry
because of their ability to secure cattle that fattened quicker on less feed. The tendency,
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however, has been that capitalist farming was a resource- and capital-intensive project
that increased the organic composition of farming that in turn required the greater
appropriation of cheap natures.
The boom and bust cycle cattle kings experienced during the nineteenth century,
created many losers and few winners. High meat and grain prices during the 1850s and
1860s made many cattle kings profitable. The high prices of cattle outstripped the slower
increased costs of production. However, in 1873 agricultural prices bottomed out, forcing
some landlords who had borrowed heavily out of farming (Gates 1973: 201). The
problem for the cattle kings turned landlords of Illinois and to a lesser extent in Iowa was
that the cattle business tended to increase the value of land. This also impacted middling
and poorer farmers who were struggling to purchase their own land. The increasing cost
of land prohibited many from profiting from breeding and raising cattle, especially with
competitive cattle businesses to the west contained cheaper land. High land values in
Illinois and Iowa forced specialization in feeding operations (Gates 1973: 199). Isaac
Funk and Jacob Strewn were both millionaires when they died, while John Alexander
faced economic disaster as his cattle were infected with Spanish fever (Bogue 1963a: 94).
On the whole, there were more losers like Alexander than winners like Funk and Strewn.
The cattle business was for the wealthy who could afford the cost of investments in land,
cattle, and feed, not for the middle or poor farm families.
Isaac Funk, one of the more famous cattle kings, moved from Ohio to central
Illinois in 1826. By the 1840s Funk purchased over 27,000 acres of farm land in McLean
County, Illinois (Prince 1997: 133). Funk, like other feeders, began reaching westward to
Iowa and Missouri and to the south in Texas for cheaply sourced stock. These common
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stock cattle processed the corn faster than the cattle from the Corn Belt, turning corn into
fat at a quicker rate. He and others would purchase cattle at a year old, fatten them for
less than a year, and then sell to agents of industrial meatpacking firms. Reports suggest
that stockmen were profiting $24 a head of cattle (Whitaker 1975: 22). By the midnineteenth century Funk was selling cattle in large masses to the meatpackers in Chicago.
McLean County became an important Illinois county for the production of cattle. In the
1860, it raised 19,708 head of cattle, and by 1890 was raising 51,781 head of cattle (Atlas
of Historical Geography of America). Selling around a 1,000 cattle a year, and perhaps
even more hogs, to Chicago’s meatpackers, Funk was able to obtain loans and purchase
more cattle from far and wide. After years of working and building trust with
meatpackers, Funk began operating on a contract with one Chicago packing company
(Whitaker 1975). Funk was a forerunner in the prairies in many ways: purchasing more
land than most, having a keen eye for buying stock, and signing contracts with food
processors. Funk’s accumulation of wealth enabled him to purchase more than 4,863
acres from the Illinois Central Railroad and 8,000 acres from the government (Gates
1973: 204). The Funk family dynasty would continue to shape Midwestern agriculture
well into the twentieth century.
While cattle kings-landlords purchased many hundreds of thousands of acres
throughout the Midwest in the nineteenth century, how common was tenancy? By 1860,
one in five farmers were tenants in the Midwest (Post 2011: 86). From 1880 to 1900
tenant rates in the Midwest were on average lower than the United States average by
around six percent (Wright 1988: 186). In 1880, 31 percent of tenants farmed in Illinois
and around 24 percent in Iowa (Bogue 1963a: 62). In 1900, 39 percent of tenants farmed
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in Illinois and 35 percent in Iowa (Atlas of Historical Geography of America). Data on
tenancy rates prior to 1880 are sparse. The highest rates of tenancy were areas with the
greatest concentration of landownership, which happen to be the areas with the most
productive soils. The highest rates of tenancy were in central Illinois, with the lowest
rates in southern and extreme northern Illinois. Tenancy rates were lower in northern
Iowa. On the whole, in Illinois and Iowa, many tenants accumulated enough cash to
climb the agricultural ladder to owner-operators (Bogue 1963a; Gates 1973). Those failed
to accumulate the necessary resources moved further west. We can deduct from prior
research that those farmers that were able to purchase their own land in Illinois and Iowa
were better off resource wise. We might call this class the “petty bourgeoisie” of petty
commodity producers, analogous to those English yeoman farmers that emerged in a
better position during the transition from feudalism to capitalism.
This section has sought to demonstrate how the state and capital were dominant
forces in the organization of nature on the frontier. The democratic intention of Jefferson
to give land to yeoman farmers was an ideal that did not hold historically. Wealthy
speculators seeking to turn quick profits bought up land as the state dispossessed Native
Americans. Over the nineteenth century an agrarian class structure of landlords (cattle
kings), tenants, and petty commodity producers emerged. Its development, as the next
section discusses, engendered a world-ecological agricultural revolution.
Sodbusters: Farm- and Environment-Making on the Frontier
Farm-making on the American frontier was an environment-making process that
incorporated ecologies beyond the point of production, including plants, livestock, white
capitalists and settlers, and raw materials. Without a doubt, the making of the Corn Belt
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was an extra-territorial project whereby humans and the rest of nature flowed into the
fields and households of the region. Beyond the external cheap natures flowing into the
Midwest, we must also explain the dynamics of the farm enterprise and household as
inseparable to gender, ecology, and geography produced cheap food. If, as Post (2011)
claims that we must explain the social conditions of existence for petty commodity
production to explain its origins and development, then he fails to fully appreciate the
contradictory unity of production-reproduction and geography-ecology. If we are to
understand the transition to petty commodity production we must explain the agrarian
household as a gendered and ecological form of production and reproduction. The
following section explains the dynamic of the gendered division of labor that constituted
the transition to petty commodity production.
Ecologies of Extra-Territorial Farm-Making
Farm-making was perhaps the most difficult transition in the life-cycle of the
family-operated farm. It required capital, sweat equity, cooperation, forward thinking,
and more. But before the construction of the farm the household had to make a long and
difficult journey. Prior to leaving westward in a horse-drawn covered wagon, farm
families spent between three months to a year preparing—selling or giving away goods to
family and neighbors, men trained a team of horses and constructed the wagon, while
women sewed a cloth roof and organized the mobile household (Riley 1981). Men
overwhelmingly made the decision for the family to settle the western frontier. Women
were reluctant to homestead in unforgiving conditions (Schwieder 1977). Neighbors
prepared food and held large festivities for the departing family. The family would carry
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with them a set of resources and knowledge gained from years of familial networks and
neighborly exchanges that would assist them in their journey.
Settlers traveled by horse-drawn wagon along the National Road that stretched
from Maryland to Illinois. Travel by covered wagon was cheaper for families than by rail
or boat, but took considerably longer. For migrating farm families, the advantage of the
covered wagon was that they could bring household items and farm implements. Some
families inevitably brought with them too many household items, forcing them to scatter
those items along the wagon-train highway. In Iowa before 1840 settlers via wagon
“outnumbered those entering by steamboat nine to one” (Richman 1931, cited in Smith
1990: 196). After 1840, steamboats became the more popular form of transportation.
During the migration boom of the 1850s the steam ferry at Rock Island was making 100
trips daily (Smith 1990: 196). This is not to suggest poor farm families were the ones that
utilized wagons for transportation. In fact, poorer farm families did not have the capital to
migrate west. Migrating westward was prohibitively expensive, associated costs included
“transportation, animals, tools, seeds, provisions” (Riley 1981: 12). Most of the families
that migrated west had built up resources and had established themselves as a farming
unit. Farm men were generally not too young where they did not have the capital and
resources, yet they were generally not too old where the move would have been difficult
(Bogue 1963a). If feasible most families waited until children did not require so much
care work.
The horse-drawn wagon that would be the family’s shelter for the journey had a
gendered division of labor. Men took the reins, managing and driving the horses over
well-worn rough paths that the migrating families before them had taken. Women cared
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for the children, regularly organized the wagon for sleep arrangements, and prepared
food. It was preparing meals that was the most difficult task for women. Unlike the
kitchen she had left, where she had all the proper cooking appliances, on the wagon she
had to develop her creativity under less than ideal conditions. Kitturah Belnap was
exemplary of the creativity of pioneering women in her making of butter. At night,
Belnap milked the cows placing the milked filled buckets under the wagon overnight. By
the morning, she skimmed off the cream and placed in a churn. Placing the churn on the
wagon, the family road all day over bumpy roads and by the end of the day Belnap had
produced a tasty stick of butter (Riley 1981: 25). What also made cooking food difficult
for women was the lack of wood on the prairies, a formidable problem for farm-making
as well. When women were short on supply of wood she turned to mixing together “hay,
prairie grass, or slough grass” as a fuel for cooking (Riley 1981: 25). Preparing breakfast
or dinner a camp-fire could easily be interrupted by rainfall. The production of fuel was
perhaps the most taxing task of the journey that fell primarily to women.
Based on work patterns the journey was considerably more difficult on women
than men. When the family stopped, women were expected to cook meals, wash clothes,
care for the younger children, while men would mend harnesses and rest. After women
cleaned up the meal and reorganized the wagon, the family continued the journey, where
she remained busy sometimes driving the horses or herding livestock, caring for the
children, and improving the general living environment in the wagon. Women’s diaries
indicated that although women took on a greater burden of reproductive work, they rarely
complained of the hardships or inequity that characterized the gendered division of labor
(Riley 1981).
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When the family arrived to their plot the physical environment did not simply
exist, it was made. Braudel’s (1995) slowest structures of time, that of physical
geography-nature, were crucial in the development of farming and agriculture in what
would be the Midwest. During the ice age four glaciers, the Nebraskan, Kansan, Illinoian,
and the Wisconsin, had deposited rock debris and carved out rivers. The Holocene period,
following the Ice Age, had experienced alternating climatic shifts between cool-wet and
warm-dry conditions and an overall change in the patterns of soil and vegetation (Hudson
1994: 15). As a result of glaciation and burning of woodlands, along with agricultural
practices, by Native American tribes, the ecology of Illinois and Iowa was always
shifting, reflected in the patterns of plants, soils, animals, waterways, and human activity.
While on the whole soil quality was made favorable for farming, soil composition, along
with landscapes, were uneven. The rough and uneven terrain of the Ozarks buttressed
southern Illinois, while gently rolling hills and low-lying flatlands characterized central
and northern Illinois and major parts of Iowa (see figure 1).
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Figure 1
Digital Scholarship Lab, University of Richmond, Atlas of the Historical Geography of
the United States.
Structural time-space was enjoined with conjunctural time-space in the making of
the Midwest. Native American tribes regularly practiced setting fire to forests to drive out
big game (Saur 1950, 1958). Burning of woodlands provided bison with rich grasslands
to feed upon. Bison served multiple purposes to the socio-ecology of various groups. As
grasslands advanced and retreated herds of bison moved, making large trails for groups of
people to move more freely. Bison themselves were excellent carriers of plants, which
developed wherever bison migrated (Hudson 1994). The perennial vegetation of the
prairies generally has longer root systems than domesticated crops, allowing greater
access to nutrients in the soil at deeper levels, resulting in the greater build-up of biomass
than possible with domesticated crops (Glover et al. 2010). As burning continued for
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centuries woodlands retreated and prairies expanded. The retreating of woodlands would
be initially problematic for would-be settlers who relied on cheap plentiful supplies of
nearby wood, but the bioaccumulation of soil nutrients was formative in farm
productivity.
In the nineteenth century capital accumulation, state-power, and the production of
nature formed an organic whole, operating through time and space. A historically specific
configuration of humans and extra-human natures mobilized the socio-ecology of the
Prairies and Plains, transforming swamps and wetlands into major agricultural zones.
While the decision on where to homestead had been structured by land policies and
speculation, settlers arriving in Illinois and later Iowa had three ecologies to begin the
farm-making process: woodlands, prairies, and savannahs. Savannahs were said to have
represented the best of both worlds in that prairies were available for grazing livestock
and wood could be harvested nearby. Wood was a crucial resource in the farm-making
era.
We must consider the obstacles and opportunities in the socio-ecology of the
region before assuming that the march of civilization was a westward linear process.
Southern Illinois was settled in the 1820s and was inhabited much longer with
subsistence producers. Northern Illinois and the eastern third of Iowa were settled in
1840s. In the 1860s, and no later than the 1870s, was all of Iowa formed. Importantly, the
Grand Prairie of Illinois was the final region to be settled (Bogue 1963a: 8). The Grand
Prairie of Illinois “was originally a vast expanse of monotonously level grassland” (Hart
1991: 128). Settlers bypassed this region because it had inadequate supplies of wood,
drinking water, and transportation. Moreover, the area was very inhospitable with its
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concentration of mosquitoes and higher rates of malaria (Prince 1997). The Illinois
Central Railroad, after receiving a federal grant of over two million acres, sought to open
and settle the Grand Prairie, in what would become the heart of Illinois agriculture
(Bauerly 2016: 50). Although the last region to develop, settlement of the Grand Prairie
of Illinois was accelerated through the 1850s and was fully settled by the 1880s.
Settlement acceleration occurred in a world-historical set of developments, including an
increased demand of wheat from Europe, transportation revolution in canal- and railroadbuilding, and the great drainage projects.
In Iowa, most the state was covered in tallgrass prairies with smaller mixes of
woodlands. Settlers first arrived in southeastern Iowa in the 1830s after crossing the
Mississippi River that bordered Illinois and Iowa. Concentration of settlement along the
Mississippi River provided several advantages for settlers. The Mississippi River was a
crucial transportation network bounding Iowa to northern timber frontiers and southern
markets that that consumed and reexported its farm commodities. Iowa’s settlers, like the
settlers of Illinois, some of who migrated to Iowa, moved into regions that contained a
mix of prairie in woodland, although with much less timber available. Settlement moved
from southeastern Iowa, angling across the state, and completing settlement in the
northwestern section of Iowa by 1870s with large-scale drainage of wetlands (Schwieder
1996).
Our concern for this study is the tallgrass prairies of central and northern Illinois
and most of Iowa, a region that was the epicenter of two agricultural revolutions. Within
this ecological boundary existed wetlands and drylands. West of the Ohio River valley
opened to grassland prairies, including the Grand Prairie and beyond. Soils were highly
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fertile, and unlike the woodlands, were many feet deep. The tallgrass prairies were a rich
mosaic of grasses and forbs that formed a deep, extensive root system. The physical
environment of the Midwest, primarily Ohio to Iowa, was quite favorable for developing
highly productive agriculture. Annual average rainfall ranged 30 to 40 inches, doubling
the precipitation in the Great Plains (Schwieder and Fink 1999: 184; Hart 1991: 143). Not
only is there sufficient rainfall for growing a variety of crops, but that rainfall is
consistent throughout the summer months. Inconsistent rainfall and lack of access to
water were constraints to Plains farmers (Cunfer and Krausmann 2016). The silt-loam
soils that developed under the prairie grassland are ideal for farming. One study on Iowa
soils classified 26 million acres as Grade 1 agricultural land (Marbut 1934), which
“correlates well in amount and distribution with the black, fertile, prairie soils” (Smith
1990: 198). The rich soil can store moisture for long periods of time. Although the
landscape is characterized by both eastern woodlands and grasslands of the prairies, soils
ranged from a lighter color in the east to a black coloration (black color is an excellent
indicator for high content of organic materials) in the prairies, an indication of uneven
soil types, yet across the Corn Belt rich soil was highly fertile compared to eastern soils
(Bogue 1963a). Soil-building of this variety accumulated occurred over thousands of
years from a residue of prairie vegetation with expansive root systems (Smith 1990).
Disadvantages abound in the prairie lands. The open prairie grasslands were
treeless, the soil was impenetrable, and settlers were plagued with fever and ague.
Prairies fires were common (Whitney 1994). Timber had to be imported from the Great
Lakes region for the construction and maintenance of farms in the prairies (Cronon
1991). Malaria and other diseases persisted as low-lying swamp lands created ideal
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conditions for mosquitoes. The poorly drained black-soils of the Grand Prairie were not
farmed until the mid-nineteenth century, even while western regions had developed
farming in a major way. Poorly drained prairies would be a persistent problem until the
last two decades of the nineteenth century. Given this, ironically, the difficult farming
conditions during the first phase of white settlement would condition large-scale
transformations across the landscape, turning obstacles into opportunities and creating
one of the most productive farming region in the world. Braudel’s (1995) plurality of
time through space enables us to see the dialectic tension between geophysical
environments and civilizational-making projects.
While the socio-ecology of the Illinois and Iowa prairies were favorable, farmmaking was expensive and difficult. Recall, large portions of the best lands had been
purchased by speculators, cattle ranchers, and wealthy farmers. Even lower quality land
was expensive. By 1830 land-speculation had driven up the cost of farm-making, often
beyond the means of most farm families. To purchase 80-acres of Illinois land, clear and
fence land, tools and livestock, and to construct housing could cost between $500 and
$600. Over the next several decades, as speculators and land-companies maintained a
concentration of land, 80 acres of land alone in Illinois cost over $1,000 (Post 2011: 85).
In Iowa, the cost of farm-making was less, but not much (Danhof 1941). The result was
that most farm families, even with modest means, were forced to “borrow money to
purchase land and capital-equipment” (Post 2011: 86). Speculators and landlords, then,
transformed natures from cheap to dear with the privatization of landholding.
Speculators and land-companies were enthusiastic about lending money to farm
families, but rarely offered cheap credit. Land-speculators and their agents signed up
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settlers at the Federal Land Office. Settlers were then given one year to pay in full of the
newly acquired land with high interest rates ranging from “20% to 50%” (Post 2011: 86).
Additionally, most settlers had to purchase other materials, including draft animals and
livestock, seed, and implements which usually occurred through merchants and bankers
on short-term loans. The result was that settlers were forced to specialize in cash-crops,
usually wheat and corn-hogs.
As might be expected, for those unable to obtain credit, usually younger lessestablished settlers were forced into tenancy. Frederick Law Olmstead stated that
“laboring man, who has not one thousand dollars at command will probably find his
account in first accumulating the sum by working for others” (Danhof 1941: 325).
Tenancy occurred immediately with the newly established frontier and, as we saw, was
relatively stable throughout the nineteenth century.
The high costs (monetary and energy) of farming in the prairies did not end with
the purchase of the land. Clearing forests remained the most labor-intensive and
expensive activity settlers and would-be farmers would perform. The most common
practice was cutting timber and brush into “windrows during the winter,” and after two
years that timber would be used for rails and “the remained burned” (Danhof 1941: 340).
This method cost around $10 per acre. The quickest method for clearing the land was
chopping the timber in the spring after trees had been girdled the previous fall that would
ensure a more complete burning. This method cost around $14 or $15 per acre. Stump
removal was no easy task, requiring a team of horses or oxen to pull decayed stumps
from the ground. This process of “hacking, grubbing, and burning” did not last a few
years, but occurred over at least a generation (Nelson 1995: 11). After the initial clearing
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farmers contracted teams to break the soil. In the more forested areas breaking the soil
ranged from $3.50 to $5.00 per acre, while on the outskirts of the timbered areas soilbreaking cost between $10 to $12 per acre (Danhof 1941: 341). To save money, farmers
of modest means usually cleared the land themselves, although the cost of breaking soil
could hardly be avoided. However, most settlers were under the gun to make good on
debts and feed their families.
Settlers from the east had not experienced the soil conditions of the open prairies.
The deep dark soils of the prairies housed an expansive intractable root system that
challenged conventional iron plows which could not scour. Breaking the heavy prairie
soils was physically demanding and expensive, requiring up to six oxen, at least two men,
and capital. Custom plowing by wealthier farmers and landowners was common in the
farm-making era, at a rate between $2.00 to $4.00 an acre (Bogue 1963a: 71). Custom
teams could break one to three acres a day. By the 1840s, settlers were utilizing a John
Deere steel plow to break intertwined root system. Twenty years later John Deere’s plant
in Moline, Illinois was producing 10,000 plows a year (Smith 1990: 198). By the 1850s
plow manufactures imported steel from England that formed the moldboard. The lighter
cast steel plows required fewer draft animals to haul. From 1833 to 1900 over 28.6
million acres of Iowa prairie was converted into agriculture, releasing unknowable
amounts of stored carbon (Smith 1998: 94). What had been an ecological obstacle to
farm-making had spurred economic growth in plow production while improving “soiland labour-productivity” (Post 2011: 94), linking plow manufacturers in Illinois with
steel manufacturers in England.
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Like most aspects of farming there is a temporality involved in breaking prairie.
Farm men were most likely to practice plowing. Through trial and error farmers learned
that when breaking occurred in April thick grasses emerged in July. Breaking in the
summer was problematic in that there was not enough time for the sods to rot before the
fall. Eventually it was discovered that the best time of a year to break prairie was early or
mid-May to July (Bogue 1963a). Breaking prairies at this time of year ensured that sod
did not reappear in the summer but had sufficient time to decompose. If breaking is done
improperly, in terms of timing and the work itself, productivity suffers. Debates raged on
regarding the depth of plowing, whether it was more appropriate for the farmer to
practice shallow or deep plowing. In the Prairie Farmer, Illinois farmer Mr. Hardup
challenges L. Warren’s recommendation for deep plowing, stating, “every year has
brought additional proof to me that shallow breaking on the prairie is most decidedly the
best for all crops.” (original italicized). Mr. Hardup goes on to say that deep farming is
preferable after culture (weeding). In any case, farm-makers carrying debt could only
afford to break several acres in a season, hence many rushed to plant sod corn. Capitalist
farmers, because of their wealth, paid custom teams over several seasons so as not to rush
the breaking process, ensuring higher rates of productivity when farming ensued (Bogue
1963a). In this way, prairie breaking was a socio-ecological project structured by agrarian
class relations.
It is not an exaggeration to say the modern capitalist world-system was built on
wood. From the Dutch shipbuilding and silver and sugar production of the early
modernity to frontier North America, wood was life. In 1841, a writer in the Union
Agriculturalist and Western Prairie Farmer wrote that major obstacle to prairie
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settlement was a lack of access to timber (Bogue 1963a). No greater issue than fencing
grabbed as much attention in the agricultural press. In 1860 Iowa farmers spent
$26,000,000 on fencing, inclosing 4,784,000 acres (Danhof 1944: 172). Estimates
suggest that fencing cost about one-third of value of farms in the prairies. The voracious
demand for wood was unsustainable on the emerging frontier, especially on the open
prairies. Farmers traveled several miles to procure timber for fencing in their crops and
livestock, a costly activity in terms of energy use. One study argued that the average onehundred acre farm required “300 to 800 rods (1500-4000 m) of fencing” (Whitney 1994:
256). Resolving the timber-shortage unfolded through the incorporation of the timber
frontier of the Great Lakes. As farm settlement advanced west of the Mississippi River
into Iowa and beyond the “logging frontier cut its way through the pineries of northern
Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota” (Scarpino 1985: 19). Sturdy white-pines flowed
down the Mississippi River, sometimes covering “ten acres of water and contain millions
of board feet” (Scarpino 1985: 20). By the 1870s sawmills had sprouted up throughout
Iowa’s hinterlands and along the Mississippi River. The farming frontier, then, became
an important outlet market for the northern Midwest timber frontier.
Timber fencing was prohibitively expensive for most farmers. Farmers began a
creative trial-and-error process with fencing. During the 1850s hedging was a common
cheap form of fencing. Hedge fencing had been common in England and Europe,
allowing immigrants to transplant their hedging methods to the prairies. Osage orange
was the most common plant forming the hedge. A native plant of Arkansas and perhaps
Texas, Osage orange was exported to the prairies as a cost-effective material of fencing.
The initial outlay was “eight to fifteen cents per rod”, but many farmers complained of
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the expensive upkeep (Bogue 1959: 119; Bogue 1963a: 78). Ditch, post-and-board and
wire fencing were also common during the settlement period, but were more expensive.
By the 1870s, barbed wire had resolved the fencing problem. J.F. Glidden and Jacob
Haish began mass producing barbed wire in DeKalb, Illinois. DeKalb Fence Co.
produced all sorts of wire fencing, but made a special line of fencing for hogs, an
important and growing market in the Corn Belt (Prairie Farmer 1897). In the 1870s wire
was priced at twenty cents a pound and by the 1890s had dropped to two cents a pound
(Bogue 1963a: 81). Barbed-wire not only resolved the fencing question in the treedeficient prairies, but was constitutive “in the creation of a multi-million dollar industrial
complex, the American Steel and Wire Company of New Jersey, and the monopolization
of 96 per cent of all barbed wire manufacturing facilities within one giant company”
(McFadden 1978: 466). Once again, the socio-ecological obstacles to farming in the
Midwest had generated new opportunities for agro-industrialization. The emergence of
farming in the Midwest, however, was predicated on the external flows of cheap nature.
The frontier enclosures, then, not only took hold with speculation and landholding
companies, but also through the physical enclosing of farmlands. Fencing was indeed
revolutionary. In the open prairies, where timber was scarce and expensive, agricultural
development accelerated. The biggest improvement was barbed wire’s ability to prevent
cattle and other livestock from damaging crops. Farmers frequently complained of the
damage of cattle on their corn. The enclosure of farmlands, as had been the case in
England and elsewhere, increased livestock productivity, allowing breed improvement
and greater efficiency in feeding (Hornbeck 2010). Illinois and Iowa farmers greatly
expanded and specialized in livestock production. Concomitantly, land values across the
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Prairies and Plains increased as private property became more delineated. Over the period
from 1880 to 1900 there was an increase in overall production as more land came under
the plow, as well as an increase in productivity. Most of these changes, however,
occurred in the period between 1880 and 1890 (Hornbeck 2010). There is standing debate
of whether barbed wire directly affected crop productivity or whether incorporating the
drained wetlands was responsible for these changes. In any case, the fencing revolution
transformed the ecology of the prairies by allowing the strict separation of crop and
livestock, enabling the transformation of the prairies into the Corn Belt.
Farm-making was a continual process in which families constructed and
maintained corncribs, barns, outhouses, etc. In McLean County, Illinois, the average
value of farm lands and buildings per acre was $9 in 1850. In Washington County, Iowa,
the average value per acre was $6 (Minnesota Population Center). Those farming in
northern Illinois in the 1840s and 1850s and northern Iowa in the 1850s and 1860s were
committed to producing wheat (Bogue 1963a: 124) (see graph 1 and 2). Spring wheat
were said to have been most productive in these areas.
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Figure 2
Digital Scholarship Lab, University of Richmond, Atlas of the Historical Geography of
the United States.
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Figure 3
Digital Scholarship Lab, University of Richmond, Atlas of the Historical Geography of
the United States.
While central Illinois and central and southern Iowa are able to grow both spring
and winter wheat, it is more profitable for farmers to raise corn and livestock (Abbott
1861). In central Illinois, Sangamon and Morgan Counties produced more than a million
and nearly 800,000 bushels of corn in 1839, respectively, the most of any Illinois
counties (Digital Scholarship Lab). In Iowa, many eastern and southern counties
produced more than a million bushels of corn in 1859 (Digital Scholarship Lab). While
the western migration of people and corn was evident throughout the mid nineteenth
century, there was an intensification of crops, but especially corn and hogs.
Each region was dedicated to commercial farming as specialization ensued.
Specialization, however, did not simply mean the elimination of mixed- or diversified
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farming. In fact, diversified farming increased in the last quarter of the nineteenth
century. Most petty commodity producers produced a myriad of crops such as wheat,
corn, oats, barley, hay and livestock such as swine, cattle, and poultry. Diversity in
commodity production protected farm families against the vagaries of market and nature.
Importantly, as this section and the previous section have made clear, land
became commodified in the nineteenth century Midwest. Not only were speculators and
landlords driving up the value of land, but the ecological conditions of the Midwest posed
many obstacles to farming that when combined with the economic demands of the worldeconomy transformed natures from cheap to dear. For Midwestern farmers, the cost of
entry into own-operated farms was high. The privatization of land and the corresponding
increase in the cost of ownership of that land results in market-dependence or “sell to
survive” (Post 2011). Undeniably, social property relations structured the transition to
petty commodity production in the Midwest and Plains.
Women’s Double Burden in the Transition From Independent Production to Petty
Commodity Production
The development of capitalist social property relations was only one, albeit an
important, moment structuring the transition to petty commodity production. As the
forces of production in farming were revolutionized productivity and specialization
advanced. Those farmers that were able to mechanize and increase labor productivity
were more likely to reproduce their conditions of existence. Those that were not able to
successfully adapt to market-competition were forced to sell their land, joining the ranks
of semi-proletarianized or proletarianized labor. The road to petty commodity production
and proletarianization were fundamentally structured by the law of value.
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According to Headlee, Byers, Post, and Bauerly, successful reproduction of petty
commodity producers was conditioned on the ability of farm men to advance labor
productivity, a process that resulted in the deepening of market-dependency. But if we
are to fully to explain the transition to petty commodity production and its development,
we must appreciate and historicize the paid and unpaid work of women and the rest of
nature. Wallerstein and Smith (1992: 254) argue that “In a capitalist system, wages can
never be the sole or even principal mode of payment of the vast majority of the world
workforce. Wages must always be combined with other forms of income.” In a similar
vein, Dunaway (1995: 92) states, “As it incorporates new zones of the globe, capitalism
embraces two antithetical labor recruitment mechanisms (1) an historical proletarianizing
of male into wage laborers who produce commodities for the market and (2)
simultaneously historical generalization of non-waged labor that is overwhelmingly
conducted by women in arenas that are never fully integrated into the cash economy.”
While Wallerstein and Smith (1992) were focused on proletarian wages, it is not a far
stretch to make the comparison of income derived from farm men’s commodity crops and
women’s productive labor. In fact, Dunaway explains this development in the antebellum
South. In the nineteenth century Midwest, the origins and persistence of petty commodity
production operated through women’s double burden.
If we are to understand the necessary conditions of the operation of the law of
value we must consider the work of women and the rest of nature. The dynamism of
capitalism as a unique surplus appropriating historical system has forced households into
joining together multiple productive and reproductive forms of work in the “economics of
survival”. This is most clear in the case of the “farmer’s wife”. I argue that the transition
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to petty commodity production in the mid-nineteenth century was a product and producer
of women’s double burden. The emergence of petty commodity production had as much
to do with debt-driven farm-making and mechanization of grain harvesting, as it had to
do with patriarchy, gender inequity, and undervaluing of women’s work. As agrarian
feminists have rightly pointed out, the experience and contribution of farm women has
been left out of the history of agricultural development in the United States (Sachs 1983;
Fink 1986; Kulikoff 1992; Jellison 1993; Osterud 1993; Adams 1994; Neth 1995;
Schwieder 1996).20 Our purpose here is to explain the transition to petty commodity
production in the Midwest as part of an ecological, geographical, and gendered historical
process.
The agrarian gendered division of labor, then, was also a moment structuring the
transition to petty commodity production. As the initial farm-making stage passed, men
and women engaged in different forms of work with differing demands. Men focused on
crop production, mostly wheat, corn, hogs, oats, and hay. They mowed hay and weeded
corn fields. In short, their work patterns were structured towards the production of
primary farm commodities for market exchange. As Post and others point out, the law of
value governed the relations of farm production for petty commodity producers, forcing
farms to specialize commodity production, introduce new tools and methods, and
accumulate capital. This was certainly true for most Illinois farmers by the 1840s, and no
later than the 1850s in Iowa. Their survival, at least in part, pivoted on deepening marketdependence through obtaining credit to purchase “labour-saving tools and machinery”
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Bogue (1963a) seminal work on the transition From Prairie to Corn Belt does not
include the experience and work of farm women. More than three decades later Hudson’s
Making the Corn Belt women are curiously absent from making the Corn Belt.
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(Post 2011: 227) to advance labor productivity and temper the labor crunch associated
with harvest season.
If nineteenth century Midwestern farming was made possible through highinterest loans, how did farmers service these debts? In a word, wheat. As “civilization
crop”, wheat was both a domestic and international commodity, an almost guarantee in
returns as bread and flour was essential for the proletarian diet. Midwestern farmers
produced wheat for the national and world markets to service debts. After hogs, wheat
fetched the best prices on the market. The nineteenth century wheat complex was a
profitable opportunity for farmers and implement manufacturers, spurring economic
development in the United States and Europe. The transition from independent household
production to petty commodity production is most explicit in the production of wheat.
Wheat became the foundation of the transition to petty commodity production in
the Midwest and the first American agricultural revolution. A confluence of forces was at
play. First, as discussed in chapter two, British and much of European agriculture was
stagnating, threatening the advancement of proletarianization. Second, and directly
related, was the increasing reproductive crisis of Britain’s and Europe’s industrial
working-class. In order for Britain to advance proletarianization under increasingly crisis
conditions of the working-class, the Anti-Corn Law League abolished the Corn Laws in
1846 (Araghi 2009), opening import markets in grains. Russian crop failures opened the
opportunity for American farmers to realize higher prices for wheat during the 1850s.
Given the rising costs of housing and unions success in obtaining the male breadwinner
wage, cheap wheat was a necessary condition for advancing proletarianization. Third,
following Post (2011), the high cost of farm-making, related to both private property and
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lack of cheap timber, created a large middling class of farmers in debt. The ‘economics of
survival’ necessitated that farm families deepen their market dependence through
commercialization and specialization, a process that compelled farmers to sell in order to
survive. The solution for farmers was to produce more wheat for national and
international markets.
Two farm-related developments that were fundamental to wheat as foundational
to the twin processes of the transition to petty commodity production and the nineteenth
century American agricultural revolution. First, Cyrus McCormick’s mechanical reaper
was said to have “made bread cheap,” again (Olmstead and Rhodes 2008). Prior to the
mechanical reaper, farmers used a hand-tool called a cradle to reap wheat. A reaper could
yield between ten to twenty times more than the cradle (Mazoyer and Roudart 2006:
360). “With a cradle, one person could reap two to three acres per day, with additional
labour being expended on raking and gathering the cut wheat. The horse-drawn,
mechanical reaper combined the tasks of reaping and raking, increasing the acreage a
single person could harvest to twelve acres per day, an increase in labour-productivity of
approximately 75%” (Post 2011: 94). Horses replaced oxen for motive power as they
were nimbler, faster, and “moved at a steadier-pace” (Danbom 1995: 112). Taken
together, the wheat complex forming initially in northern Illinois, Iowa, and southern
Wisconsin increased labor productivity, reducing “the number of worker-hours required
to produce an acre of wheat from thirty-five in 1840 to twenty in 1880” (Danbom 1995:
112). While wheat acreage doubled over this period (Gates 1960: 287), women’s unpaid
labor increased, having to feed ten men threshing team four or five meals a day for two to
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three weeks. Indeed, the adoption of the mechanical reaper and use of threshing teams
hardened the gendered division of labor.
The second and related development of making bread cheap was resolving the
ecological bottleneck of wheat. Following the Mann-Dickinson (1978) thesis, Post (2011:
96) rightly points out that “the natural obstacles to capitalist social relations in
agricultural made the adoption of the reaper necessary”. 21 Wheat’s ‘production time’ is
amongst the longest, upwards of forty weeks. The ‘labor time’, however, was rather short
with the largest bottleneck in harvesting. The material demands of harvesting wheat
required that the process be completed in two weeks, or else face spoilage and large crop
failure. During harvest season the demand for wage-labor was high, constraining an
already smaller labor pool. Soaking up all available proletarians in the countryside,
capitalist farmers employed wage labor year-round paying out higher wages than was
possible on smaller farms. The shorter temporality of wheat’s potential to spoil
conditioned the purchase of mechanical reapers. The purchasing of the mechanical reaper
meant increased mechanization (e.g. riding plows, harrows, and grain drills) (Danbom
(1995), advanced specialization, and a hardening of the gender division of labor. Illinois
and other Midwestern states were at the forefront of the origins of the first American
agricultural revolution as part of a world-ecological revolution in the making. We will
return to the revolutionary force in the next section.

21

The Mann-Dickinson thesis states that the disjuncture between labor time (planting and
harvesting) and production time (when ‘nature’ takes its course) forces labor to lay idle,
which “due to the seasonal nature of labor requirements…can give rise serious
employment and recruitment problems” (Mann 1990: 39).
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While the wheat complex appeared to be at the center of the transition to petty
commodity production, women’s double burden was the pre-condition of the transition.
Two major developments shaped women and men’s farm work in the nineteenth century.
First, increased commercialization of farming restructured men’s labor time around the
production of commodity crops. This process has occurred in western Massachusetts in
the early nineteenth century (Clark 1979) and several decades later in upstate New York
(Osterud 1991). In the Midwest prairies, the transition occurred unevenly in the 1840s in
Illinois and 1850s in Iowa. In the process, men spent less time performing subsistence
work for home consumption and neighborly exchanges, although cooperative farming
and exchange continued well into the twentieth century. Concomitantly, farm women
moved partially out of the production of commodity crops, focusing more on domestic
work and home production (Sachs 1983). As market-dependence grew among petty
commodity producing households, however, men’s productive labor became more
valued, while women’s productive labor was made invisible (Ankarloo 1979). 22
Second, home production was an essential income producing activity women
performed. Home production, like butter- and cheese-making, selling or trading eggs, and
sewing clothes to merchants and neighbors all generated income and/or lowered
household expenditures. Household production increased during the nineteenth century as
part of a combination of growing debts and cheap industrial manufactured household
items were imported to rural towns. While household production was essential for the
transition to petty commodity production, by the end of the nineteenth century industrial
manufacturers began appropriating women’s dairy work (Sachs 1983). Industrialization
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On capitalist farms women rarely engaged in barn or field work.
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in the nineteenth century unfolded initially through women’s outwork and then later
displaced women from productive labor. The increasing commodification of everything
altered the income-producing activities of women’s contribution to the agrarian
household.
If farm men were working primarily with commodity crops, what were farm
women doing? In a word, everything! From domestic work to household production to
farming, women were crucial to the survival of the family farm. Diversity in the forms of
women’s work gave stability to the agrarian household, as much as diversity in farming
gave stability to the vagaries of the market and weather. Without a doubt, the nineteenth
century transition from independent farm production to petty commodity production
passed through women and the rest of nature. And without a doubt, patriarchy and the
double burden constituted that process in the mid-nineteenth century.
Farm men and women allocated their work among three domains: the fields,
where men, with the “help” of women, were responsible for commodity crops; the barn,
where men and women often worked together to care for livestock and maintain a garden;
and the house, where women overwhelmingly performed domestic work, preparing food,
cleaning, taking care of children, sewing clothes, etc. (Osterud 1993: 19). The spaces of
work remained flexible, depending on the demands of household chores, livestock, and
crops.
When the head of the household, the male farmer, could not meet the physical
labor requirements of the field crop or livestock operation he called upon his wife and
children to help out. “Helping out” was a short-term strategy the household utilized to
limit expenditures on wages paid to hired men. Helping out entailed driving a team of
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horses for plowing, picking corn, and putting up hay (Neth 1995). Gender expectations
were such that farm wives free available labor could be called upon by their husbands at a
moment’s notice to help in the field, even while they were busy cooking, doing
housework or gardening. Stopping or dropping what women were working on to help
men indicated that what was important were men’s work in commodity crops. For the
most part, farm men did not reciprocate in helping women in domestic work. Household
chores did not decrease when women helped men with livestock or field crops (Sachs
1983). Helping out involved completing domestic chores on top of working the fields.
To be clear, differences in the allocation of farm men and women’s time in the
field differed based on class and ecology. Women of the household of capitalist farmers
rarely worked in the fields, concentrating their time on household production. Capitalist
farmers utilized waged labor and tenants. In the Corn Belt labor allocation of men and
women’s work was diversified due to the diversity and demands of a variety crops.
Planting and harvesting seasons women and children were essential sources of labor. One
study concluded that prior to the Civil War, young children and teenage females labor
contributions was “the equivalent of one and one-half to two months’ wages of a hired
hand in the Midwest” (Craig 1991: 75). While women in the Corn Belt contributed to
labor in the fields, it was half as much as most specialized dairy farms (Craig 1991; Neth
1995). In the Dairy Belt, labor-intensive specialties like dairying required women to
allocate significant time to barn and field work. There was greater equality between men
and women on specialized on dairy farms as this required both men and women to work
every day in the barns, milking, churning butter, and making cheese (Osterud 1991). In
the Wheat Belt women and children worked less in the fields due to higher levels of
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mechanization and an intense seasonal labor demands that could only be met with waged
labor (Neth 1995: 22-23). The Corn Belt, as usual, was the middle ground between
nearly gendered exclusive patterns of field work and the nearly full integration of women
and children into crop and livestock production. The diverse middle ground of the Corn
Belt ensured greater durability during successive farm crises.
Farm women’s barn work generated necessary income for the family. Women
regularly produced and sold butter, cream, eggs, and chickens (Schwieder and Fink 1999:
193). They marketed surpluses to pay for household goods, sometimes outside the cash
nexus. Marketing entailed women transporting eggs to the local retailer who would ship
the eggs eastward. Women often traded eggs for groceries and other household items
(Fink 1986). Egg money allowed women to receive money if needed, or more often than
not to trade for flour, shoes, or clothes. Local merchants would keep an account for each
farm woman, but record keeping was casual and not precise. Merchants could extend
credit for months for women. What became known as “egg money” was the product of
women’s work. Egg money was the equivalent to the grocery bill, but in some cases more
than that (Neth 1995). Based on male diaries it seems that women’s egg money was
rarely accounted for in household income. 23 In part, this was due to the fact that as soon
as women marketed their commodities they usually purchased household items. In the
transition to petty commodity production, as men concentrated more energy into
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This could be a result of several factors. First, in most cases egg money was used
immediately to purchase household items. Second, women’s household production of
commodities were frequently used in trade between merchants or neighbors, thus
appearing outside of the cash-nexus.
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commodity crops, women’s work of “poultry-keeping and butter-making” (Osterud 1993:
22) were seen as nonessential and were periphery to the household.
Farm women’s production of butter was an important economic contribution to
the household. Women churned hundreds of pounds a butter a year in which they
marketed throughout the year. When butter prices were low women marketed more
cream, allowing flexibility in production and marketing. Iowan farm woman Emily
Gillespie recorded in her diary on May 19, 1870, that “she sold 34 pounds of butter for
$6.80” and on the same day she purchased “2 ½ yards crash (62 cents), soap (25 cents),
broom (35 cents) hat (34 cents), halibut (33 cents), cheese (35 cents, lemons (15 cents),
salt (30 cents, and shoes for James ($3.50)” (Nunnally 1989: 564). By women marketing
their surplus butter they were able to pay for household items. But butter-making and
marketing was not simply supplemental to the household, it was crucial for its prosperity.
In 1870, James and Emily Gillespie sold $551 in farm commodities, including wheat,
corn, oats, butter, and cheese. That year corn brought in $49 and butter $77.70 (Strand
1942, cited in Nunnally 1989: 568). The cash value for butter in some years exceeded the
cash value of corn.
While women’s dairy work was an essential economic contribution to the
household, their dairy work was soon devalued as a part of the industrialization of the
dairy industry. The major transformation in the industrialization of dairying in the
Midwest and almost uniformly throughout the United States and Atlantic world-economy
(Shortall 2000) occurred in the development of butter factories (Shortall 2000). During
the 1870s, commercial creameries began purchasing milk from farmers, cutting checks
directly to farm men, not women. Creameries removed the actual production of butter
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from the individual farm woman. The scale of production greatly increased with the
industrialization of butter-making. While farm women might produce a couple hundred
pounds of butter a year, creameries were producing well over 50,000 pounds (Nunnally
1989: 559-560). Eastern markets were willing to pay for uniform quality butter, that
“country butter” often failed to deliver. The development of commercial creameries,
increased regulations, professionalization of dairying, shifted dairy work from women to
primarily men. Agro-industrialization of the dairy industry, then, increased the
capitalization requirements of dairy farming while displacing women from that work.
Commercialization, led-by experts and industry, emphasized that dairying should be
scientific and rationalized. According to experts, the production of women’s “country
butter” was “unscientific, inefficient, unprofitable, and of inferior quality” (Nunnally
1989: 561). Farm men in relation to the emerging dairy processing industry appropriated
the traditional work of women.
The domestic ideology became an important force in making subjectivities. As
part of the Mie’s second round housewifization in the longue durée of capitalism, the cult
of domesticity imposed patriarchy and gender norms onto not only urban proletarian
households but rural farm households as well. In a Wallace’s Farmer column written by
Mrs. Wiscord of Tama County, Iowa on making the home more attractive, she wrote,
“There are several things that are absolutely essential, namely an eye for harmony in
arrangement, to know just what will harmonize to make a complete whole. The paper,
paint, carpets and furniture must harmonize, so that the effect as you enter a room is
restful and soothing.” As early as 1829, home manuals like The American Frugal
Housewife cautioned women to be attentive to the problem of waste. In it, Lydia Child
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wrote, “The true economy of housekeeping…is simply the art of gathering up all the
fragments, so that nothing is list. I mean the fragments of time, as well as materials”
(Andrews and Andrews 1974: 317). Food waste, such as grease and fat was turned into
raw materials for making soap. By emphasizing the home as women’s space, the
domestic ideology made women’s productive work invisible, constructing women as
symbolic housewives, even while in practice they carried the double burden.
Women shouldered nearly all the domestic labor of the household. Perhaps the
most time consuming and life-making work was food processing and cooking. The
production of use-values in the form of food derived from women’s work in gardens. In
most cases, gardens were quite large on farms, feeding not only the immediate family but
neighbors as well. Women grew vegetables, fruits, and herbs that improved the diet of
families. Women and children gathered wild herbs and tree slips to plant in the garden
and around the household. Maintaining a garden required constant effort in weeding and
picking on the part of women and children (Riley 1981). In the nineteenth century, farm
women’s relationship to food required processing, storing, and preparing, a process that
would change as packaged meals and restaurants would lighten the work of feeding large
families multiple meals a day.
The processing of food was a creative and time-consuming task of women.
Processing raw materials into consumable goods was concentrated during the summer.
Riley (1981: 60) details the myriad of raw materials women transformed into consumable
goods: “Tomatoes were covered with red wax and placed in cans. Cucumbers were salted
down in big crocks. Cabbaged was converted into sauerkraut in huge wooden barrels.
Vegetables were cleaned and carefully deposited in the root cellar. Fruiters were stored in
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crocks, were canned…Apples were wrapped in paper or hay, cut and dried, or cooked
into apple butter.” In the fall, when men butchered a hog, women turned a single
organism into multiple goods, including sausage, lard, bacon, ham, etc. (Schwieder and
Fink 1999). Canning meat and rendering lard was a two-week long process in which the
woman of the household along with women of the community participated. A butchered
steer resulted in hundreds of jars of meat, while a hog entailed canning, curing, and
handling (Fink 1986: 48). Canning meat was the most time-consuming of the food
process chores. One farm woman commented on the process of canning meat: “We
canned in a boiler…They will hold sixteen quart jars at a time, but you have to boil it
three hours, and it takes an hour to come to boil. That’s four hours. It went that way for
days. Then you made sausage. You had to grind all that” (Fink 1986: 49). By the end of
the summer and into the fall women filled the root cellar with food that fed the family
through the winter and spring. Women’s work in food processing was rather incredible
considering the conditions of production under which they labored.
While food processing was primarily seasonal work, preparing meals was a yearround task. Women and their daughters regularly prepared three to four meals a day. For
cooking meals women regularly hauled in wood and water. A constant supply of wood
was needed to fuel stoves for cooking meals and then cleaning dishes. The workload
intensified during the harvest season when women had the burden of cooking larger
meals for a custom team. For farm women, threshing season brought excessive work.
Threshing could take up to two to three weeks per farm, depending on the size of the
farm and crop. Farm women were expected to keep clean house and sleeping quarters for
men. Moreover, women had to clean their clothes and feed them. One farm woman
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recalls baking ten loaves of bread every day during the threshing season (Fink 1986:
152). Farm women made, served, and cleaned up three to five meals a day were to the
crew. In one case food preparation started as early as 3:30 a.m (Schwieder and Fink
1999: 194). Supper might begin at nine or ten o’clock at night. Women served a prelunch meal to men out in the field, allowing her to escape a hot kitchen, but requiring that
she juggle a hectic schedule of domestic and field work. Farm women were judged by
other women and men on the quality of their meals. While Post (2011) would consider
the judgement of women’s meal preparation a subjective force, as a relationship of the
division of labor, it can hardly be ignored for reinforcing the gendered relations of social
reproduction. While the mechanical reaper and thresher made have increased labor
productivity in the fields, it also increased the unpaid work of women during threshing
season.
In the early-pioneer era, stored-bought clothes were limited to wealthier families.
Seamstresses were often hired by wealthy farm families to lower women’s labor time
spent on making clothes (Strasser 1982). Most farm women made the clothes every
member of the family wore. Starting with plants and animals, farm women appropriated
flax and wool to turn into thread, a process that took hours of cleaning and “combing” the
materials. After forming the flax and wool into thread, women had to weave the thread
into cloth. “This cloth was then colored with dyes that women produced themselves from
plants such an indigo…red sumac” (Riley 1981: 67). Afterwards, farm women sewed by
hand every article of clothing. For several decades women handstitched clothes for their
families. By the 1850s merchants and dry-good stores popped up around river towns and
began supplying cheap yard goods and other materials for making clothes (Riley 1981).

128

Women were eager to purchase cloth-making materials as this reduced the necessary
labor time for producing clothes for the family. But when cheap imports were available
and household incomes increased due to women’s productive labor, they purchased from
town merchants, deepening market-dependent relations.
While the McCormick reaper was becoming more common on Midwestern farms
in the 1850s, Singer’s treadle sewing machine was replacing the iconic spinning wheel.
Home cloth production was revolutionized by treadle sewing machines by drastically
reducing the number of hours’ women spent sewing clothes by hand (Riley 1981). By the
second half of the nineteenth century men’s clothes were produced by manufacturers who
initially subcontracted to women in a “putting out” system that allowed cheap clothes to
proliferate (Strasser 1982). This would allow women to dedicate more time to income
producing activities like making butter and cheese or expanding the poultry operation, or
produce clothing for neighbors. During the second half of the nineteenth century women
supplemented household income with sewing work for local storekeepers (Nunnally
(1989). The decision for a family to purchase either a sewing machine or a reaper is
indicative of the interpenetration of patriarchy, work, and capitalism. A sewing machine
at the time ranged from $25 to a little over a $100. A mechanical reaper and mower cost
$155 and usually more (Riley 1988: 59). Overwhelmingly, men choose to purchase the
reaper, not the sewing machine. However, the popularity of the sewing machine in the
nineteenth century suggests that it was not far behind in use in Midwestern households,
again, deepening market-dependence.
The ability of the family to purchase a mechanical reaper and thresher or pay a
threshing team was predicated on women’s work. Boarding became an important source
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of income for the family, a responsibility that fell to women. Emily Gillespie recorded in
her diary that she boarded on average two or three lodgers a week. Emily usually charged
a dollar per night per lodger that included meals and a place to sleep. One night Emily
had eight lodgers stay over and the next morning they left and paid her husband James $9
(Schwieder 1977: 162). Other women, like Sadie Stillson recorded in her diary that over a
three month period in 1870 31 people lodged at her farm (Schwieder 1977). Beyond
lodging travelers, women also lodged wage workers that were periodically used
throughout the year. Farm men notoriously paid laborers low wages knowing that they
would receive free meals and lodging. Those free meals and lodging added to women’s
unpaid work, suggesting that this work was not valuable or worth paying for.
Women’s socio-ecological reproductive work in bearing and raising children was
perhaps the most important labor process performed. Frontier families had ten percent
more children under ten than eastern families and usually birthed between five and eight
children (Wheeler et al. 1977: 26; Kulikoff 1992: 48). A social, and no less a biological
relationship and process, large families were essential for encouraging population growth
and as sources of farm labor. No rest for the weary, however. In a matter of weeks, and
sometimes days, women were back performing domestic work, cleaning, cooking, and
more. Older daughters and neighbors usually helped out with domestic work during short
periods of rest. The relentless demands of patriarchy and capitalism necessitated women
forgo rest.
Following the labor process of bearing children, women were the primary
caregivers, socializing boys and girls into initially domestic work. Young boys and girls
helped in the garden, milked cows, herded livestock, all at a very early age. Women’s
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care work socialized boys into farmers and girls into farmers and housemakers. While
young children may have lightened the load of domestic work, women’s primary role as
caregiver required multitasking and supervision, a process that was difficult to manage
given that were expected to also “help out” in the field. For pre-teenage boys and girls
patterns of work were less structured by the gender division of labor that had
characterized farm men and women, and more around domestic work.
As children became teenagers the gender division of labor became more clearly
defined. Fathers further socialized boys into field work, whereby boys learned to operate
farm equipment. Mothers socialized girls further into domestic work, such as canning and
churning, gardening, and dairying. Older daughters, like their mothers, however, were
frequently called upon to husk corn, cut thistles, and stack hay (Neth 1995: 21). Older
sons were often contracted out to capitalist farmers for wages or petty commodity
producers for work-exchange. During the 1840s corn planting season boys were paid
twelve cents a day (Schob 1975: 189). Older girls served as domestic workers in
wealthier and middle-income homes (Neth 1995). In the 1840s the weekly average wage
for domestic work through various states was .96 cents in Ohio, $1.14 in Illinois, and
$2.25 in Minnesota (Schob 1975: 207). By the 1850s wages continued to increase for
domestic work, especially in the most remote frontiers in Minnesota where there was a
shortage of farm girls. The scarcity of hired girls was an intractable problem on the
frontiers, a problem that increased the burden of women’s work and conditioned the
purchasing of greater manufactured goods to ease that burden. As the life-cycle of the
farm shifted from younger to older children the gender division of labor became more
pronounced, while families could count on the wages of their teenage sons and daughters.
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The “child crop” was the most important of the farm crops. Socio-ecological
reproduction of the daily and intragenerational needs structured women’s roles and
constituted their demands of productive and reproductive work.
However, farm families became smaller during the mid-nineteenth century. Under
the cult of domesticity, child nurture, and declining prospects for sons to purchase cheap
land, birth rates in the Midwest declined to three or four by 1860 (Kulikoff 1992: 51).
Furthermore, schooling became an important dimension of farm children lives, an
expensive imposition placed on farm families as they had to pay higher taxes. Smaller
families resulted in farm women receiving less work from children, especially daughters
from middling and capitalist farm families who were receiving higher education,
performing domestic work, and other waged labor. It is no wonder, then, that women who
faced the double burden and the loss of child labor were ready to purchase manufactured
goods that may have lightened the physical burden of domestic work and household
production.
While farm women performed nearly every task of farming, they were rarely
considered farmers. The designation of farmer was primarily restricted to men. Censuses
regularly counted farm women as unemployed, even while they joined men in the field.
Women’s diaries in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries indicated that women
themselves rarely thought of themselves as farmers, even though they spent significant
time and energy raising and harvesting crops (Fink 1986; Neth 1995). Women were the
“invisible farmers” (Sachs 1983), whose work was undervalued. As market-dependence
deepened, the designation between men as farmers and farming and women as
housewives and helping out only hardened. An important consequence of the
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housewifization of farm women and their “invisible” productive labor was that it justified
men’s “power to control the allocation labor” (Osterud 1993: 15) and resources over the
household. In this way, gender inequity was structured into the patriarchal gendered
division of labor.
The above suggests that women’s demands to ease their double burden entailed
purchasing more commodities and hence deepening market-dependence. While
independent farm families practiced “safety first” farming, this historical reconstruction
suggests that the double burden placed on women and their demands to ease that double
burden accelerated the transition to petty commodity production. It certainly wasn’t the
case that women were against “safety first” farming, but that their socio-ecological
conditions of production and reproduction when compared to men was on the whole
harsher. While Kulikoff (1992: 47-51) makes a similar case with focusing mostly on
northeastern agrarian households, he does not argue that women’s paid and unpaid work
allowed the purchasing of the mechanical reaper that became the all-important moment in
the transition to petty commodity production. However, as will be made clear later and in
the following chapters, a class of “petit bourgeois yeoman household”, not capitalist
households, emerged in the Corn Belt that were stable, flexible, and dynamic, a product
of the socio-ecology of production, reproduction, and world accumulation.
The First American Agricultural Revolution (1840s-1900)
The first American agricultural revolution was a product and producer of
industrialization in the Midwest and worldwide. We are concerned about these
developments as it pertains to rising farm productivity, capital accumulation, and the
process of proletarianization in the centers of accumulation. I focus on wheat as it was the
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key commercial crop in the transition to petty commodity production and the foundation
of the first American agricultural revolution. Northern Illinois and eastern Iowa were at
the epicenter of the first American agricultural revolution that later blossomed in the
Plains.
Recall, that in the introduction, following Conkin (2008: 97), I defined an
agricultural revolution as at least a 50 percent increase in “full-sector productivity during
a single generation”. Advancing productivity developed in fits and starts, an uneven
development for sure. Between 1820 and 1850 total factor productivity in the Midwest
“grew at annual rates of 2.1 percent”, and from 1850 to 1860 to 2.4 percent. Over those
same periods “labor productivity grew at annuals rates of 2.3 percent” and 3.2 percent
respectively (Bauerly 2016: 59). The mechanical reaper and mechanical thresher, along
with the seed drill, accounted for roughly 50 percent of labor productivity in the
nineteenth century (Post 2011: 93). Advancing agricultural productivity was highly
dependent on the importation of wheat varieties that could be adapted to emerging
agricultural zones (Kloppenburg 2004; Olmstead and Rhodes 2008). Farm machinery
increased labor productivity in wheat and other small grains by four to six times, and
twice as much in corn between the 1830s and 1870s (Bogue 1963b: 21). Between 18401860 to 1900-1910 estimates for labor productivity increases are “2.6% per annum for
wheat from 1.5% to 2.15% for corn” (Post 2011: 93; Parker and Klein 1966).
“Productivity advances in wheat cultivation led all crops with a 94.6 per cent decrease in
labor requirements, from 61 to 3.3 hours per acre between 1830 and 1896” (Pudup 1987:
205). Over the nineteenth century pre-harvest labor productivity in wheat increased by
more than 50 percent, while harvest labor productivity also increased by more than 50
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percent (Parker 1984). The great productivity gains in corn would occur until the second
agricultural revolution.24 While labor productivity advanced unevenly in the United
States over the nineteenth century, the biggest advances occurred in the Midwest (Parker
1984) (see graphs 1 and 2).
Pre-Harvest Labor Productivity of Major Commodity Crops in the Northeast,
South, and West
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Source: Parker 1984: 160

24

During the nineteenth century, the Corn Belt “produced [corn] yields of forty to sixty
bushels per acre” (Warman 2003: 180), with Illinois and Iowa on the high end of the
range.
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Harvest Labor Productivity of Major Commodity Crops in the Northeast, South,
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Source: Parker 1984: 160
American farm commodity exports increased throughout the nineteenth century,
with Britain serving as the most valuable market. From the birth of the nation, United
States exports to Europe rose every year, making significant increases in 1835 and 1847
(Schlebecker 1975: 75). Between this period cotton, primarily from the American South,
export earnings increased from $30 million to over $60 million before dipping in the
1840s (Nourse 1924: 13) (see table 1). Cotton continued to be a major export commodity,
accelerating in the 1850s, but declining during the Civil War. During the Civil War
period when Britain experienced several years of failed harvests, Midwestern grain
exports increased. While Russia and Prussia maintained historical levels of grain and
meat exports to Britain that when combined with harvest failures in France, allowed the
United States to fill the gap. American grain and meat exports more than tripled during
the Civil War years (Nourse 1924: 17). Between 1850 and 1899 American wheat exports

136

grew from 2.1 million of quarters to 22.4 million of quarters (Harley 1980: 227).25
American meat exports were also significant for this period. By the end of the 1880s, the
United States exported to Britain over 120,000 tons of beef, dwarfing New Zealand and
Argentina’s beef exports (Critchell and Raymond 1912: 13). By 1900 the value of total
meats exported was $114,000,000, only $27,000,000 less than wheat and wheat flour
exports. Pork products by far made up the largest amounts of meat exports (Whitaker
1975: 147-148) (see table 3). Agricultural exports helped finance American
manufacturing (Schlebecker 1975).

Export Earnings of American Agricultural Commodities, 1805-1860
Year
Livestock and
Non-meat Food
Cotton
Animal Products
1805
$3,385,000
$11,752,000
$9,445,000
1815
1,332,000
11,234,000
17,529,000
1825
3,314,793
7,526,718
36,846,649
1835
2,901,896
8,250,577
64,961,302
1845
6,206,394
9,810,508
51,739,341
1855
17,178,080
23,651,362
88,143,844
1860
20,215,226
27,590,298
191,806,555
Table 3
Source: Nourse 1924: 15
American Exports of Major Agricultural Commodities, 1867-1896 (measured in
millions)
Year
Wheat
Corn
Beef and
Pork and
Cotton
Products
Products
Bushels
Bushels
Pounds
Pounds
Pounds
1867-1876
101,069
48,485
169,353
696,278
436,602
1877-1886
254,938
138,182
444,336
1,815,249
3,707,070
1887-1896
286,153
118,586
918,975
1,988,382
5,176,305
Table 4
Source: Nourse 1924: 25

25

Between the 1850s and the first world War world grew from five million quarters to 75
million quarters, a growth rate of four and a half percent annually. Between 1875 and the
first world war world population grew at three-fourths a percent annually (Harley 1980:
226).
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During the nineteenth century, agricultural revolution a pattern emerges in
relation to exports. From the beginning, American cotton had been an export driven
commodity, feeding Britain’s textiles mills. Over the nineteenth century American cotton
exports continued to rise, only dipping during world economic contraction. While cotton
was the foundation of Britain’s initial industrialization, recall that wheat and rye prices
had skyrocketed during Britain’s developmental crisis, 1825-1845, acting as a brake to
industrialization. Also recall that Britain had an overabundance of cotton during the
crisis. What Britain’s working class needed more than cheap clothing was cheap food.
Wheat, too, was primarily an export commodity crop. While exports increased
throughout the nineteenth century, several dips occurred following the Civil War because
of international competition. Unlike cotton and wheat, corn was a primarily domestic
commodity crop. Measured in bushels, corn exports were almost always less than half of
wheat exports. Corn exports declined in part due to its use as a feed for the increased
production of hogs and cattle. Only during the last decade of the nineteenth century did
corn begin to close the gap, which was a result of draining the Grand Prairie. Overall,
farmer’s producing corn were less dependent on export markets as they used corn as a
feed for livestock. Beef and beef products and pork and pork products also increased
throughout the nineteenth century, with pork (and pork products) always making up a
greater portion of meat exports. Over the nineteenth century American exports left its
mark on the world market.
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The success of the nineteenth century agricultural revolution can also be
measured by proletarianized labor. 26 From 1860 to 1900 18 million less people in the
United States made their living in farming (Pudup 1987: 205). Between 1821 and 1932
over 34 million mostly European immigrants entered the United States, primarily as
proletarians (Warman 2003: 178). The population of expanding industrialized cities
“tripled between 1850 and 1910” (Moore 2002: 186, original italicized). Importantly, for
Britain’s industrial revolution, a cheap grain invasion from the United States increased
real wages (O’Rourke 1997: 775). Cheap food improved the standard of living of
Britain’s proletarians, enabling them to spend a greater portion of their monthly
household budget on housing (Seccombe 1993). Between 1870 and 1900 the general
United States population nearly doubled, with the industrial working-class expanded
more than a third of the population (Agnew 1987: 56).
Cheap American wheat invaded European economies to such a great extent that
Europe’s peasantry was in ruins. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century wheat prices
fell by 27 percent in Germany and 30 percent in Sweden (Agnew 1987: 53). Eastern and
Central European farmers, too, faced crisis conditions (Potts 1990). The productivity
revolution that debt-laden Midwestern farmers generated had constituted a ready-made
market in renewing Britain’s and America’s industrial revolution. The first American
agricultural revolution, then, was no less a productivity revolution, but a world-ecological
revolution, absorbing capital investments and appropriating cheap natures far and wide as
it fundamentally transformed world accumulation and world nature.

26

Moore (2010: 399) rightly points out that urbanization is “rough-and-ready index of
proletarianization”.
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In the first half of the nineteenth century eastern states led in the manufacturing of
farm equipment. After 1850 Illinois became the leading state of farm machinery in shares
of product value (Pudup 1987). The Midwest including the Plains manufactured nearly
half of the total of farm implements and machinery in 1850 (Bauerly 2016: 57). The
growing differentials in land-labor ratios of the Midwest and East undoubtedly was a
factor in the growing demands for mechanization of the prairies and Plains. The
mechanization of farming in the Midwest in the mid-nineteenth century generated
forward and backward linkages. There was an increase demand in iron and steel for
plows, hoes, and horseshoes, while there was also an increase demand in household
products, like iron stoves, kettles, and skillets. The demands of farming and householding
figured into the development of nineteenth century metallurgy and the expansion of iron
foundries. By 1870, the manufacturing of agricultural machinery alone accounted for
25.5 percent of the value of all U.S. machine production” (Page and Walker 1991: 294).
At the turn of the twentieth century the iron industry would be the United States “premier
industrial sector” (Page and Walker 1991: 296), an industry with agrarian roots. While
McCormick and other reaper manufacturers began selling reapers in the 1830s, the mass
production of mechanical reapers did not occur until 1848 with the increasing demands of
Midwestern farm families. Cyrus McCormick moved his Virginia operations to Chicago
to serve a fast-expanding home market (Headlee 1991). Mass production combined with
aggressive marketing and installment plans allowed the widespread adoption of
mechanical reapers across the Midwest and Plains. By the early twentieth century
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McCormick took his success internationally, selling reapers and threshers to Russian
farmers.
The production and processing of wheat fed into industries like flour milling.
During the last quarter of the nineteenth century Minneapolis became the flour mill
center of the world.27 New milling techniques derived from Hungarian grain mills had
been adopted into the milling complex of the Midwest (Morgan 1979). Because wheat
required processing before consumption, milling firms were integral to national and
world markets. Between 1850-1860 flour milling ranked fourth nationally in value added
by manufacture and was the leading industry in the United States, “in terms of the total
value of products produced” (Bauerly 2016: 63) (Page and Walker 1991: 294). Grain
elevators, concentrated in Chicago, fundamentally transformed the handling and
marketing of wheat. Steam-powered grain elevators drastically increased the amounts of
wheat moved and stored, a process that drastically reduced the need for labor (Cronon
1991). From 1850 to 1860 exports of wheat and wheat flour increased from 2 million
bushels to 76 million bushels, with nearly half of it exported to Britain and Ireland (Gates
1968, cited in Bauerly 2016: 68).
Chicago became the epicenter in grain trading, enacting a revolution both in
export processing and international financialization, a process that further alienated petty
commodity producers from their crop. In 1848, the Chicago Board of Trade was founded
which was to deal with the many wheat varieties headed to the Midwest grain elevators.
The growth of wheat production enabled new opportunities for finance capital, in which

27

Minneapolis milling firms dominated the flour industry in which a mere four firms
controlled over 80 percent of the city’s milling in 1890, and easily becoming the leading
flour producer in the United States (Page and Walker 1991: 297).
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traders bet on futures contracts while shaping the organization of wheat exchange
(Cronon 1991). The power of companies like Cargill and other “merchants of grain”
benefited at the expense of farmers by creating a complex grading system that often
undervalued farmers’ wheat (Morgan 1979). Complex financial markets simplified
natures, forcing farmers to increase productivity as surplus-value was appropriated by
traders.
While wheat was not the only major commodity crop of the nineteenth century, it
was the important for feeding an expanding world proletarian class in Europe.
Productivity advances certainly occurred in the cotton South with the introduction of the
Petit Gulf hybrid cotton variety and the continuous frontier movement to fresh natures
(Olmstead and Rhode 2008). However, the social conditions of reproduction and
existence of the plantation slave labor regime blocked significant advances in
productivity. Post (2017: 184-185) explains:
“the planters’ inability to easily replace slaves with improved tools and
machinery meant that geographic expansion – the addition of more land
and more slaves – was often the most rational and rapid way of increasing
output in the face of rising prices. Plantation slavery thus entailed
accumulation without technical innovation…the need to preserve slaves’
value as fixed capital required that they be maintained whether they
labored or not, and this provided an incentive for planters to try and keep
their slaves working year-round.”
In the Midwest, petty commodity production was the dominant social formation
driving economic development. The growth of agrarian home markets and industrial
manufacturing went hand-in-glove, blocking the frontier tendency of slavery and
solidifying petty commodity production in the Midwest. World-ecological conditions and
the material conditions and demands of wheat production in the Midwest engendered the
first American agricultural revolution.
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Making the Corn Belt and Petit Bourgeois Yeoman Farmer
The transition to petty commodity production unfolded in the Midwest prairies
from roughly 1830s to the 1870s. In 1882, a periodical in The Nation was the first to use
in print “corn belt” to signify the dominant corn growing region of the United States.
Prior to the twentieth century popular magazines and geographers designated the Corn
Belt as stretching from “northwestern Ohio, a considerable strip across northcentral
Indiana, all of northern and central Illinois, the whole state of Iowa, northwestern
Missouri, northeastern Kansas, and southeastern Nebraska” (Warntz 1957: 44). The heart
of the Corn Belt that emerged in the 1870s was Illinois and Iowa.
The Corn Belt, like the Wheat Belt, shifted over the nineteenth century,
culminating into its modern form in the 1880s. In 1839, total corn production in the
United States was 337,531,875 with Tennessee and Kentucky the top producing states. In
1840 Tennessee was the top corn producing state, Ohio became number one in 1850, and
by 1860 Illinois had reigned the king of corn. Following the Civil War the center of the
Corn Belt had shifted from Terre Haute, Indiana to Springfield, Illinois (Warntz 1957:
42-43).
How do we explain the origins of the modern Corn Belt occurring in the 1870s
and what was the outcome? The concluding section of this chapter explains the origins of
the modern Corn Belt that gave rise to a class of petit bourgeois yeoman farmer that was
relatively prosperous, dynamic, stable, and flexible. They were neither capitalist nor
tenant farmers but were relatively better off petty commodity producers.
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If we are to explain the shifting Corn Belt was must examine the geographical
relations of civilizational crops, namely wheat and corn. Several forces explain the
shifting Wheat Belt from the Midwestern prairies to the Great Plains. First, international
competition was intense in wheat, owing to wheat frontiers in Argentina, Russia, Canada,
and Australia. In the 1850s, crop-failures throughout Europe, the Crimean War, and
expanding proletarianization of England, northwestern Europe, and the United States
combined to increase wheat prices (Post 2011: 95). By the 1860s it was becoming
increasingly clear that the world wheat market was highly competitive and unstable.
Frequent price fluctuations exacerbated already existing uncertainties of farmers. Second,
the price of land was substantially lower in the Plains than in states like Illinois and Iowa
(Ankli 1974). In fact, many of families that failed at farming in the prairies moved
westward to try their luck in cheaper, yet riskier farming conditions. Those that farmed in
the Plains knew they could not compete with corn growers in prairies so they focused on
wheat. Third, and related, harsher climates and socio-ecological conditions characterized
the semi-arid Plains. Rainfall was irregular, soils were of lesser quality, extreme
temperatures, and greater distances between community and markets all conspired to
limit the expansion of commercial farming in the Plains. Fourth, under the guidance of
agricultural presses, farmers shifted more land, energy, and capital to raising corn, oats,
horses, and hogs. Finally, the drainage of major sections of the wetland prairies
fundamentally transformed Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa into the feedlot empire, supplying
cheap corn to hogs.
Although mechanical innovations were critical in the transition to petty
commodity production and the first American agricultural revolution, biological
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innovation, too, transformed American agricultural landscape. In the nineteenth century,
biological innovations resolved two obstacles to shift the center of the Wheat Belt from
the Prairies to the Plains. First, farmers needed wheat varieties that could withstand
harsher climates while maintaining or increasing yields. Second, farmers attempted to
fight “yield sapping insects and diseases,” a product of biological globalization
(Olmstead and Rhode 2008: 17-18). The introduction of Red Fife, a hard spring wheat of
international origins (Canada and Eastern Europe), became foundational to the emerging
Wheat Belt in Wisconsin, Minnesota, and the Dakotas. In Kansas, Nebraska, and
Oklahoma “Turkey”, a hard winter variety, was imported from southern Russia. Red Fife
and Turkey could maintain yields despite recurrent drought conditions and winterkills
(Olmstead and Rhode 2008). 28 In Nebraska, yields averaged 12.5 bushels per acre
between 1870 and 1900. From 1900 to 1909 average yields increased to 17.5 bushels, a
40 percent increase (Olmstead and Rhode 2008: 36). Scientists attributed the increase to
the substitution of Turkey Red for spring wheats (Olmstead and Rhode 2002: 945). By
the early twentieth century most wheat planted was either durum or hard spring varieties.
In turn, petty commodity production spread throughout the Wheat Belt.

28

Winterkill rates in Kansas averaged around 20 percent (Olmstead and Rhode 2002:
944).
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Figure 4
Digital Scholarship Lab, University of Richmond, Atlas of the Historical Geography of
the United States.
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Figure 5
Digital Scholarship Lab, University of Richmond, Atlas of the Historical Geography of
the United States.
Those harsher conditions that made it an obstacle for farmers to realize higher
yields, that when combined with monoculture farming were also the same conditions that
engendered the invasion of pests and pathogens. Rust has plagued wheat production for at
least hundreds of years. In the mid-seventh century, English winter wheat were planted in
Massachusetts black stem rust appeared, devastating the wheat crop. In the late
nineteenth century stem rust destroyed large wheat sections of Iowa and Texas. Losses
due to stem rust were estimated between five and ten percent in the late nineteenth
century (Olmstead and Rhode 2002: 948). The rust problem was partially resolved
through the introduction of improved rust-resistant early maturing spring varieties and
better cultural methods. In terms of insects, the Hessian fly, which had entered in New
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York through Hessian mercenaries and spread west, was by far the most destructive.
Farmers realized to combat the fly that needed to plant winter wheat later and spring
wheat earlier. This would reduce the likelihood of an invasion, but increase the
probability of the rust, a problem that persisted. The answer to the Hessian fly problem
was the introduction of a Mediterranean wheat from Europe. Chinch bugs and
grasshoppers also plagued farmers wheat crop. These pests regularly whipped out half the
farmers’ wheat crop in a given year, and forced many to abandon their farms in the
southern Plains. The same varieties that could withstand unfavorable weather conditions,
Red Fife, Turkey, and new developed winter and spring varieties, were also able to
withstand the onslaught of pests, diseases, and weeds. Olmstead and Rhode (2008: 32)
state that by 1919…roughly 80 percent of U.S. wheat acreage consisted of varieties that
had not existed in North America before 1873, and less than 8 percent was planted in
varieties dating earlier than 1840”.
By the 1870s, the Wheat Belt was concentrated in the semi-arid Plains and tied to
the world market (Friedmann 1978). Minnesota and the Dakotas were quickly turning
into a wheat frontier as adaptable varieties could withstand unfavorable weather and
pests, and both capitalist farmers and petty commodity producers settled the region.
During the economic downturn of the last quarter of the nineteenth century capitalist
bonanza farms folded, while family farms persisted, owing to the different logics of
reproduction. While the mechanical revolution definitively founds its origins in the
prairies, it blossomed in the Plains Wheat Belt. In the transition to petty commodity
production Headlee (1991), Byers (1996), Post (2011), and Bauerly (2016) unduly focus
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on mechanical innovations. Biological innovations occurring through the accumulation of
world germplasm gave rise to petty commodity production in the Plains.
Agricultural presses encouraged prairie farmers to concentrate on producing a
myriad of crops and reduce their acreage of wheat. In 1870, a letter to the Iowa
Homestead read: “A farmer in Iowa can make more money on a dozen of eggs than he
does on raising a bushel of wheat. A farmer in Iowa can make more money on one hog
than he can on one acre of wheat” (Throne 1949: 127). During the 1870s corn and oats
prices dropped significantly. Midwestern farm families had several options. A family
could reduce the cost of hired labor, relying on a greater extend on the unpaid labor of
family members. A family could increase overall production of crops and livestock to
compensate for declining farm prices. Finally, they could curtail the production of one
crop to increase production in another crop. Farmers utilized all three options. Farmers
increased overall production through mechanization and the purchasing of more land.
Average acreage per farm increased in the late quarter of the nineteenth century, the
majority ranged from 100 to 160 acres (Bogue 1959: 150). By the 1870s, and no later
than the 1880s for most farm families were shifting greater acreage from wheat to corn as
feed for the rising prices per hundred weight for hogs and oats to feed horses as they
became essential for pulling farm equipment. Farmers also increased the diversity in field
crops and increased the value of livestock through improved breeding and feeding
(Bogue 1959).
If wheat was foundational to the transition to petty commodity production, why
did corn dominate the Midwest prairies? Corn was ubiquitous in the prairies web of life.

149

While we often think of corn as fungible commodity of the twentieth century, Warman
(2003: 155) explains the fungible nature of corn in the nineteenth century:
“Settlers made use of every part of the corn plant. The leaves…became
fodder for the livestock. Corn stubble left in the harvested fields became
grazing fodder for the large livestock. Corn husks were used to stuff
mattresses and to weave rugs and make twine. Corncob dolls clothed in
corn husk dresses were ready playthings. Hulled corncobs were used as
scrapers, pipes, or fuel. Fermented corn mash became beer and
whiskey…Surplus corn was earmarked for animal feed, and eventually
transformed into milk, eggs, and meat. Pork and whiskey both were
considered to be forms of concentrated corn…Corn pervaded work, food,
and relaxation, every conceivable aspect of day-to-day existence.”
Warman (2003: 155) continues:
“Corn was everywhere and became the organizing axis of pioneer
agriculture and pioneer subsistence. Corn set the precedents for the
sequence and style of work and serves as a bridge for the transformation
of agriculture. Corn was the foundation of the household economy and
allowed for the preservation of a high degree of self-sufficiency. Corn was
also the basis for the realization of surplus and participation in a wider
market. Corn was the means that permitted successive waves of pioneers
to settle new territories. Once the settlers had fully grasped the secrets and
potential of corn, they no longer needed the Native Americans. Indigenous
peoples were wiped out, scattered, or relocated as settlers penetrated even
further inland.”
During the early settlement of what became the modern Corn Belt, corn was the
traditional American frontier crop. While originating in Mexico, corn, unlike wheat,
required no worldwide search for compatible varieties. Women of the Mandan, Arikara
and Hidasta tribes had been growing hardy varieties of Flint, flour, and sweet corns that
were well adapted to the Midwest for many years (Olmstead and Rhode 2008). Just as
European settlers had survived on “Indian corn” in the days of Jamestown, American
settlers appropriated the Native Americans land, food, and farming techniques.
The great adaptability and biophysical advantages of corn enabled its great
uneven expansion across larger and larger swaths of the world. The plant size can range
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from three to thirteen feet in height, in some cases Native Americans corn grew up to
sixteen feet tall (Warman 2003). Considered a short-day plant, corn flowers “after the
number of hours of daylight falls below a certain maximum threshold,” usually nearing
the end of summer (Olmstead and Rhode 2008: 69). From germination to pollination
occurs from forty-five days to approximately one hundred fifty days (Warman 2003: 14).
The length of an ear of corn ranges from four to twenty-four inches, and there are
anywhere between five hundred to one thousand kernels on an ear of corn. Husks
covering the ear shield kernels from adverse weather conditions and pests. These tightly
ordered symmetrical kernels are able to concentrate energy because the ear is positioned
near the center of the stalk. The large surface area of the plant’s foliage enabled it to
absorb greater solar energy compared to other crops. “Corn transforms light, heat, and
other inorganic elements into biomasses with the least amount of waste. The plant
actively responds to the transformation of solar energy, the most abundant of the
inorganic elements, and becomes a resource readily available to people” (Warman 2003:
16). Furthermore, its extensive root system enables the plant to draw in moisture and
nutrients from a wide area. All these biophysical features combine to contribute to the
high productivity of corn.
While most think of the genetic revolution in corn breeding occurring in the
modern era of hybrid corn seed, much work was being done on corn varieties in the
nineteenth century. 29 Farmers and breeders made much progress in improving corn
varieties by adapting to geographical and ecological conditions to improve yields. A

29

Prior to the biological revolution in the 1920s and 1930s, there existed roughly onethousand varieties of corn (Olmstead and Rhode 2008: 64).
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cross between Northern Flints and Southern Dents produced what became Corn Belt
Dents (Olmstead and Rhode 2008). Northeastern farmers used Flint varieties because
they were early maturing. In general, flint varieties produce slender-stalks that have ears
with eight to ten rows of smooth, hard kernels. Southern farmers used a variety of Dents
that were late maturing, heavier-stalked with many rowed ears with softer kernels.
Northern Flints and Southern Dents were both adapted to the socio-ecological conditions
of farming in their respective geographical locations. The migration of New Englanders
and peoples from Virginia and Kentucky migrated with their respective corn seed
varieties and in the process of settling the Midwest they crossed northern and southern
varieties. Corn Belt Dents came to dominate the Midwest agriculture. Those varieties
were highly productive and became the foundation seeds of the hybrid corn revolution,
owing to the work of humans and the rest of nature.
From the beginning of settlement farmers planted more acreage and obtained
more bushels of corn than any other crop. From 1840 to 1850 corn increased from
1,406,241 to 8,656,799 bushels (Ross 1951: 22). In Iowa, between 1840 and 1860 corn
production increased over 400 percent, which became the fastest growing corn producing
state (Throne 1949: 126). Throughout the second half of nineteenth century both Iowa
and Illinois were the top corn producing states.

Year
1866
1871
1876
1881
1886
1891
1894
1896

Iowa Corn Yields, Acreage, and Production (1866-1901)
Yield (per acre)
Acreage
Production
32.0
1,810,000
57,920,000
43.5
3,060,000
133,110,000
34.0
5,200,000
176,800,000
30.0
6,530,000
195,900,000
29.0
7,960,000
230,840,000
40.5
9,040,000
366,120,000
15.0
8,750,000
131,250,000
43.0
9,160,000
393,880,000
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1901

28.5

9,460,000

296,610,000

Table 5
Source: USDA, cited in Hampton 1945: 24

Figure 6
Digital Scholarship Lab, University of Richmond, Atlas of the Historical Geography of
the United States.
Several developments can be discerned in relation to the production of corn and
the transition to petty commodity production in the Midwest. First, unlike wheat, corn
was not an internationally traded commodity. It would not be a major export until the last
quarter of the twentieth century. In terms of price per bushel, corn was a bulkier product
than wheat, making it costlier for farmers to transport corn long distances. Second, corn
was not as susceptible to pests and diseases as wheat. Wheat fields regularly suffered
from grasshoppers, Hessian fly, chinch bugs, and rust. Third, the demands of corn
harvesting was not like that of wheat. Harvesting corn could occur slowly when time was
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available, lasting sometimes into winter. Recall, wheat needed to be harvested in two
weeks or face spoilage. As a result, technologies in corn harvesting had not developed to
the extent that of wheat harvesting. Finally, the costs of farm equipment was much higher
for wheat than corn. An Illinois agricultural editor compared the costs and returns:
“Think, for instance, of buying a drill, price $125, reaper, price $125 and then a threshing
machine, price $175—total $425, as a necessary preparation for wheat sowing; and then
ten bushels per acre at 40 cents per bushel! Then think of corn, 60 bushels per acre at 30
cents per bushel, and no additional implement required but a sheller costing $25, or so!”
(Gates 1960: 288-289). The fungible nature and socio-ecology of corn when compared to
wheat suggests that corn farmers were less market dependent than wheat farmers.
The prosperity of the heart of the Corn Belt in terms of major commodities
derived not solely from corn, but also biological exchanges of hogs. Corn Belt farms
always had an array animals including hogs, beef and dairy cattle, horses, poultry, and
sheep as they served multiple purposes in providing motive power, economic returns, and
manure for field crops. Hogs in particular were sometimes referred to as “mortgage
burners” or “mortgage lifters” as they were the most consistent sources of profits (Fink
1986: 32). Importantly, they have the ability to thrive in many conditions and eating a
variety of foods including corn, acorns, potatoes, soya beans, barley, clover, alfalfa, and
numerous more (Shaw 1936). Hogs are quite fertile, having two litters a year with an
average litter between six to nine piglets after only a four-month gestation period. Cattle,
on the other hand, had a gestation period of nine months that resulted in a single calf
(Cronon 1991: 226). Moreover, sows can farrow at a year old, whereas cows are at two to
three years old, enabling farmers to produce as much or more meat from hogs than a steer
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in half the time (Bogue 1963a: 104). After chickens, hogs are the most efficient livestock
at fattening. One study stated that “it takes about 6 pounds of grain and 6 pounds of hay
to produce a pound of lamb (live weight), 10 pounds of hay and 10 pounds of corn to
make a pound of beef, and 5.6 pounds of corn for a pound of pork (USDA 1922, cited in
Shaw 1936: 359). Furthermore, hogs cost the farmer little investment when compared to
cattle, making raising hogs affordable to all farmers. Lastly, more of the carcass of the
slaughtered hog could be used for food and non-food products. This was not the case for
cattle, nor sheep. The carcass of a dressed hog weighs 65 to 80 percent of its live weight,
while cattle dress out around 50 to 60 percent and sheep and lambs 45 to 55 percent
(Bogue 1963a: 104). The biology of the swine was impressive, a product and producer of
farming practices, historical natures, and an expanding packing industry.
Eastern settlers brought hogs with them as they settled the Midwest. Prior to
breeding the unique Midwest hog, long-nosed, spindling legged hogs were numerous
especially in the wooded regions of the Corn Belt where these characteristics were
advantageous for foraging along the forest floor. These mast-fed wood hogs were
sometimes referred to as “prairie sharks” that rarely reached 200 pounds (Bogue 1963a:
109). Hogs thrived in most environments, especially wooded regions that had mast of
roots, acorns, and beechnuts. When allowed to roam free, which was the case prior to
herd laws, hogs will become wild within a few generations (Hudson 1994). The
confinement and feeding hogs a corn diet ensured they fattened at a quicker pace and also
improved the quality of pork and lard. Hogs fattened on woodland mast often produced
soft pork that was oily and hard to preserve, whereas hogs fattened on corn made the
flesh solid and the lard white and firm (Hudson 1994). “Hogging down” was a common
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practice for fattening hogs, which involved releasing hogs in a fenced in field to consume
the unpicked corn from the harvest. “Corn provides an ideal food for hogs and swine
enable the farmer to save transportation costs by “marketing corn on the hoof,” provide
animal manures to replace lost soil fertility, and add economic and agricultural stability
by creating more diversity to farm operations” (Shaw 1936: 372).
Since hogs often had the highest rates of return farmers focused on achieving the
most efficient breed of swine. Efficiency meant the fastest weight gain on the least
amount of corn. Imports from the eastern United States and Europe are well-documented.
Each breed of hog had its advantages and disadvantages. For example, razorbacks were
large animals with strong legs which helped on long distances to markets, but they were
slow to fatten and produced little meat or lard. The Berkshire hog became trendy during
the 1830s and 1840s because of its massive size. However, it often had poor feet and
crooked legs and required great care in feeding, a bad combination for long distant
marketing. “Lard hogs” fattened quickly and easily but were impractical to drive to
market. Competition among hog breeders eventually produced a hog that would become
the standard of the industry: the Poland-China. Poland-Chinas were a cross between the
Berkshire and Irish Grazier, leading back to imports from Spanish and English settlers
(Shaw 1936; Hudson 1994). The most important biological change hog breeders created
was the lengthening of the intestines, which helped improve the ability of hogs to absorb
food nutrients (Clemen 1923). Breeding pure-bred hogs was a competitive, and
sometimes cutthroat, venture. Like in the canine world, breed associations and registers
developed to construct the ideal breeds of hogs. Packers, beginning in the 1870s, would
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influence breeding stocks by paying higher premiums for a younger and leaner hog that
were in higher demand both domestically and internationally.
Cattle, Hogs, and Horses in Illinois and Iowa (1850-1900)
Illinois
Iowa
Year
Milk
Other
Swine
Horses
Milk
Other
Cows
Cattle
Cows
Cattle
1850 294,671
541,209 1,915,907 278,226
45,704
69,025
1860 522,634
970,799 2,502,308 563,736
189,802
293,322
1870 640,321 1,055,499 2,703,343 1,017,646 369,811
614,366
1880 865,913 1,515,063 5,170,266 1,023,082 854,187 1,755,343
1890 1,087,866 1,968,654 5,924,818 1,335,289 1,498,418 3,394,765
1900 1,007,664 1,373,024 5,915,468 1,350,219 1,423,648 2,653,703
Source: Bogue 1963a: 86 & 103
Table 6

Swine

323,247
38,536
934,820
175,088
1,353,908 482,786
6,034,316 792,322
8,266,779 1,312,079
9,723,791 1,392,573

The Civil War ignited a profitable expanding pork industry. Chicago succeeded
Cincinnati as the “Hog Butcher of the World”, which during the Civil War, fed two
million Union soldiers, particularly salted and smoked pork (Cumbler 2005). Of course,
pork packers and meatpackers in general were dependent on the farmers’ supplies. The
marketing of hogs required farmers were up to date on the latest prices for corn and hogs.
In general, farmers aimed to sell hogs between 16 and 20 months at a weight of 200
pounds. After reading farm journals and local newspapers, along with the farmer’s
personal experience, they had to decide which was more profitable in the fall to sell corn
or corn on the hoof (Walsh 1982). If the price of corn was high, they sold the grain and
kept hogs off the market, if economically possible. If the price of corn was low, as it was
from the 1870s through 1890s, corn was fed to hogs to fatten as quickly as possible and
to get as many hogs on the market. If farmers did not like market prices for hogs they
sometimes hired someone to butcher on the farm or do the butchering themselves and
make cure meat and sell “country bacon” to neighbors (Walsh 1982). Packers complained
that farmers were careless with their cuts and cooling of carcasses. Early packers were so
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Horses

dependent on the farmers’ supplies that they sometimes took dressed pork, up to onethird in the early years.
In the mid-nineteenth century Midwestern packing companies served a variety of
markets with different demands. In the South, merchant packers sent by boat hams, lard,
and lard oil. In the Northeast a more varied market existed. Fancy hams were sold to
wealthy families, while bacon, lard, and bulk pork, were sold to poorer families. By the
1830s, “the United States had replaced Ireland as the leading source of cheap provisions”
(Walsh 1982: 36) to Britain. Packers served British tastes with dry salting bacon, mildly
curing ham, and “mess pork was placed in a special pickle to preserve a better color”
(Walsh 1982: 36). By the 1840s, United States packers had exported 166 million pounds
of bacon and ham alone (Walsh 1982: 36). Packers also served the different demands of
France and the West Indies. By 1880, meat and animals ranked second in United States
exports, more than half were exported to Britain (O’Rourke and Williamson 1994: 901).
Prairie farmers that concentrated on raising hogs in the post-Civil War era were likely to
experience greater prosperity than those that relied on growing more wheat.
How did wheat and corn-hogs figure into the transition to petty commodity
production in Illinois and Iowa? As farm-making proceeded farmers in the Midwest
began to rely on wheat as the most important commodity crop. The two decades prior to
the Civil war, farmers regularly switched between winter and spring wheat varieties were
planted, depending on local ecological conditions as well as persistent periods of
favorable and unfavorable seasons. Wheat prices increased nearly 60 percent between
1850 and 1854. Gates (1960: 289), states that high wheat prices in the 1850s allowed
Illinois and Iowa farmers to enjoy real prosperity. Wheat acreage doubled over this
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period, leading to increased land values, allowing for farmers to continue to borrow.
Northern Illinois and eastern Iowa became major wheat producing centers in the midnineteenth century. Northern Illinois counties alone purchased one fourth of McCormick
reapers sold between 1849 and 1857 (Gates 1960: 288). In 1854 three fourths of
McCormick reapers were sold to Illinois, Iowa, Wisconsin, and Minnesota (Throne 1949:
124). In Iowa, wheat acreage continued to climb throughout the mid-nineteenth century
but began leveling off in the last quarter century (see table 7).
Iowa’s Three Leading Crops in Nineteenth Century in Acres
Year
Corn Acres
Wheat Acres
Oats Acres
1856
737,213
388,080
190,922
1863
1,733,505
1,149,836
336,137
1869
2,058,239
1,804,504
657,007
1875
4,019,738
3,244,954
956,687
1880
6,616,144
3,049,288
1,507,577
Source: Hampton 1945: 22
Table 7
Importantly, however, Midwestern producers could not afford threshers, thus
were forced to pay threshing teams. The result was that many farm families in Illinois and
Iowa that concentrated on corn and oats were less capitalized than wheat producers in the
emerging Plains region. Farmers that concentrated more on raising corn and hog, and not
wheat, were less likely to be in debt and had greater economic stability than farmers
concentrating on wheat production. Recall, that corn planting and harvesting equipment
had lagged behind wheat. While the origins of petty commodity production and a
concomitant agricultural revolution centered in Illinois and Iowa, these producers were
less mechanized than petty commodity producers and capitalist farmers in what would
become the modern Wheat Belt.
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The following table, compiled from multiple tables on Whitaker’s (1975) study of
livestock development in the Midwest provides a quick visual to understand the changes
in the number of Illinois and Iowa from 1850 to 1900 in terms of farms, improved land in
farms, crops produced, etc. as a percentage of the United States total. Whitaker’s (1975)
tables are derived from the twelve and thirteen censuses and reconstructed here.
Illinois Agricultural and National Position, Percent of Total
Item
1850
1870
1900
Number of farms
5.26
7.6
4.6
Improved land in
4.46
7.6
4.6
farms
Corn
9.7
17.1
14.9
Wheat
9.4
10.5
3
Oats
6.9
15.2
19.1
Swine
6.3
—
9.4
“Other” cattle
5.4
—
3.8
Source: Whitaker (1975)
Table 8
Iowa Agriculture and National Position, Percent of Total
Item
1850
1870
Number of farms
1.02
4.3
Improved land in
.73
4.9
farms
Corn
1.5
9.1
Wheat
1.5
10.2
Oats
1.0
7.4
Swine
1.06
—
“Other” cattle
.78
—
Source: Whitaker (1975)
Table 9

1900
3.9
7.2
14.4
3.5
17.8
16.8
7.5

Perhaps the most important development in the making of the Corn Belt was the
draining of the wetland prairies. During the particular wet years of the 1870s areas known
for flooding ruined many farmers crops. Such crop failures in conjunction with high land
prices became the impetus for large-scale drainage projects. Like the Dutch in the long
sixteenth century who managed to control water-logged fields, the Americans drained
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more than 20 million acres in wetlands (Prince 1997). The principle force Those drained
fields switched from pasturing to arable farming, growing more corn to feed hogs. The
greatest benefit from draining the wetlands was aeration of the soil. Organic matter
decomposed faster, roots penetrated more deeply, and growing seasons lengthened. The
drained lands were relatively flat, ensuring the long-term maintenance of soil fertility
compared to hillier prairies that had been settled earlier. The flatlands would be ideal for
mechanization in the twentieth century.
While drainage began as early as the 1820s in southern Illinois, it was not until
after federal legislation of the 1850 Swamp Act that gave millions of water-logged acres
over to states and counties and following the Civil War when professional drainage teams
could ditch and drain large fields. As early as 1853 legislation was passed in Iowa to
begin dealing with the problems of flooding, levees, and straightening of streams
(Hampton 1945: 24). In 1878, Illinois passed a constitutional amendment that allowed
large landowners and small farmers to organize drainage districts, whereby they had
“legal power to levy assessments for the construction of levees and ditches” (Bogue
1959: 146). Drainage did not begin in earnest until the 1870s in the Grand Prairie of
Illinois and Indiana and a decade later in Iowa with the manufacture of drainage tile.
Today, virtually no wetland prairies exist in Illinois or Iowa (Urban 2005;
Drainage work is hard and expensive, requiring substantial manual labor and
machinery as well as skilled surveyors. Drainage on a larger farmer could cost up to $750
(Schob 1975: 114). The Irish were the best skilled group at drainage, some of whom
traveled the Midwest in teams performing drainage work, while others remained in the
area as farmers (Schob 1975). “Draining land requires burying lines of tile, installing
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surface drains, and digging ditches deep enough to receive the tile conduits that feed into
them, arranging the whole system so as to remove excess water from the lowest portions
of the fields, yet retaining a water level high enough to allow natural flow into a local
stream” (Hudson 1994: 138). Further complicating the issue are property lines and how
specific drainage projects could divert water from one farmer to another, thus being
beneficial to one farmer and harmful to another (Bogue 1963). By 1882 Illinois had more
than 100 firms manufacturing drainage tile, some even reported that were unable to meet
demand (Hudson 1994: 139). One Irish farmer named Scully who farmed and rented out
land in Illinois regularly had disappointing harvests. Scully began installing drainage all
over his rental properties, a massive expense that was offset by raising rents on tenants.
Tenants in turn had to increase production to advance the increased rent (Hudson 1994:
140). In this way, landlord-tenant relations were constituted through a set of socioecological relations and conditions. Fixing poorly drained fields and draining the wet
prairies increased productivity as well as increased overall production as new lands were
improved. Central Illinois transformed from disease-ridden swampland into fertile rich
farmland soils, becoming one of the most productive farming regions in the world (Smith
1998; Urban 2005).
An agricultural depression swept across the United States from the 1870s to the
late 1890s, sparing the Corn Belt (Bogue 1959; Bogue 1963; Hudson 1994). The price of
farm commodities declined precipitously over two decades. Farm foreclosures were
particularly high in the Plains, a product of increasing global competition of wheat
producers, increasing dependence on wheat, unfavorable weather, and the dominance of
monopoly capitalism. Not surprising, economic conditions were harsher in the Plains that
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resulted in farmer-led populist movements who protested the monopoly of the railroads
and grain operators. There was little protest from farmers in the richer farming region of
central and northern Illinois and eastern Iowa. In the post-Civil War South, plantation
slavery transformed into sharecropping, perhaps equally as harsh (Warman 2003). Black
and white sharecroppers, alike, faced extended economic hardships. While corn prices
remained low, hog prices increased over the two decades following the Civil War.
Central Illinois and Iowa farmers specialized and intensified their corn-hog operations
during this period. However, southern Illinois farm families remained relatively
impoverished compared to their counterparts in central and northern Illinois (Adams
1994). As we will see in the next chapter, the standard of living for the petit bourgeois
yeoman farm family in rich agricultural zones of central and northern Illinois and the
eastern half of Iowa was better than most petty commodity producers in the United
States. This prosperous region was not only home to the first agricultural revolution it
would also be the home of the second agricultural revolution in the twentieth century.
In sum, I have explained the emergence of the Corn Belt following the Civil War
and the attended outcome of the petit bourgeois yeoman farmer. A confluence of forces
can explain the direction and pace of the transition to petty commodity production in
Illinois and Iowa. During the mid-nineteenth century Illinois and Iowa quickly emerged
as the ‘feedlot empire’ centered between the cattle frontier to the west and major markets
to the east eastern. Midwestern farmers received higher prices for livestock than wheat,
and when livestock prices plummeted they could sell corn directly as is or in a host of
other commodity forms. Petty commodity producers shift in the second half of the
nineteenth century to increasing specialization in corn-hog farming was pivotal in
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increasing prosperity, itself a product of a dynamic stability that was largely absent in the
Plains and the South. As a whole the region was characteristically dynamic, stable, and
flexible. The emergence of the dynamic, stable Corn Belt occurred in the context of
world-historical transformations, from world accumulation to the frontiers to the
household.
Conclusion
The transition to petty commodity production in the Midwest and subsequent
agricultural revolution fundamentally transformed the capitalist world-economy. The first
American agricultural revolution resolved the nineteenth century developmental crisis
that had centered in Britain. Agro-industrialization had advanced productivity gains to
such an extent that cheap grains led to the widespread dispossession of European farmers.
In turn, those dispossessed farmers became part of the industrial reserve army of labor as
part of the long-run process of proletarianization. In the nineteenth century world
migration concentrated in the United States. In 1820, the United States population was
9.2 million and by the beginning of the twentieth century the population stood at 105.7
million (Potts 1990: 131). The greater majority of European immigrants sought work in
American factories. In short, cheap food paved the road to proletarianization and
industrialization for the United States and Europe.
The uneven development in transition to petty commodity production across the
Midwest and Plains unfolded through differences in the socio-ecology of agrarian
households. Land use patterns of commodity crops varied between specialization in
wheat, dairy, and corn-hog production. On the whole, petty commodity producers in the
Corn Belt experienced greater prosperity than their counterparts around the United States
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throughout the nineteenth century. Corn Belt prosperity pivoted on high hog prices and
the paid and unpaid work of women and the rest of nature. The dynamic stability that
characterized Corn Belt agriculture operated through the diversity in both farming and
householding in relation to agro-industrialization and the world market.
In Illinois and Iowa farmers experienced increasing prosperity during the thirtyyear agricultural depression following the Civil War. Bucking the national trend, these
farmers would once again become the epicenter of another agricultural revolution in the
twentieth century. The second American agricultural revolution, like the first, emerged
out of a developmental crisis in the capitalist world-economy. This time the crisis
centered in the United States. The solutions, like the first, were twofold and mutually
interpenetrating: increase agricultural productivity by incorporating unappropriated
frontiers with complex of technics and advanced the process of proletarianizationhousewifization. We now turn to the second agricultural revolution, or what might be
called the American Green Revolution.
If Headlee, Byers, Post, and Bauerly missed the ecological question of the
transition to petty commodity production, they also missed the gender question—these
questions, as we will see, are dialectically bounded in the production of nature.
In summation, we have broadened our scope of the transition to petty commodity
production in the Midwest through a world-ecological framework that incorporates the
world-historical transformations into national shifts in geography, ecology, and gender.
In doing so, I have provided a more precise explanation of the direction and pace of the
transition to petty commodity production in the Corn Belt and beyond. The patterns of
work, both in their productive and reproductive turns, formed the basis of the agrarian
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household, a product and producer of agro-industrialization in the capitalist worldecology.
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Chapter 4: Agrarian Housewifization and the Remaking of Women and Household
While housewifization as a concept has generally been applied to urban classes,
housewifization has certainly, historically, unfolded across the urban-rural geographical
divide. Mies (1986) and others (Federici 1998; Fraser 2016) have argued that
“colonization and housewifization” went hand-in-hand over the longue durée of historical
capitalism, yet to what extent did housewifization occur in Midwestern agrarian
household in the United States? What forces constituted that process? If one of the
objectives of this research project is to explain the production of cheap food, then we
need to explain the historical conditions of cheapening lives, particularly of agrarian
women. While the antecedents of agrarian housewifization were emerging in the
nineteenth century Midwest with a corresponding valuing of men’s labor over women’s,
at the turn of the twentieth century the forces of capital, state, and nature would
systematically remake agrarian households in the web of life.
But farm women were not simply bystanders in the process of housewifization.
Women’s outrage and political unrest over the material conditions of re/production
compared to farm men and urban women spurred housewifization. By the turn of the
twentieth century it was becoming increasingly clear that the fate of petty commodity
producers was not solely in the modernization of fields, but also in the modernization of
the household, a process centering around women’s subjectivities and the rationalization
of housework. Not all farm women needed to be saved. Women of capitalist farms were
best able to uphold the separate spheres ideal, while most tenant farm families struggled
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to survive. The target of modernization of the household, and thus, housewifization, was
petty commodity producers who were able to purchase some household goods, but could
not quite uphold the ideal farm enterprise and household. The agrarian web of life needed
to be fundamentally restructured around separate spheres of production and reproduction.
While Corn Belt farm families increased their economic standing over the late
nineteenth century, farm women’s work lives remained difficult. The material conditions
of women’s production and social reproduction had largely remained as it had merely a
decade or two after settlement. Farm women throughout the nation complained of their
hardships and exhaustion. This was probably more so the case for the Corn Belt where
economic progress was advancing in the face of women’s economic status. During the
golden age of American agriculture when farm families experienced their greatest
economic prosperity in history, farm women were reaching their limits that culminated in
the little known “farm woman problem”. 30
In this chapter I explain the crisis of farm women and how the forces of capital,
state, and nature acted to restructure agrarian women as modern housewives. The solution
to the farm woman problem was to advance housewifization where the favorable
conditions prevailed, namely in petit bourgeois yeoman households centered in the heart
of the Corn Belt. Like any capitalist solution, housewifization of agrarian women was
partial and incomplete. While women underwent the process of housewifization, farm
men’s subjectivities were being altered to the demands of capital accumulation and
capital’s cheap food strategy, a topic taken up in chapter five. To secure cheap food for a
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Jellison (1993) and Ramey (2014) historicizes the farm woman problem from a
regional perspective. I interpret the farm woman problem as constituting long-run
historical patterns of housewifization in the production of cheap food.
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growing class of proletarians, farm men and women’s subjectivities needed to be
redefined around a capitalist world-ecology.
The Golden Age of American Agriculture
Recall from the previous chapter that aside from the Corn Belt most agricultural
regions experienced a depression the two decades following the Civil War. By 1897 farm
prices began to recover, giving rise to the greatest economic prosperity American farmers
would ever experience. The first two decades of the twentieth century was the golden age
of American agriculture. Prices for major farm commodities soared and land values
appreciated, providing prosperity to many farm families. Agricultural prices generally
increased faster than the costs of production, and during the period between 1909 and
1914 farmers had purchasing powers equal to or greater than non-farm workers (Hurt
1994). While general prosperity was experienced across most regions, it was the Corn
Belt with its “unmatched resources of soil and climate, adaptability for the utilization of
new methods and machines, and accessibility to primary markets” that would “set the
pace” for the modernization of agrarian living in the twentieth century (Ross 1951: 118).
In 1900 agriculture remained the largest economic sector in the United States. Out
of 76 million Americans 40 percent lived on farms and another ten percent were involved
in agricultural services (Conkin 2008: 3).31 Agriculture’s economic contribution to the
United States economy remained strong throughout the first two decades. Between 1910
and 1920 agriculture’s economic contribution to the United States economy more than
doubled, in which cotton, wheat, corn, and hogs made up the greatest value (Alston and
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However, after World War I the farming population would begin to decline until the
present day, except a reversal for the years 1933 and 1934 when rural areas became a
sponge absorbing the displaced urban industrial workers (Conkin 2008: 3).
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Pardey 2006). Only second to cotton in value, wheat remained the main cash crop of the
nineteenth century farmer, as wheat constituted a larger percentage of European and
American diets (Ulrich 1989: 13). Production in all major crops continued to increase
briefly following World War I, breaking records with each succeeding year. Winter
wheat in particular was the most dependable of the wheat varieties as it could withstand
most adverse weather conditions while also fetching high yields. In 1899, wheat acreage
was 52.3 million acres, then jumped to 55.6 million acres in June 1914, and broke a
record in 1915 at 60.3 million acres (Ulrich 1989: 13). The United States was one of the
leading wheat producers in the world, but found formidable competitors in Argentina,
Russia, Canada, and Australia. In 1913, the United States exported more than four
million tons of wheat, just eight years later the United States exported nine million tons,
earning more than $1 billion in grain exports (see table 10) (Morgan 1979: 66).
World Production and United States Production of Wheat, 1909-1914
World Production, Bushels U.S. Production, Bushels
1909
3,582,000,000
683,000,000
1910
3,575,000,000
635,000,000
1911
3,552,000,000
621,000,000
1912
3,792,000,000
730,000,000
1913
4,127,000,000
763,000,000
1914
3,586,000,000
891,000,000
Table 10
Source: Hibbard 1919: 7
The years between 1909 and 1914 were a watershed moment in the trajectory of
American agricultural policy. During this period, farmers in the United States
experienced historic heights for their commodities relative to the goods and services they
purchased. For example, in 1910 farmers paid an index price of 97 percent of production
costs, which included taxes, interests, and wages (Hurt 1994: 12). Based on the principle
of parity, the federal government would utilize the 1909-1914 period as a measurement
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for paying farmers following the Great Depression (Hofstadter 1956). What would
become known as price supports would act as a standard for agricultural policy over the
next half-century, ensuring that the price farmers received for commodities they produced
were equal or near equal to the cost of production. In this way, parity was used as a
measurement to create equality between agricultural commodities and industrial prices
farmers paid so as to offset the growing rift between rural and urban natures. This
development will be explained in chapter five.
What were the reasons for the long-run prosperity for farmers? A central factor in
the farmer’s prosperity was gold. For thirty years after the Civil War a combination of
constrained money supply with the first American agricultural productivity revolution led
to depressed prices. It was groups like the Greenbacks and the Populists who in the late
nineteenth century pushed for an increase in the volume of currency that would increase
inflation, thereby lowering farmers’ debt to asset ratio (Mooney and Majka 1995). By
1897, there was a greater flow in the global circulation of gold which eased credit,
resulting in increased prices for food commodities (Prasad 2012). Between 1896 and
1909 a bushel of wheat increased from 72 cents to 98 cents, corn went from 21 cents to
57 cents, and cotton went from 6 cents to 14 cents a pound (Hofstadter 1956: 110). With
the increase in the supply of gold, inflation was beneficial to farmers.
Another central factor in the American farmer’s prosperity was the expanding
urban markets. While exports markets stagnated, or declined in some years, throughout
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, American cities were growing at a rapid
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rate.32 The period between 1890 and 1920 witnessed an increase in both rural and urban
populations, with urban populations increasing faster. Immigrants represented a larger
supply of cheap labor for urban industrial capitals. In 1890, over 5.7 million farms
supplied a domestic urban population of 22.1 million people. By 1920, 6.4 million farms
were supplying 54 million urban people (Hofstadter 1956: 110).
Rural banks were a key institution to farm families’ prosperity. Credit has always
been an essential element in farming, even for wealthy farmers. Rural credit reform had
been debated for years, but by 1910 there were two major constituents fighting to shape
the trajectory of finance in agriculture. The first group was the American Bankers’
Association which sought to limit the government’s capabilities in provisioning
agricultural credit. The second group was farmers who demanded that the government
intervene to provide longer loan periods and lower interest rates. In 1916, President
Wilson under political pressure from Midwestern farmers, signed the Federal Farm Loan
Act (Link 1964). The bill was a compromise to each group, in which banks profited from
the increased business while wealthy farmers enjoyed better term loans, including
“amortization, long terms, easy payments, profit sharing, limited liability, farmer control,
tax-free mortgages” (Shulman 2003: 128). 33 During this period farmers were able to take
low-interest rate loans from the newly established Federal Farm Loan System. 34 Rural
banks popped up everywhere, often where there were already multiple banks serving an
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There was a steady decline of exports of foodstuffs from $545,473,695 in 1900 to
$369,087,974 in 1910. By 1910 the urban population made up almost half of the United
States population (Saloutos and Hicks 1951: 27).
33 Schulman (2003) argues that the Federal Farm Loan Act set a precedent for farm credit
and was influential to New Deal policies.
34 Under the Federal Farm Loan Act, 12 farm land banks were given $500,000 each and
40 year loans at 6 percent interest (Bowers 1974: 76).
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area. Between 1914 and 1920 more than 1,700 new banks began operating (Saloutos and
Hicks 1951: 103). Life Insurance companies, too, had served farmers with mortgage
loans with favorable conditions. In fact, life insurance companies became the biggest
lender of mortgages to farmers (Clarke 1994).
Meanwhile, prior to the agricultural policies of the Great Depression, the
government introduced guaranteed minimum prices for wheat, corn, and cotton, along
with other farm commodities. Optimistic bankers urged farmers to purchase farm
equipment and expand farming operations more loans with friendly credit. With prices as
high as they were, $3.00 per bushel of wheat and $2.50 per bushel of corn, farmers could
pay off debts within a few years (Sage 1974: 253). Rural banks, some who had no
experience with farming as a business, lent out money to high risk customers. Giving
greater credit and reasonable rates to farmers meant greater profits for banks, who at the
time were flush with money. Banks and insurance companies were deeply implicated in
the prosperity and later depression farmers experienced. In order for most farmers to
modernize their operations required loans from banks. The federal funds funneled into
rural banks, providing low interest loans to farmers. The problem, however, was that
farmers were resistant to accruing debt to capitalize the farm (Clarke 1991). An
advertisement from Country Gentlemen attacked the farmer’s fear of debt, insinuating
this fear was unreasonable (Neth 1995: 219). Bankers and reformers promoted the idea
that debt was necessary, and even desirable, for making improvements to increase
income. Many farmers and bankers enjoyed in the prosperity together.
Perhaps one of the most important factors constituting the prosperous times was
the dramatic increase in land values. The land value of farms in the United States had
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increased during this period. From 1900 to 1910 land value increased by 118.1 percent
for the country (Saloutos and Hicks 1951: 22). From 1910 to 1920 the value of farm
property increased from $40,991,449,090 to $78,924,100,338, a 90 percent increase (US
Census 1920: 29). Between 1900 and 1910 the average price for an acre of Iowa land
went from $36.35 to $82.58, an increase of 127.2 percent (Schwieder 1996: 146). “In the
best farming areas, such as Iowa, the price of farmland more than doubled between 1914
and 1920” (Cochrane 1993: 100). Iowa lands that sold for $3 to $5 per acre in 1870s were
selling for $135 to $155 an acre in 1910 (Saloutos and Hicks 1951: 23). Over this entire
period, land values across the United States increased by 70 percent, with the highest land
values in the Corn Belt (Fitzgerald 2003: 17). The cyclical nature of land values would
have a profound impact on the historical trajectory of farming and its linkages with other
industries. Importantly, it was not that farmers were becoming wealthy on the
commodities they produced and sold, but made their money, at least on paper, through
land appreciation (Saloutos and Hicks 1951). The cause of the appreciate in land values
has been widely theorized, but the most convincing causes are the increasing investment
in farm equipment and buildings, improved availability of markets, and improved roads
and schools, combined with the world’s increasing supply of gold, “which had inflated all
prices”, with food prices rising more rapidly (Saloutos and Hicks 1951: 24). 35
Land served two purposes for farmers. Purchasing more land would enable
farmers to produce more commodities so as to increase profits. Greater overall
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Some claimed that the closing of the frontier that when combined with a great interest
in land speculation, created land scarcity and concomitant rise in land values. In truth,
there was still much land available in the first quarter of the twentieth century, especially
in the west.
174

production would enable farmers to pay off their debts and make reasonable profits. Land
was also source of wealth to acquire more wealth via speculation. Land speculation was
particularly prominent in states like Iowa and Illinois, where land values were some of
the highest in the nation. In 1910, the average price for an acre of in Iowa was $82.58,
and by 1920 it had jumped to $199.52. For Illinois, during the same period, the increase
was from $95.02 to $164.20 (Saloutos and Hicks 1951: 102). Speculation was not limited
to eastern nor international capitalists, but farmers of modest means also engaged in
speculation.
World War I was a catalyst for agricultural growth and farm prosperity,
generating unprecedented demand for farm commodities. Under the Food Production and
Food Control Acts of 1917, President Woodrow Wilson appointed ex-Iowan Herbert
Hoover as the chair of the Food Administration. Hoover ordered massive increases in
food production, especially in wheat and hogs, with a set minimum price of $2 for wheat,
which bold well for Wheat Belt farmers who experienced increased income as a result
(Nordin and Scott 2005). Unfortunately, the price fix came too late for the 1917 wheat
crop that was almost the same as the previous year due primarily to unfavorable weather.
Corn Belt farmers had also experienced prosperity, although not to the degree of their
Wheat Belt counterparts. Hog prices were not fixed like they had been for wheat, but the
Food Administration worked with middle-men to assure a price of $15.50 per
hundredweight for hogs (Saloutos and Hicks 1951: 95). Under the national agricultural
program farmers were urged to produce without limits and at whatever cost (Wallace
1924). Like many wars of the twentieth century, patriotic duty called for all citizens to
sacrifice to win the war. One slogan stated, “Win the War—Damn the expense” (Wallace
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1924: 1). Another said, “Plow to the Fence for National Defense!”, in which 40 million
extra acres was brought under the plow for food production (Ramey 2014: 89). 36 The
average annual value of American farms between 1910 to 1914 was six billion dollars.
By 1917, it was $13 billion and growing thereafter (Saloutos and Hicks 1951: 90). During
and immediately after World War I, cotton rose from 7 cents per pound to 35 cents a
pound, wheat went from 67 cents a bushel to $2.16 a bushel, and corn increased from 67
cents to $1.44 a bushel. Gross farm income more than doubled from $7.6 million to $17.7
million (Winders 2009: 33-4). Wheat Belt petty commodity producers have historically
experienced greater highs and lows in income than the Corn Belt producers, who were
more economically stable. World War I reinforced this pattern. The demands of World
War I brought optimism and prosperity to the American farm, evidenced in higher farm
prices and incomes.
Lastly, the prosperity of the American farm family pivoted on the unpaid work of
women and children, whose labor conditions had not improved proportionally to men
over a century. In fact, the unpaid work of women and children was roughly the same in
most farming regions (Schwieder and Fink 1999). In the Corn Belt the soils, family
farms, and community institutions remained rich throughout the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. Without the farm- and community-based strategies of survival,
family farming would have to ceased to exist by the turn of the twentieth century.
Prosperity, then, was a product of unequal power relations constituted through gender and
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Saloutos and Hicks (1951: 90) estimated 45,000,000 extra acres were brought in under
the plow.
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class hierarchies that would continue to persist through the first half of the twentieth
century and beyond.
How did the Corn Belt experience prosperity and how did the region contribute to
the United States economy? In the early twentieth century, the United States was the
leading corn producing country in the world. One gentleman at a corn carnival in 1899
stated that “from the beginning of Indiana to the end of Nebraska there is nothing but
corn, cattle, and contentment” (Ross 1051: 118). States like Iowa and Illinois led in corn
production, along with Minnesota and Wisconsin. During the mid-1920s the Midwest
produced one-third of the total of American agricultural production, with Iowa and
Illinois leading the way (Alston 2010: 10). Most of the corn produced on farms, nearly
three-fourths, was used as feed for hogs and cattle (Warman 2003: 182). Again, Corn
Belt farmers were less dependent on world markets compared to Wheat Belt and Cotton
Belt farmers. While wheat dwarfed corn in terms of American exports, wheat acreage
was about half that of corn acreage (Warman 2003: 183). Over the twentieth century corn
would surpass wheat as the key crop in American agriculture.
Iowa, the premier agricultural state in the United States, led the nation in gross
value of output with $365,411,000 of the nation’s value in agricultural products in 1900
(Johnson 1978: 163). Once again environment-making in the form of drainage of Iowa’s
northwest quarter would be crucial for increasing agricultural growth. In 1912, after
drainage projects were completed all records in terms of acreage, yield, and production
were broken (Hampton 1945). In 1916, Iowa alone had roughly 53 percent of the
livestock receipts at the Chicago stockyards (Ross 1951: 121). In 1914, Iowa’s gross
income from farming and agriculture grew to over half a billion, making nearly nine
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percent of the total of the United States (Ross 1951: 121). Reflected in these
transformations was an increase in land values and value per farm. During the period
between 1900 and 1910 land values in Iowa went from $36.35 per acre to $82.58, “an
increase of 127.2 per cent” (Ross 1951: 121-2). The average value per farm increased
from $8,023 to $17,259 (Ross 1951: 122). These changes were unmatched across the
nation, except in Illinois and Wisconsin. Many farmers used the wealth accrued from
increased land values to obtain credit to purchase more land and machinery.
Illinois, followed by Iowa, had the greatest concentration of prosperous farmers in
the United States. Cash-grain farms averaged $2,781 annually (Nordin and Scott 2005:
104). The average annual income for a Corn Belt family farm was $1,938 (Jellison 1993:
23). Per capita of the wealth of people was approximately $2,584 (Iowa Census). The
number of farms increased during this period. In 1915 there were 199,755 farms and by
1925 there were 208,780 farms (Iowa Census 1925: lxxiii). One of the major factors for
the increase is tenant farmers buying their own farms. Iowa and Illinois had the most
numerous farms that were well-off. In the Corn Belt tenant farmers were averaging
around $900 in income a year. In the South, tenants averaged around $200 year (Hurt
1994: 42).
Aside from increased prices for farm commodities, Iowa farmers’ incomes were
at an all-time high, according to Hampton (1945), as a result of three factors. First,
Iowa’s productivity capacity held an unprecedented reserves of feed grains (table 2).
Second, the record-breaking acreage and yield of corn, wheat, and oats during World War
I ensured prosperity and development. Iowa farmers increased their basic food crops—
corn, oats, wheat, barley, and rye—by 26 percent over the average yearly production for
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that decade. And third, there was a great growth in the livestock and poultry industries,
itself made possible by cheap feed. Furthermore, speculation was held to a minimum,
while the “total farm mortgage indebtedness of the state was greatly curtailed” (Hampton
1945: 31).
Net Returns Per Labor Hour
Iowa
North Central States
1917
1918
1917
1918
.98
.88
.92
.52
1.26
1.08
.88
1.00
1.10
.58
.98
.68
.93
.77
.84
.40
1.63
.58
.72
.23
1.11
.44
.85
.65
.13
-.60
.77
-.05

Corn
Wheat
Oats
Rye
Barley
Potatoes
Hay
Table 11
Sources: Wallaces’ Farmer (1918); Saloutos and Hicks 1951: 99

By far the biggest contribution to the prosperity of the Corn Belt family farm was
the war demand for pork and pork products, especially lard (Saloutos and Hicks 1951:
94). Hog production increased 15 percent between 1917 and 1918 (Schwieder 1996:
149). It must be kept in mind that these were well-established European markets, with
roughly 12 percent of American pork and pork products had been shipped internationally
prior to the war. This nearly doubled with the war. The average United States lard exports
to Great Britain preceding the war was 450,000,000 pounds. By 1919 it was over a billion
pounds (Saloutos and Hicks 1951: 94). Lard remained the largest pork product export.
The exports of hams, shoulders, and bacon declined as competition from Danish
producers provided higher quality pork products (Taylor 1932). Perhaps more injurious to
American packers exporting pork products like hams and bacon was Britain’s prohibition
of boric acid in 1927. American packers had relied on boric acid as a key input for
preserving meats, while packers from Europe because of their closer distance to Britain’s
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market did not require the use of boric acid (Taylor 1932). Banning the use of boric acid
increased the cost of business for American packers. Nonetheless, pork and pork
products, especially lard, remained a massive source of income for farmers and packers.
Corn Belt farmers, recall, often assessed the prices received for corn and hog to
determine whether they would sell the corn as is or on the hoof. Overall, corn production
had stagnated for the years 1916 and 1918, leading to higher prices for corn. With hog
prices at an average $8 per hundredweight, farmers were incentivized to sell more corn.
However, the Food Administration, with the assistance of the Chicago Board of Trade,
artificially increased the price for hogs to roughly $15 per hundredweight (Saloutos and
Hicks 1951: 95). Exports of pork and pork products increased considerably during the
war period, leading to greater prosperity for Corn Belt families.
Other indictors of the prosperity Iowa, Illinois and other Corn Belt states was the
greater use of modern technologies and conveniences. Among Midwestern states, Iowa
and Illinois had the highest rates of electricity in the home, as well as running water. By
the early 1920s automobile ownership in these states were among the highest in the
country (Schwieder 1996: 150). In fact, over the first quarter of the twentieth century
rural people had a higher proportion of cars than urban people (Kline 1997). Telephones,
dishwashers, and indoor bathrooms were more common in the Corn Belt compared to
other agricultural regions. Finally, rural free mail delivery was being generalized
throughout the Corn Belt, and by 1901 Iowa had nearly 300 routes (Schwieder 1996:
143). While communication and transportation technologies increased the standard of
living for many Corn Belt farm families, farm women’s experience did not evenly reflect
these developments.
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During the decade and a half before World War I, and shortly thereafter,
optimism about the prosperity of agricultural was exceptional. Agricultural journals,
businessmen, popular magazines, and elites boosted of the accomplishments of what we
would become known as the “New Agriculture”, which expressed the changes from
settler farming to modern farming. The good times brought increased investment in land,
farm equipment, and modernized buildings. Most of these were purchased on credit or
farmers took out mortgages, as limited available cash remained a problem. As long as
prices remained higher for farm commodities, farmers were able to pay back their loans.
By 1920, Corn Belt agriculture had developed the most productive, diverse, and dynamic
farming system in the world (Hurt 1994).
The Farm Woman Problem: A Little Known Historical Development
Under the veil of prosperity women’s working conditions at the turn of the
twentieth century were more like their mothers than husbands. While farming regions
around the United States had experienced economic prosperity throughout the golden
age, farm women had been largely absent from the benefits. The gendered socioecological relations of reproduction that maintained the farm through the first agricultural
revolution were exhausted at the turn of the twentieth century. The drudgery of farm and
household work for women led to a great migration for urban employment. Men’s
patriarchal control over the means of production and resource allocation only heightened
the contradictions between men and women. Although agrarianism obscured patriarchal
control over the benefits and costs of petty commodity production, farm women in
greater waves were entering wage work to increase their independence but also out of
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necessity to save the family farm. The asymmetry of the agrarian web of life reached its
apex during the golden age, giving impetus to the advancement of housewifization.
At the turn of twentieth century as the frontier had officially closed and the United
States had entered a period of greater industrialization, there was a growing concern over
the wave of rural to urban migration. 37 Specifically, it was women who were leaving the
farm in greater droves, even while the farm sector experienced its greatest prosperity.
Although women’s work was not valued, at some point during the migration crisis,
agricultural leaders admitted that to maintain the family farm would mean remaking the
lives of farm women. “Uncle” Henry C. Wallace wrote in the Wallace’s Farmer, “Until
we make life on the farm satisfying to the farmer’s wife, we will labor in vain to check
the drift of rural population to the towns and cities” (Jellison 1993: 5). The solution
according to the state, capital, and agricultural experts was to advance agrarian
housewifization.
The state acted when President Theodore Roosevelt created the commission on
country life, consisting of the leading agricultural experts, such as Henry C. Wallace,
Liberty Hyde Bailey, and Kenyon Butterfield. 38 The commission conducted research on
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In 1900, the farm and urban populations in the United States were almost equal. By
1910 the urban population of the United States had clearly passed the farming population
(Gardner 2002: 92-3).
38 The Country Life Commission consisted of seven prominent men. The director of the
commission was internationally known horticulturalist and director of the College of
Agriculture at Cornell, Liberty Hyde Bailey. Henry Wallace, editor of the Midwestern
journal, Wallace’s Farmer, Kenyon Butterfield, the most prominent rural sociologist and
president of the Massachusetts College of Agriculture, Walter Hines Page, editor of the
World’s Work, Gifford Pinchot, U.S. Forest Service, W.A. Beard, editor of the Great
Western Magazine of California, and finally, C.S. Barret, president of the Farmer’s Union
in Georgia, who of all the men had most direct experience in farming (Larson and Jones
1976: 583-4). These prominent men were connected to well-respected mainstream
institutions and were quite influential in their respected fields. The commission and its
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rural wellbeing, providing questionnaires to farm families all over the United States. The
questionnaire compromised of twelve questions, including “Are the farm homes in your
neighborhood as good as they should be under existing conditions?”, “Do the farmers in
your neighborhood get the returns they reasonably should from the sale of their
products?”, and “Are the sanitary conditions of the farms in your neighborhood
satisfactory?”.39 The members of the Country Life Commission found that one of the
most prominent major deficiencies was “the burdens and the narrow life of farm women”
(Bailey 1908: 15). Based on 94,000 responses the results showed that farm women were
overwhelmingly unsatisfied with farm life (Larson and Jones 1976). Perhaps not
surprisingly, the most respondents came from the “North-Central” region (i.e. the
Midwest), where there was a large farming population and a relatively larger population
of better-off agrarian households. While farm women were universally unsatisfied with
their working conditions and life on farms, the most promising population and that would
become the target of housewifization were women from the Midwest.
In 1913, a few years after the initial Country Life Commission report, President
Woodrow Wilson’s secretary of agriculture David Houston sent out letters to the wives of
USDA volunteer crop correspondents so as to procure feedback how the USDA could
help farm women. Of the 2,241 replies Houston received, the majority were white,
middle-class, and native-born. The chief complaint from farm women was that their work
was severely under mechanized compared to farm men (Jellison 1993: 10-11). Houston,
echoing the ideas of the USDA and agricultural leaders, stated that “the woman on the

report became foundational to a larger Country Life Movement (Bowers 1974; Danbom
1979).
39 For a full list of the questions see Larson and Jones (1976: 586-587).
183

farm is a most important economic factor in agriculture…On her rests largely the moral
and mental development of the children, and on her attitude depends in great part the
important question of whether the succeeding generation will continue to farm or will
seek the allurements of life in the cities” (Jellison 1993: 15). In 1919 home demonstration
agents conducted a survey of over 10,000 farm women in 33 northern and western states
and found similar results to earlier studies regarding the condition of farm women in the
United States (Ward 1920). One of the requirements of the study was to make sure all
economic groups of farm women were represented. Ward (1920: 438), the head of the
extension work for women in the USDA, acknowledges that it was more likely that
“progressive” members of the community would participate in the survey. The middling
farm families became the principal target for reformers because they were the ones that
were more likely and capable of adapting the principles of the New Agriculture. That is,
deepening capitalist relations of farming such that men were individualized capitalist
farmers and women were individualized homemakers. The fragmentation and separation
of the gendered division of labor became a principle organizing force in the nature of
farming in the twentieth century.
Government and agricultural leaders were concerned about the growing
resentment women were expressing. President Roosevelt was concerned about what he
called “race suicide”, in which there was a marked decline in births for urban white
women. Roosevelt hoped that white farm women would make up for the declining birth
rate and supply the nation with abundant “child crops”.40 To do this meant to make rural
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Hempstead (1992) and others have argued that the Country Life Movement contained
within a thread of support for eugenics, sometimes explicitly.
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life more hospitable. Herbert Quick, a journalist from Iowa and a prominent figure in the
Country Life Movement, wrote in the popular national magazine, Good Housekeeping,
that the rural to urban migration was primarily a movement of women. While men were
more content on the farm, women’s conditions were abysmal leading to migration. Quick
emphasized that to keep women on the farm required modernizing the home with the
latest appliances and conveniences (Ramey 2014).
The Care Crisis of Women’s Double Burden
If a growing number of reports indicated the dissatisfaction of farm women’s
experiences and wellbeing, what exactly were those conditions and how did farm women
express their dissatisfaction? Women’s work was constant and increased during the late
nineteenth century. This was the case for men as well (Craig and Weiss 2000). However,
differences abound. First, while many farm families were cash strapped, even during this
period of great prosperity, purchasing farm equipment was top priority, which lightened
the physical burden of men’s work. Women’s combination of unpaid work that limited
household expenditures and paid work that allowed the purchasing of household
commodities, itself a form of work, along with cheap money enabled farm families to
purchase farm equipment, improved livestock, and inputs. Although farm women worked
in the field, barn, and household, women shouldered nearly all the burden of housework.
The labor conditions of the household were often neglected in favor of improving
conditions in the field and barn. Osterud (1993) argues that field work when compared to
domestic work gained the greater attention because at certain stages field crops required
immediate attention while some domestic chores were more flexible and could be
completed later. What Osterud (1993) fails to mention, although she would likely agree,
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is that it was capitalist markets that conditioned and structured “immediate attention” and
“flexibility”. While both men and women had entered and participated in the
modernizing project of the New Agriculture, women were working in similar conditions
as their mothers, not comparable to their husbands. Work, patriarchy, and capitalism were
interpenetrating forces structuring the social conditions of existence for men and women.
The spatiality of the agrarian web of life was asymmetrically gendered, placing a
greater physical burden on women. Farm women most complained about lack of access
to nearby water, lack of electricity, and outdated equipment (Jellison 1993). They often
complained that wells were conveniently located near barns to water livestock, while they
were some distance to the kitchen where she would perform much of her work. The
average farm family was using around 175 gallons a day for just the household. This
required farm women to fetch many pales of water from around 40 feet away. For Plains
women, the distance was usually farther than for Midwestern women, owing to lack of
available water sources (Schwieder and Fink 1999). Kansas women, and women of the
arid Plains, also complained of the incessant cleaning due to the never-ending battle
against dust. While ecological conditions were favorable for the humid Midwest families
compared to the dry Plains, which lightened the burden of heavy lifting, many
Midwestern farm women experienced unaccommodating working conditions. An Iowa
farm woman stated: “In my opinion, the worse feature of the farm is too much work and
too little pleasure. No wonder young folks leave the farm. The main cause of
dissatisfaction of housewives is their isolation” (Schwieder 1986: 202). Another farm
woman complained about how farm men invested all the income into the farm operations,
while neglecting the household, stating:
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“…I would work to have a law passed whereby no man should be allowed
to own a farm unless he would provide for his wife as well as he did for
his stock—plenty of water, and easy to get, good drainage, and other
sanitary conditions about the farmhouse” (Fink 1986: 38).
One Kansas farm woman responded with wanting electricity in the home for a reasonable
price:
“The thing [farm woman] needs in this day and time is electricity. Then
when her house is lighted, her cream separated and churned, her washing,
ironing, and sweeping, her sewing machine run by the same power, and
she relieved from the drudgery of washing and filling lamps, lifting and
washing jars, pans, and all these other hard old things, she can have some
time for a social life and the improvement of her mind” (Jellison 1993:
13).
There were two extremes of rural farm women. First, those wealthy farm women
that ordered paid housekeepers. Recall from chapter three, domestic hired girls were a
scarcity throughout the Midwest, in which most were employed in wealthy, and some
middling, households. Second, those women that farmed and performed waged work. In
between these extremes was the more common, at least during the first quarter of the
twentieth century, the farm wife who farmed, performed household labor, and exchanged
non-commodity crops to local markets. Home economists did not target farm women
working as waged labor. Rather, they focused on women who engaged in domestic work,
household production, and some farming.
The crisis of care work and the production of cheap food are co-produced in the
capitalist web of life. When we break down a typical week for farm women compared to
urban women we can see the tremendous amount of work each were performing. A 1932
study indicated that farm women were averaging 62 hours a week with a quarter working
over 70 hours, while urban women were averaging 52 hours a week (see table 12). Over a
single year farm women were working more than 500 hours more than their urban
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counterparts. The biggest difference was of course in farm work, which for farm women
performed more than 450 hours more than their urban counterpart. On the whole, women
and certainly farm women were working more hours a week than men working industrial
jobs (Kneeland 1932: 564). Although an exaggeration, a common phrase at the time was
that “man works in twentieth century while his wife keeps house in the sixteenth”
(Kneeland 1929: 6). Overworked farm women and cheap food, then, advanced economic
growth while undermining the conditions of social reproduction.

Farm and Urban Homemakers Time Spent Per Day, 1932
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Table 12
Source: Kneeland, H. 1932. “Leisure of Home Makers Studied for Light on Standards of
Living.” In Yearbook of Agriculture 1932, 562-564.
If we break down earnings from the unpaid and paid labor of women we can get a
better sense of their contributions to the family farm and economic growth. One study
asked farm women what their wages for housework should be: farm women stated $2 an
hour (Kneeland 1927: 387). If we average the 63 hours a week by $2 you get $126 a
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week. Annual income in wages would amount to $6,300. Recall from chapter three that
Illinois and Iowa farmers were the most prospersouf farm units. During the Great
Depression, the average annual net income for Illinois farmers was roughly $2,000 and in
Iowa slightly less (Nordin and Scott 2005: 104). During the 1930s, women’s home
production was estimated at 40 to 50 percent of the total household budget (Schwieder
1996: 265). Farm women knew that by not hiring domestic servant she could stretch the
household income. Given all this, it stands to reason that women’s combination of waged
and non-waged labor was substantial to household income.
In sum, the ‘farm woman problem’ is often absent from historical accounts of
Midwestern agriculture. The prosperity of the golden age obscures the hardships women
experienced, as well as their economic contribution. Farm prosperity, as I have indicated
here, cannot be reduced to transformation in the productive forces of producing
commodity crops, or even to the role of the state. Rather, this prosperity was a product of
the cheapening of farm women. In this way, we can see the dialectical contradictory
nature of production and social reproduction, its social crisis-tendencies, and the social
conditions of agrarian existence. Capital and the state took note and acted on the growing
plight of farm women by introducing new ways of organizing the agrarian web of life.
Science and Power: Remaking Farm Women as Housewives
Farm women were active participants in unveiling the paradoxical conditions of
the golden age of farming and their lives. To be sure, farm presses and political leaders
were writing of the “drudgery” of farm women in the nineteenth century, but the
historical conditions of the twentieth century presented a stark contrast of modernization
and underdevelopment within the agrarian household. But as detailed above, farm women
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were active participants in struggling against the cheapening of their lives. According to
the state and capital, the solution was housewifization for agrarian women, which became
a key element a larger agrarian revolution unfolding throughout the United States. 41
Furthermore, as chapter five will explain, while stagnating agricultural productivity and
rising food prices boosted farmers’ income, rising food prices posed an obstacle to capital
accumulation, a growing concern for industrial capitalists and other elites in the first
quarter of the twentieth century. Although the state and capital sought to modernize all
agrarian institutions under the impetus of the Country Life Movement, women’s political
actions and demands for higher status via improved labor conditions impelled the state
and capital to act. The state nor capital, however, were interested in dismantling
patriarchy on the farm or in the city. Rather, they sought through different means and
reasons, sometimes in contradictory ways, to restructure farm women as housewives.
The double burden of farm women had reached crisis proportions by the late
nineteenth century. Many daughters left the farm for wage labor and educational
opportunities, leaving farm women with a greater portion of reproductive work. The
exhaustion of the social relations of reproduction conditioned the Smith-Lever Act of
1914, which “created a voluntary system through which the federal government provided
matching funds on the basis of the rural population to states and counties that desired the
services of country farm and home demonstration agents” (Jellison 1993: 16). A
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Not to be confused with agricultural revolutions, which primarily focuses on advancing
farm productivity, agrarian revolutions are fundamental transformations in the socioecological relations of reproduction and production. Clearly, this is not an easy separation
given that agrarian social relations constitute agricultural revolutions and agricultural
revolutions constitute agrarian social relations. In any case, when speaking of agrarian
revolutions, we are focusing on farm peoples’ subjectivities.
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partnership between the USDA, agricultural colleges, and farm bureaus, would carry out
the work of what became known as the “Agricultural and Home Economics Extension
Service”, which divided the farm into two distinct spheres: farm work and housework.
Farm work was linked to the man’s sphere, while housework was linked to the woman’s
sphere, and never the two shall meet. Louise Stanley, the first chief of the Bureau of
Home Economics, stated that “the contribution which home economics studies have to
make to national economy has not yet been realized…The closer the adjustment between
production and home demands the greater the economy to all, especially if the home
demands are so directed as to promote health, efficiency, and well-being of the
individuals” (Stanley 1924: 1). Echoing Stanley (1924), Florence Ward’s (1920: 7)
survey “The Farm Woman’s Problems” stated “The entire purpose which animates the
work of the cooperative extension service as it pertains to the home is to help the home
maker to so arrange the various departments of her housekeeping that she may secure for
herself, her family, and her community the highest possible degree of health, happiness,
and efficiency”. Farm women would now experience a systemic round of
housewifization, as science, capital, and nature sought to generalize the housewife of the
bourgeois household.
The reality of farm men and women’s separate spheres was non-existent, at least
for much of the farm population. As described in chapter three, farm women in the Corn
Belt worked alongside their men in the barn and in the field. The diversified farm
necessitated that farm women and their children participate in tending animals and
maintaining and harvesting field crops. Not only did the diversified farm require all
hands-on deck, especially during plowing, planting, and harvesting, but the lack of
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money to pay farm workers necessitated the appropriation of women and children’s
unpaid work. Bourgeois farmers were more likely to construct a gender division of labor
based on men working in the fields and women working in the household (Neth 1995).
Bourgeois farmers were able to hire more field hands, allowing women to maintain the
household and daughters to attend school. The bourgeois farmer, like his urban
counterpart, actively constructed the ideal farm family to emulate. The extension service
would impose the bourgeois farm model on petty commodity producers.
The extension service had long been in operation with the Morrill Land-Grant Act
of 1862, primarily focusing on farm men, but resources were much more limited and
based on state and local organizations, including private capital. Now, the federal
government would pump money into extension services all around the country, and in
1915 created an Office of Home Economics to provide research support for the home
agents (Kline 1997: 360). Importantly, though, farm communities were expected to raise
funds for home agents to subsidize their salaries. It is no surprise then that the first home
agent under the Smith-Lever Act began working in the Kankakee County, Illinois, a
wealthy farming county in east-central Illinois. Fifteen-hundred women the Kankakee
County pledged $1 a year for three years to fund the work Eva Benefiel. Home economist
Eva Benefiel completed her first home demonstration on July 1, 1915. began working in
Kankaee County, Illinois on July 1, 1915. Housewifization would then be enacted and
financially supported by the federal government and its extension services. Scientific
homemaking as environment-making became the order of the day.
During its first decade of work home economists sought to improve the lives of
women through increasing social opportunities, improved food preparation techniques,
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home sanitation, and household efficiency (Schwieder 1986). To do this, the extension
service encouraged cooperation and social interaction centered on preexisting groups and
organizations. Women had already been part of a wide range of community networks that
exchanged food, household items, and labor. Community groups, both formal and
informal, provided a social outlet for women as well as an economic safety net. Home
economists realized the benefits of women’s groups and sought to reinforce those
connections. Women’s relationship to one another not only increased social opportunities
that would relieve the isolation of farm life, but these exchanges also entailed lowering
the cost of reproducing the family (Neth 1995).
By all accounts abstract social nature through USDA home economists sought to
maximize the unpaid work of women, concentrating their efforts on the management of
the household. While farm women had complained about their status within the family
farm unit evidenced in their labor conditions, home economists took the complaints as
inefficiencies in the relations of reproduction in the household. The chief goal for home
economists was to map out the household as a space for increasing the efficiency of
women, solidifying their roles as housewives. Although generally coming from a farming
background, the worldview of home economists was a gendered normative abstraction
where the separate spheres of production and reproduction made up the family farm.
The deficits of the rural household needed to be modernized through
rationalization and simplification of domestic work. The nature of the household could be
reduced to “mathematical abstraction” (Moore 2017: 11) in the life-making capacities of
women. The solution was a series of interventions via home demonstrations on how best
to organize the household as abstracted from the agrarian web of life. Above all, the
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drudgery of farm women could be eliminated through home economist’s practices of
abstract social nature which sought to restructure the spatio-temporalities of domestic
work. For example, women wasted time and energy walking many miles in a given day
in old-fashioned kitchens. Kitchen spaces of work were irrationally organized such that
the stove, sink, and work table were too far apart. The kitchen was the workshop to the
largest occupational group in the United States: housewives (Kneeland 1929). As such,
the kitchen became the hidden abode of social reproduction, a vital space for the
preconditions of cheap food.

Modernizing the Farm Kitchen

Figure 7
Source: USDA Archive: Apron Strings and Kitchen Sinks: The USDA Bureau of Home
Economics, Barrows (1921).
Caption: Above are two kitchen plans. The kitchen “A” plan is wasteful in that it requires
more steps between the stove, table, and sink. The kitchen “B” plan is more efficient in
that the workshop is more condensed, limiting the necessary amounts of steps taken.
Not only were kitchens battlegrounds for housewifization, but women’s bodies
became a focal point as well. USDA bulletins like “Posture in Housework” explain how
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“using your body correctly” can reduce the amount of energy required, thereby
improving efficiency in housework. Proper posture and the use of correct tools when
sweeping, washing dishes, and walking up and down stairs could reduce energy use (see
below). The results of good posture in housework would help eliminate fatigue, improve
looks, and get rid of nervous tensions and irritability (USDA). The household was treated
as a factory, whereby women’s labor process could be rationalized. However, unlike the
factory workers who fragmented into smaller and smaller components of a larger labor
process, women still performed all the household chores.

Figure 8
Source: USDA Archive: Apron Strings and Kitchen Sinks: The USDA Bureau of Home
Economics, Barrows (1921).
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Figure 9
Source: USDA Archive: Apron Strings and Kitchen Sinks: The USDA Bureau of Home
Economics, Barrows (1921).
The solution to the farm problem and the process constituting agrarian
housewifization was deepening market-dependency. Besides encouraging already
existing cooperation between women of the community, home economists concentrated
their efforts on convincing women and families to modernize the household with
electricity and running-water and to purchase appliances like washing machines and
refrigerators. The idea was that modernization of domestic work would lighten the
physical burden of women daily chores, freeing her from drudgery to pursuit leisure
activities. The mass production of relatively cheap household commodities enabled farm
families to consume new products. To be clear, the home economics extension service
was not about teaching women to farm, nor about obtaining credit or labor if a single
woman was to pursue farming, and finally, the service was not about challenging the
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hierarchal gendered structure of the farm (Fink 1986). Women’s rightful position,
according to the extension service, was in the private sphere of the home. One of capital’s
tried and true method of stabilizing historical crises has been to increase marketdependency. In the first quarter of the twentieth century the solution to the farm women
crisis was housewifization by way of consumerism.
In their pursuit to remake home environments, home agents were entering an
established set of bundled relations with defined patterns of food-getting and familymaking. Home agents, who were often single middle-class women, taught farm women
how to modernize their home with laborsaving technologies. The principle target of home
agents were white women from middling farm families. For those families that could not
afford to purchase the modern conveniences, it was recommended that women use their
“egg” money to make their purchases. Little did the home agent know that women’s egg
money had purchased the daily needs of the family, leaving no money left. While
agricultural experts acknowledged women’s role on the farm, they were acknowledging
wealthy farm families who could afford to maintain traditional bourgeois gender roles
and purchase the latest modern conveniences. Most home agents failed to realize the
debts farm families had incurred over this period of economic growth and expansion.
What disposable income was available it was often used to purchase farm equipment and
livestock. As a result of patriarchal control over resources and capitalism unduly focus on
advancing farm productivity, modernizing the home was of secondary concern for most
farm families—developments most home agents failed to fully appreciate.
Homemaking was institutionalized early on for Iowa women. Iowa farm women
had access to earlier forms of practical education through several mediums. In 1869,
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Iowa State College, later turned university, established what would become a prominent
Home Economics program in which women attended lectures and short courses
(Schwieder 1986). As earlier as 1870 Iowa had created its first farmers’ institute, which
was funded by local farmers (Morgan 1934). State and county farm institutes catered to
the needs of women. In 1901 the State Farmer’s Institute in Des Moines held a
conference where five papers were presented, three of which were farm women
themselves, on “The Farmer’s Garden”, “Domestic Economy”, “Culture and Social Life
in a Farming Community”, and “Poultry on the Farm” (Schwieder 1986: 203-4). Iowa
women, more than many in the Midwest and Plains, were exposed to higher education.
By 1900 Wallace’s Farmer carried a regularly column called, “Hearts and
Homes”, which provided the opportunity for farm women to write about their problems
and concerns. In some cases, they wrote about practical matters of housework and
gardens, and in other cases they discussed the deeper meanings around “their roles as
wives, mothers, and community members” (Schwieder 1986: 204). While initially the
column was open to Iowa farm women, over the coming decades home economists at
Iowa State College and extension personnel increasingly wrote in the column after the
1920s. Experts paid less attention to deeper structural problems of patriarchal dominance,
focusing greater attention on everyday tasks that farm women practiced. The changing
direction from Wallace’s Farmer from ordinary farm women to experts confirmed two
ongoing developments. First, dialogue shifted from critical stances of patriarchal
dominance towards improving the task-orientated day-to-day activities of women, as if
these were not inextricably linked to patriarchy. Second, that the role of experts was
gaining greater traction in society as part of the progressive era. As chapter five will
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detail, the Wallace family was influential to the historical trajectory of farming in Iowa
and the United States. In 1932, the journal’s circulation reached 244,870 subscribers,
many were Iowa farm families (Schwieder 1986: 206). Iowa farm women were certainly
at advantage compared to other farm women around the country, at least in terms of
opportunity to education.
To what extent did science, expertise, and power operate to improve the
productivity, and thus well-being of farm women? One of the main ways home
economists sought to measure women’s work was through time-use surveys. Under the
arm of the USDA Bureau of Home Economics and funded by the Purnell Act of 1925,
home economists and social scientists, like Illena Bailey (1915) and Hildegarde Kneeland
(1929), began to study every task that farm women performed. 42 Specifically, they
categorized women’s activities into four different categories: “homemaking” (household
management, childcare, and housecleaning), “farm work” (garden work, poultry, dairy,
and field), “leisure”, and sleep (Kline 1997: 368). 43 Home economists provided women
with forms where they were asked to fill in the time taken for daily activities for a week
(see figure 2 and 3). Farm women were contacted through the American Farm Bureau
Federation (AFBF), a national farm organization that represented wealthy commercial
farmers, which had access to many farm families as it had become the largest farm
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The Bureau of Economics and the Journal of Home Economics were central outlets for
research on farm women during this era.
43 There seems to be a parallel between time-use studies of rural farm women and
Taylorism that had developed to study the labor process of industrial workers. While
social scientists were preoccupied with creating “objective” surveys, they believed, like
Taylor and industrialists, that by studying the actions of workers (and non-workers as
well), one could point to inefficiencies and thereby seek to resolve that through
technological or organizational techniques.
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organization in the United States. Like most studies, non-English speaking women were
excluded, while the women most likely to participate were “well-educated, middle- and
upper-class, native-born, white women” (Kline 1997: 370). What these studies sought to
accomplish was to measure quantitatively the labor process women performed daily so as
to intervene with laborsaving household technologies to advance labor productivity and
to increase leisure time. Greater leisure would result in greater happiness in the farm wife
that would in turn creating a better life for farm families.
Daily Time Record of Homemaker

Figure 10
Source: National Agricultural Library. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Home
Economics. 1925.
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Daily Time Record of Homemaker

Figure 11
Source: National Agricultural Library. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Home
Economics. 1925.
Time-use surveys spanned all the facets of farm women’s lives. The research was
conclusive. Farm women were spending nearly 12 hours a day working, equating to
roughly 64 hours a week, which was substantially more than their urban counterparts
(Ramey 2014: 34). During the busy summer months women were regularly working
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more than 13 or 14 hours a day. Interestingly, studies suggest that parity in existed in
farm women’s average length of working-day across all geographical regions. However,
differences in ecology, crops, and class shaped the qualitative dimensions of farm
women. For example, Midwestern farm women spent more time raising larger poultry
flocks compared to eastern and western farm women. Midwestern women had greater
access to closer water sources than Plains women, resulting in less physical demands for
Midwestern women. Midwestern women also had greater access to power machinery and
engines that when not in use in field work could be hooked up to perform housework
(Ward 1920). The biggest time-difference in women’s work, however, was not between
rural women, but between rural and urban women.
The USDA home agents were largely unsuccessful in their attempts to modernize
large populations of farm women. Prior to World War I, had just begun performing home
demonstrations and had not much success. During the war, the federal government
infused more funding to the Bureau of Home Economics, dramatically increasing home
agents. During the war, however, home agents focused less on convincing women to
purchase home appliances and more conserving food for the war effort. Throughout the
1920s and 1930s home agents once again emphasized purchasing home appliances to
resolve the farm woman problem. The families that purchased modern appliances were
wealthier families affiliated with the AFBF, where the greatest concertation of members
was in Illinois and Iowa (Jellison 1993). It was not until after World War II had many
farmhouses were modernized when most families that were still farming were wealthier
ones that could afford house appliances.
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Home economics agents were not the only group to attempt the housewifization
of farm women. The AFBF also became an important institution for relegating women’s
work. The AFBF formed in 1919 that derived from county and state farm bureaus around
the United States. As a reaction to radical organizations like the Non-Partisan League, the
Farm Bureau was a conservative farm organization that upheld the agrarianism and was
financially linked to the USDA. The farm organization also held financial ties to
“International Harvester, the Chicago Board of Trade, and Sears” (Neth 1995: 132). Its
members were made up of larger commercial-orientated farmers, who were required to
pay substantial dues, up to $15 a year (McConnell 1953: 56).44 The Farm Bureau was in
charge of housing extension service county agents and promoting commercial farming.
The county agent would be a servant, not a leader, to the local farm bureau (McConnell
1953). In 1921, Henry C. Wallace, the secretary of agriculture, was one of the biggest
supporters of the Farm Bureau, and felt that as an organization it should be the most
powerful business institution in the United States. The Farm Bureau was an external force
structuring household social relations.
The first priority of the AFBF was upholding the goals of the agrarian
bourgeoisie—wealthy farmers, agribusinesses, and large landowners. Their goals focused
on improving production and marketing. Because of the goals focused primarily on
commodity crops and cash-nexus relations, subsistence work and home production were
secondary. The AFBF reinforced the nuclear bourgeois family in which worked was
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While there is widespread consensus that the Farm Bureau is composed of
predominately wealthy farmers, McConnell (1951: 149-150) actually provides
convincing evidence that the members of the Farm Bureau were overwhelmingly wealthy
farmers.
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differentiated by gender and alienated from the community. This negatively transformed
women’s’ activities as they were more likely to engage in community exchange than
men. The AFBF with the help of home economists promoted the individualization and
privatization of farm women and rural life. One study found that farm families in four
Midwest states “extension agents most effectively reached families living on large farms
and those who were members of the conservative Farm Bureau” (Wilson 1929, cited in
Jellison 1993: 41). Throughout the 1920s county and state farm bureaus concentrated on
integrating family-based activities that would seek to maintain the patriarchal form of the
family farm (Berlage 2001).
Capital in the Production of Nature
Although the USDA’s Home Economics agency and farm bureaus were important
institutions, it was capital that was more effective in the housewifization of farm women.
Unlike the extension agents, capital acknowledged the diversity of farm women’s work
and experiences (Jellison 1993). Capital, unlike extension agents, exploited the economic
opportunities that were presented as tensions grew between men and women’s work.
Advertisers played on the inequalities and insecurities of men and women, suggesting to
farm men that if they did not “bring the city to the farm” or purchase the latest
conveniences that promised to improve the lives of farm women their wives would leave
them to experience the modern urban world. In this way, housewifization and
modernization went hand in hand with capital accumulation and restructuring the form of
the family farm as a bourgeois family.
Women’s housework preserved the value of commodities, and no other lifemaking activity was as consistently physical demanding as laundry. “Blue Monday” was

204

laundry day in which the better part of the day was dedicated to cleaning clothes of the
entire family. Because many farm families did not have running water women had to
fetch water from a well or nearby waterhole. One wash, one boiling, and one rinse used
fifty gallons of water, equaling to 400 pounds. Women fetched water from the well,
which on average was 30 feet from the Midwestern house, 60 feet in the Plains
(Schwieder and Fink 1999). The water then had to be heated on the wood stove, itself
requiring corn cobs or wood to heat. 45 After heating the water and adding lye, which
softened the water, women agitated the clothes and linens with a hand crank (Fink 1986).
After hanging up the clothes and linen to dry they were brought in to dry. The following
day women ironed, sewed, and mended clothes and linens.
Since washing clothes constituted the greatest physical burden for women, there
was a push from women to find alternatives to washing clothes. Commercial laundry
services emerged in rural areas to serve farm families. Many women, even poor ones,
were glad to bring their family’s laundry to commercial laundromats. Roughly a third of
families utilized commercial laundromats during the 1920s (Smith 1990: 135). Laundry
cooperatives also formed to socialize housework throughout the community. Middling
and wealthy households regularly paid professional laundress to clean the family’s
clothes, either there at their household or at her household. On the whole, farm women
were pleased with the options of spending money to relinquish the burden of performing
laundry.
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Corn cobs were often used to heat wood stoves as corn was always an abundant
resource and required less energy hauling than wood. Using corn cobs ensured costs were
kept minimal.
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The laundry options provided to farm women in the early twentieth century was
an obstacle to washing-machine manufacturers. Manufacturers like Iowa’s Maytag
Company and Voss Company were now mass-producing washing machines for the home.
They advertised in farm journals like Wallace’s Farmer, which often pictured a young
white, middle-class woman smiling as she effortlessly washed clothes. Maytag
advertisements read, ““All Work and No Play is Not for the Farm Woman of Today”,
“Big Farm Washings Cost Less with Maytag”,” (Fink and Schwieder 1989: 587) and the
“gasoline-powered Liberty motor” promised to “liberate” farm women from the drudgery
of washing clothes (Jellison 1993: 45). Companies stressed the idea of modernity and
progress with the purchase of the latest model washing machine, and emphasized that
“women’s” technology should reflect the latest “men’s” technology. In this way,
companies were capitalizing on the existing inequalities between farm men and women,
but only in terms of farm and household equipment.
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Figure 12
Source: Wallace’s Farmer, August 15, 1931, 937.
The development of laundry does not follow the typical transition from private
housework to a marketed service, as was the case for clothing. Laundry work was
exclusively performed by the unpaid labor of women and daughters in the household.
When domestic servants, professional laundresses, and commercial laundromats
emerged, women were content to spend the money to offset the time and energy required
to wash clothes. However, manufactures mass production of washing machines intended
for the private use of the household with the expectation that women would once again
perform unpaid labor in washing clothes meant that once again women were offsetting

207

the cost of social reproduction. The purchase of household washing machines entailed the
purchasing of a whole host of commodities, including “detergents…electric parts,
plumbing supplies” and giving rise to a new branch in textiles, synthetic fabrics (Smith
1990: 136). Washing machine ownership was higher in the Corn Belt than most farming
regions. The initial cost for many was out of the reach for poorer farm families (Jellison
1993).
Companies like Sears, Roebuck and Company and Montgomery Ward, both
headquartered in Chicago, constructed a consumer market for rural populations (Worthy
1980). At the turn of the twentieth century, more than one of three people lived on farms,
constituting a large consumer base for businesses (Lobao and Meyer 2001: 103). Sears,
Roebuck Company provided a large selection of inexpensive goods that farm families
could afford. They also had a selection of luxury goods that wealthier farmers purchased.
In this way, the company was able to cater to a large swath of farmers while creating a
desirability element for poorer farmers (Neth 1995). Mail-order houses became an
important site for increasing the consumption habits of rural people. In part, there was a
great increase in the use of mail-order houses because prices were cheaper than those
charged by the local merchants (Saloutos and Hicks 1951). Most rural people were not
loyal to the local town merchants, and as a result, companies like Sears, Roebuck and
Company began to increase the distance between farmers and the commodities they
purchased that in turn undermined local merchants and community networks.
Communication and transportation technologies became another solution for
overcoming farm women’s hardships. By 1900, many farm families were gaining access
to telephones with local rural-based companies. Over the next two decades major

208

companies like AT&T gained monopoly power over urban markets and later penetrated
rural markets. Bell’s telephone promised to remove the isolation farm women were
experiencing. The telephone allowed women to market household commodities and
socialize with their neighbors and kin without leaving the farm (Jellison 1993). The
biggest obstacle to farm families purchasing telephones was the cost of infrastructure.
The cost of setting up telecommunication infrastructure depended on the concentration of
people within a given area. In the Corn Belt where telephone ownership was higher there
was a greater concentration of people. 46 Whereas in the Wheat Belt telephone ownership
was much lower for much longer because of the higher cost associated with a more
dispersed population. During the Great Depression, however, telephones were often the
first conveniences farms cut. Telephone ownership declined significantly for Wheat Belt
families who suffered more from droughts, while telephone ownership fell less drastically
in Corn and Dairy belts (Neth 1995: 201).
Radios were another modern convenience that changed the relationship between
farm families, their communities and the rest of the world. During the 1920s, with the
start of commercial broadcasting, thousands of farm families throughout the Midwest
purchased radios. Broadcasting entailed advertising, education, and entertainment. In
1912 in the Midwest Illinois had the highest ownership of radios at 12 percent of farm
homes. By 1940, Iowa had the highest ownership of radios at 85 percent (Neth 1995:
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Interestingly enough the 1920 United States Census revealed farm households owned
more telephones and automobiles than nonfarm households (Kline 1997: 366). In 1920,
Illinois, Indiana, and Iowa had the highest use of telephones throughout the Midwest
(Jellison 1993: 54).
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253). In 1933 the Collins Radio Company originated in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, became the
leading radio manufacturer by the 1950s (Schwieder 1996: 272).
Although the automobile did not modernize the household directly, the use of
automobiles on and off the farm changed the dynamics of the farm and household. While
automobile companies advertised initially to men, farm women soon became an
important demographic of advertisers. Like other capitalists, automobile manufacturers
realized the demands of women’s day to day life required improved transportation for
marketing goods. Indeed, the automobile allowed women to accelerate the time for
marketing goods and provided a sense of freedom from the farm. In many cases, farm
men sent their wives with farm equipment parts to town to be fixed. The success of the
automobile, however, could not be realized without the power of the state to impose taxes
to modernize roads. During the prosperous years of the golden age and following World
War I, the federal government spent roughly $75 million a year building rural post roads,
while “state and local governments were to match the federal funds so that the federal
contribution was not to exceed 50 percent of the construction. In Iowa in 1925 23,909
farm families lived along improved roads” (Cochrane 1993: 223). By the end of the
1930s over 121,000 farm families lived along improved roads (Fink and Schwieder 1989:
580). Capital accumulation, state power, and the production of nature co-produced the
housewife as a consumer.
Finally, electricity and running water brought the city to the country. The cost of
electric power transmission to the countryside was a barrier to the widespread adoption of
electricity in the household (Gardner 2009). It would not be until the Rural Electrification
Act, “which provided low-interest rates loans for rural electrification projects”, during the
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Great Depression would significant changes occur (Fink 1986: 47). This was a mighty
development project to remake the environments of six million farms (Kline 2002: 327).
Rural electrification primarily benefited farmers in the Corn and Dairy belts. “In order to
establish REA electricity in a neighborhood…residents had to guarantee that an average
of three families per mile would use the REA lines” (Jellison 1993: 99). This meant that
heavier populated farming regions like the Corn Belt could take advantage of loan
interest loans, while many Wheat Belt farmers had to wait years for electricity. Prior to
the Great Depression, Iowa, Illinois, and Indiana were the leading Midwest states that had
electric lighting (Jellison 1993: 55). In 1920, 21 percent of Iowa’s farm homes had
electricity, and by 1940, 45 percent had electricity (Fink 1986: 47). REA proponents
suggested that the greater use of irons, refrigerators, and vacuum cleaners, and other
appliances the greater use of electricity, which in turn, increases the housewife’s
productivity at an overall lower cost (Jellison 1993: 99).
Recall, farm women were fetching many pales of water on average 40 feet away
maintain the household. Having running water in the kitchen and bathroom would relieve
the back-breaking work of walking, stooping, lifting, and fetching buckets of water.
Electric water pumps were very much welcomed by farm women, as this would greatly
reduce back-breaking work of procuring water for the household. In Wallace’s Farmer
one farm woman wrote that electricity had given her a “houseful of servants—servants
that carry water, sweep rugs, help with washing and ironing and preparing of meals”.
While another farm woman held similar feelings about household electricity, “No water
to be carried uphill; no waste water to be carried out; no kerosene lamps to be cleaned
and filled; no hand scorching sadirons to be used; no fuel to clutter up my kitchen in pails
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and boxes; no ashes to be swept up and carried out…It seems too good to be true”
(Schwieder 1996: 273). Running-water and electricity were said to free the farm women
from the drudgery of household work.
Electricity would also improve women’s productive work on the farm. Prior to the
use of electricity for maintaining a poultry operation, raising chicks was no easy task as
they could die from lack of heat. Even after the introduction of incubators with brooding
boxes finicky thermostats did not maintain a constant temperature, a certain death
sentence for chicks. On really cold days or when the incubator wasn’t working eggs and
chicks were brought into the house and warmed around a stove or heater (Fink 1986).
Electricity allowed farm women to expand their poultry operation to increase income. In
the barn, electricity reduced labor involved in dairying in terms of milking machines,
separators, and cooling tanks.
When farm women were able to afford the modern laborsaving technologies,
researchers found that women’s leisure time had not increased (Vanek 1974, 1978, 1980;
Cowan 1976; Walker 1976). When electricity and running water had freed up time and
eased the physical burden for women, they generally focused on more time on household
production or increased their standards of cleanliness (Jellison 1993). During the first
quarter of the twentieth century capital and the state had laid the ground work for
modernizing the agrarian household, a process that accelerated during the Great
Depression and after World War II. Businesses were able to lower the costs of consumer
goods, like washing machines, allowing households to purchase many household
appliances. Without a doubt the physical labor of women’s work had reduced, but their
time spent working had not.

212

Conclusion
In sum, the housewifization of farm women had mixed results. Capitalists farm
families were not targeted by home economists as they upheld the Bureau of Home
Economics prescription for separate spheres. Poorer farm families, many that were
tenants, did not have the economic resources to purchase modern appliances. In some
cases, even if they had money, they were less willing to improve the home as they were
renters and could be displaced at-will by landlords. The generalization of the
modernization of the farmhouse had not occurred until after World War II. By this time
when farm women seemed to have the opportunity to be exclusively housewives, poorer
farm families were displaced from farming. Those farm families that were well off, often
members of the county farm bureau, and who already possessed some modern household
commodities were the primary targets of home economists. These relatively prosperous
families were concentrated in the heart of the Corn Belt, Illinois and Iowa.
Housewifization found its fullest development in the petit bourgeois yeoman household
of the Corn Belt.
While the process of agrarian housewifization had its antecedents in the midnineteenth transition to petty commodity production, it had become systemic in the
twentieth century. The forces of capital, the state, and nature figured into that
development like none before. Home economists identified, mapped, and simplified the
world of farm women as a violent abstraction obscuring their life-making activities in the
agrarian web of life.
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Chapter 5: The Second Agricultural Revolution
As grasshopper invasions hastened the transition from wheat to corn-hog and
diversified farming, Illinois and Iowa farmers bucked the agricultural depression of the
two decades following the Civil War. Railroads accelerated the downward spiral of
Northeastern wheat and sheep farmers who were displaced by larger producers in the
West. On the Great Plains, as settlement accelerated following the Civil War, wheat
farmers experienced plagues of grasshoppers, droughts, and eventually depressed wheat
prices as competition in wheat production increased worldwide. The South experienced
the greatest economic deprivation with the transition from plantation slavery to
sharecropping. Freed slaves and poor whites were relegated to the worst farm lands.
Sharecropping was nearly as brutal as slavery and economic conditions may have
worsened with competing cotton producing countries worldwide (Warman 2003).
Farmers producing cotton and wheat for their survival, rather than corn, were more
dependent on world markets—a development that led to great fluctuations in prosperity
and poverty. In the Midwest, Corn Belt agriculture bucked the trend. While pork and
pork products were a major export sustaining the prosperity of Corn Belt families, hogs
prices increased substantially over the post-antebellum period. Corn Belt farm families
experienced greater economic prosperity as many farming regions suffered.
Following the golden age of American agriculture, an agricultural depression
unfolded throughout 1920s and into the 1930s, only this time the Corn Belt was not
spared. The demands of World War I increased agricultural production to such a high
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level that farm commodity prices hit unsustainable levels. What became known as the
“farm problem”—farmers faced a classic cost-price squeeze in which the costs of inputs,
including land values, were on the rise while the price of their commodities was
declining. Farm foreclosures were widespread across the nation. The farm crisis of the
1920s was unlike any other crisis prior, both in terms of its scope and severity.
The solution to the twin crisis of farming, the farm woman problem and the larger
farm problem, was the second agricultural revolution. During the American century, petty
commodity production fundamentally transformed from diversified farming units to
large-scale monoculture units. Corn remained king in the Corn Belt, but the new miracle
crop soybean greatly increased in acreage over the post-World War II era. Farm women’s
role in the reproduction of the agrarian household shifted significantly in the twentieth
century. As household production was gradually displaced by industrial capitals and
rising farm debts choked household economies, women entered in greater force into wage
work while also continuing to participate in farming.
A new complex of technics revolutionized productivity delivering cheap food to
an expanding industrial working-class. Cheap food was crucial for advancing
proletarianization and housewifization throughout the United States as food became less
and less a major expense of the household budget. No longer were urban families as
dependent on income from boarding. Advancing proletarianization expressed in the
family wage enabled the Fordist housewife, whom enabled the development of the maledominated proletarian household. The second agricultural revolution constituted the
proletarian household, a process that unfolded through the reconfiguration of farm men
and women’s work.
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In this chapter I explain the origins and development of the second agricultural
revolution. I focus on the changing nature of farm men and women’s work. I argue that
Illinois and Iowa agrarian households were at the epicenter of the second agricultural
revolution because of their unique position in the development and exhaustion of the first
agricultural revolution. Farm men’s work became more rationalized and capitalized,
while farm women formed a growing population of semi-proletarians. The twentieth
century productivity revolution would have far-reaching consequences for American
capitalism and the world-economy.
Political Economy of American Development, 1870S-1930s
Following the Civil War American capitalism took the road of core rather than
peripheral development. Agricultural regional specialization was advancing throughout
the nation. Beginning in the 1870s American firms were leading an organizational
revolution in business (Arrighi 1994). Industrialization was entering a new stage, a shift
from small- and medium-size firms to large-size corporations expressed in the era of
monopoly capitalism. Economic concentration accelerated throughout the reconstructive
and progressive eras. By 1901 United States Steel became the largest corporation in the
world (Agnew 1987). This was the era of vertically integrated firms that owned mines,
sold finished commodities, and everything in between. Vertically integration was
complemented with scientific management in constructing mass production in
manufacturing. The twin processes of vertical integration and scientific management
“increased production per worker and per machine faster and to a greater extent than
single-unit enterprises or less specialized multi-unit enterprises” (Arrighi et al. 1999:
129). American and German industrialization had succeeded British industrialization,
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itself experiencing the rise of financialization as the dominate mode of accumulation.
American ascent unfolded through “autocentric development”, the national integration of
agriculture and industry (Friedmann and McMichael 1989)—a stark contrast to Britain’s
free-trade led ascent.
American industrialization advanced as part of a long-run confluence of forces,
including a shift from independent to petty commodity production, the increased material
demands of British hegemony and American ascent, and the ability to undermined the
control of skilled laborers (Agnew 1987; Moore 2002). American industrialization and
proletarianization advanced during the conjuncture of the late nineteenth century.
Crucial to American ascent was its massive resource base. While Britain had an
abundance of coal to fuel industrialization, America had greater quantities of coal, iron
ore, copper, forests, and perhaps more importantly a seemingly endless supply of oil.
High quality agricultural lands stretched far and wide that were overlaid with 200,000
miles of track—more than all of Europe combined (Agnew 1987: 49). The railroads and
the telegraph had enabled capital to appropriate cheap natures within its own
geographical boundaries. Technological innovations in steel-making enabled American
steel firms to utilize poor quality ores that in turn increased ore and coal mining that in
turn created the demand for larger mines (Bunker and Ciccantell 2005). The rise of
American capitalism entailed the intensification and acceleration in producing and
exchanging cheap natures as part of long-run trend in world accumulation. American
ascent, then, was premised on material expansion and producing cheaper commodities
than its competitors, namely Britain and Germany. The core of American capitalism was
the appropriation of cheap nature.
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Cheap nature in the form of labor formed the industrial base of American
capitalism. The first American agricultural revolution, itself premised on the demands of
British material expansion and international investments, led to rural expulsion across
Europe, resulting in the vast expansion from 1.5 to 6 million America’s industrial
working-class, nearly doubling the rate of Germany (Moore 2002: 180). The patterns of
emigration to the United States changed both in terms of composition and quantity. While
northern and southern Europeans were the main population emigrating to the United
States prior to the Civil War, between 1880 and 1920 most groups came from southern
and eastern Europe. During those years, the number of immigrants climbed to 23.5
million (Agnew 1987: 51). Most fled depressive economic conditions knowing full well
that they would receive wage work in the United States. America’s ascent to economic
dominance would not have likely occurred without a growing industrial army of labor.
Less than a century earlier Britain’s working population had experienced a
reduction in the standard of living with a mass migration from rural regions to industrial
cities. However, by the 1870s, with the flows of worldwide cheap food, Britain’s
industrial working-class were able to spend less on food and more on better housing,
thus, improving their standard of living (Seccombe 1993). By the turn of the twentieth
century the American industrial working-class were experiencing a similar decline in
their standard of living with the transition from a rural to urban way of life. Farm houses
offered greater space and comfort than crowded urban dwellings. The problem for
industrial capitalism was that the America’s working-class was spending too much of its
household budget on essential commodities like food and housing as opposed to
discretionary commodities. Between 1913 and 1924 food prices increased by more than
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42 percent (Department of Labor 1924: 35). Throughout the late nineteenth century and
well into the twentieth century food constituted the largest expense, making up nearly
half the household budget (Gordon 2016: 4 and 65; Stanley and Smith 1992). Housing
and clothing competed as the second and third largest expenses. Women often took in
boarders, performed outwork for income, and engaging in part-time work to reproduce
the household. Housewifization was unfolding throughout urban households in which the
unpaid labor of middle-class women was estimated around $700 a year (Boydston 1990:
134). With ever increasing flow of international cheap labor capitalists were reluctant to
increase wages.
Recall, Britain’s industrialization a century earlier had experienced similar limits
to growth. The cost of food and housing was too steep for many proletarian households.
The solution then, as would be the solution in the early twentieth century for American
industrialization, was an agricultural revolution. While farm families were experiencing
the greatest widespread prosperity in American history, the contradictions between
capital and labor were becoming untenable—more so in heavy industries. In the early
twentieth century labor strikes were significant in the auto, steel, and mining industries
(Silver 2003; Podobnik 2006). The state and industrial capitalists claimed that farming
was not delivering cheap food to the level necessary for industrialization. Thus,
agriculture acted as an obstacle to economic growth (Danbom 1979). The solution was
once again two-fold. First, modernize farming so as to increase productivity to lower the
reproduction cost of working-class households. And second, American firms would assert
economic dominance globally.
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While European colonial empires were the old way of organizing the worldeconomy, American firms were reorganizing the world-economy for their needs.
Throughout much of nineteenth century Americans firms grew nationally through
domestic markets. The United States emerged economically more powerful in the
aftermath of the 1896 depression. As early as the 1890s American firms were searching
for international markets to absorb the “glut of goods pouring out of highly mechanized
factories” (Agnew 1987: 60). Transnational American-based “firms held over $1 billion
in foreign assets by 1895, and $2.5 billion by 1914”, second only to Britain (Moore 2002:
193; Agnew 1987: 62). American firms direct investment abroad amounted to 7 percent
of GNP (Arrighi et al. 1999: 130). American ascendance, then, was in part a product of
the growing dominance of its firms that were now operating globally.
Just as American firms were controlling the world-economy, the economy faced
another depression, beginning in 1929. Between 1929 and 1934 GNP declined from
$104.4 billion to $56 billion. Employment declined by 20 percent and unemployment
increased from 1.5 million to 13 million (Agnew 1987: 65). Consumer debt skyrocketed
during the 1920s as businesses provided installment plans for durable commodities, like
cars and furniture. “By 1924, three out of every four automobiles were bought on credit”
(Gordon 2016: 298). Even as consumer debt skyrocketed and international markets
expanded, there was still not enough demand for the productive capacity of American
firms (Agnew 1987; Arrighi et al. 1999). If the crises of early capitalism were generally
expressed as not enough cheap natures, the crises of the long nineteenth and twentieth
centuries were a product too much cheap natures.
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While the New Deal and World War II are often credited as saving American
capitalism, I suggest that cheap food was essential for advancing proletarianization and
housewifization during the golden age of American capitalism. The challenge for meeting
the demands of achieving American hegemony required access to cheap food.
Farm Crisis to a Generalized Crisis
The history of agriculture has been a history of recurring crises. While the farm
crisis of the late nineteenth century was detrimental to farmers in the United States, the
farm crisis of the 1920s spared no victims. The agricultural crisis hit in summer of 1920.
Farm incomes held steady until 1920 when the government removed the price guarantee
for wheat, lowering the price of wheat by 33 percent before the year was over (Fitzgerald
2003: 18). Over the 1920s prices for corn dropped by 78 percent, wheat declined 64
percent, and cotton dropped 57 percent (Hurt 1994: 43). Livestock prices declined as
well. Economists estimated that the costs of corn production exceeded the price of corn
by 50 percent (Hurt 1994: 43). With low returns from farm prices thousands of farmers
were unable to pay off their mounting debt that had accrued during the prosperous years
of expansion (Cochrane 1993: 101). Not only were farmers’ incomes declining, but also
consumers were paying higher prices for food, posing a formidable obstacle to capital
accumulation. What was more problematic for farmers other than crop prices was the
increase in non-farm goods. For example, in 1919 a farmer could purchase one gallon of
gas with one-fifth a bushel of corn, whereas in 1921 a gallon of gas cost 2 bushels
(Saloutos and Hicks 1951: 100). Land values, like farm commodity prices, declined,
further contributing to the hardships of the farm family. The dynamism of the American
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farm family had been so productive that it undermined the long-term viability of the
enterprise.
During World War I European governments purchased food imports with United
States lent money, which furthered ensured international markets for American farmers.
After World War I, Europeans began building up their agriculture so as not to depend on
imports from the United States and elsewhere. European countries became more selfsufficient in terms foodstuffs. Compounding the problem of food self-sufficiency in
Europe, American Farmers began once again to experience competition from beef and
wheat farmers in Argentina, Canada, and Australia, offering lower prices than American
producers. United Kingdom’s imports of American beef fell from 50 percent to 5 percent
following the war (Saloutos and Hicks 1951: 105). Worldwide competition and
international food self-sufficiency have always been obstacles to American farmers’
prosperity.
While the farm crisis was particularly difficult on farmers, the agrarian web of life
was interconnected well beyond the farm. The farm crisis or the ‘farm problem’ only
became problematic for capitalism when food prices were high and capitalists whose
profits were tied to agriculture were threatened. 47 Bankers, lenders, and business leaders
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Farmers and their organizations did not view the farm problem in the same light. They
believed that banks, speculators, middlemen, railroads companies, and agribusiness were
profiting from the hard-working farmers. Even the conservative AFBF believed that
‘middlemen’ were undermining the prosperity of the farmers everywhere. This was
certainly the case in the last quarter of the nineteenth century with populists’ movements
across large farming regions. However, by the turn of the twentieth century most farm
organizations were not concerned about class interests and contradictions, but narrowly
on the prices of farm commodities (Bauerly 2016). Farmers urged government regulation.
Government had price controls for wheat and hogs that lasted until 1919 when they were
removed. The farm problem, according to farmers, was a result of capital and government
seeking to profit and control farmers.
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that encouraged farmers to purchase more land to increase production were at risk.
During the 1920s, rural banks collapsed and lending contracted (Clarke 1994). Farm
equipment manufacturers experienced sales losses due declining land values that farmers
used as collateral. The costs of the crisis would be disastrous for many farm families and
the agrarian web of life throughout the 1920s, a process that would continue into the
1930s. In this way, the farm problem cannot be isolated to farm management practices
and family relations. Rather, they must be conceptualized historically through relations of
power, wealth, and control outside of, but in relation to, farming.
As the farm crisis morphed into the global crisis of capitalism, the Great
Depression exacted a greater toll on farmers across the United States. In 1932, wheat
declined to 37 cents per bushel, 5 cents per pound of cotton, and corn fell to 32 cents per
bushel (Winders 2009: 35). Farm incomes drop precipitously, resulting in a doubling of
farm foreclosures in less than a two-year period (Winders 2009: 35). Part of the problem
for cotton and wheat farmers was declining or stagnating exports. Wheat farmers from
Canada, Argentina, Australia, and Russia increased production, creating a global glut for
wheat. While cotton exports maintained stable through the crisis, overall cotton
production increased significantly with its frontier expansion westward into Arkansas,
Texas, and Oklahoma. During the 1920s corn exports dropped from 5.3 MMT to .3 MMT
(Winders 2009: 38). Productivity gains were limited, but overall production had
increased with the drainage of farmland in the Corn Belt. Overall, exports declined
following World War I with the recovery of European agriculture. The value of the dollar
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increased relative to other currencies making United States exports less competitive
(Winders 2009).
The impact of the farm crisis and the subsequent Great Depression was uneven
throughout the farm regions of the United States. In the South, where many sharecroppers
lived in poverty and hardship, the economic crisis also intensified conditions, leading to
the “Great Migration” of poor rural black farmers to industrial cities in the North, a
process that accelerated following World War II. During the 1930s around a 1/3 of
southern sharecroppers and 12 percent of the tenants throughout the thirteen cotton states
fled to industrial cities (Hurt 1994: 297). In the South, cotton surpluses continued to
mount through the 1920s and early 1930s, while cotton prices between 1927 and 1933
dropped from 20 cents a pound to 10 cents a pound. During the same period per farm
income for cotton farmers fell from $1,245 to $397 (Winders 2006: 148). Pellagra, a
disease of poverty and unduly narrow diet, became epidemic throughout the South. This
deadly disease disproportionally impacted poor sharecroppers who did not have access to
adequate land to grow their own food (Warman 2003). Under the Agricultural
Adjustment Act (AAA) of 1933, the federal government provided payments to planters
and tenants. Planters regularly stole tenants federal payouts, which they used to purchase
farm equipment and wage labor, leading the expulsion of many sharecroppers.
On the Great Plains climate refugees were displaced by the black blizzards of the
1930s Global Dust Bowl (Holleman 2017). The Plains farmers mining of soils and longterm dependence on wheat as a monoculture undermined the health and vitality of the
region. “In May 1934, a dust storm removed an estimated 300 million tons of soil from
the Great Plains” (Hurt 1994: 300). Drought conditions through the 1930s when
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combined with strong winds limited families’ ability to survive the bad times, resulting in
another “Great Migration” of 500,000 rural people (Hurt 1994: 303). This time it was to
the fields of California. The 1930s great migrations of the Southern sharecropper and
Plains farmer cyclically punctuated a long-term secular trend of rural displacement.
The Cotton and Wheat belts were the hardest hit farming regions during the two
decades following World War I. Under Roosevelt’s New Deal the Farm Mortgage Act
and Farm Security Administration (FSA) provided loans for poverty-stricken farmers
who hoped to stay on the farm, many that provided to the Cotton and Wheat belts. On his
visit to the South, Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace observed the dire
conditions of tenants and sharecroppers. Wallace suggested that the South’s farm
problem could be resolved by converting tenants into family-owned farms, like the
prosperous farms of his home state Iowa (Bauerly 2016). While Secretary Wallace was
one of the main architects of the Agricultural Adjustment Acts, the act only passed with
the support of the Southern Democrats and the AFBF who favored production controls
and price supports (Winders 2006). In this way, Southern Democrats and the plantation
class were politically strong in shaping the trajectory of agricultural policy.
The Corn Belt while also faced hardships throughout the 1920s but began to
recover during the mid-1930s. Aside from AAA payments families received for corn and
hogs, what enabled the Corn Belt family to persist was its ability to carry out diversified
farming. Home or subsistence production during the 1920s and 1930s actually increased
as a strategy for making up the falling prices of corn and hogs which continuously fell
below the cost of production. Farm women used strategies of “making do” with less,
recycling clothes and materials, and reducing the family diet. Equally important, women
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increased their production of chickens, eggs, and butter. From the turn of the twentieth
century through World War II Iowa was the leading egg producer in the United States
(Fink and Schwieder 1989). Women managed these small-scale, and sometimes largescale, flocks. Farm income in the Corn Belt rose four points higher than other agricultural
regions (Ross 1951: 175). In Iowa, farm women’s “home production was typically 40 to
50 percent of the total household budget” (Fink and Schwieder 1989: 574). Corn Belt
farmers were not as dependent on export markets as wheat or cotton belt farmer.
Urbanization and the meatification of the American diet would only continue to grow
throughout the twentieth century, an essential market for Corn Belt farmers.
While wheat and cotton farmers generally experienced slightly more prosperity
than corn-hog farmers during the expansive war years, there was greater instability in the
Great Plains and South during the crisis years. The Corn Belt was able to weather the
storm of the unpredictable nature of markets and weather. The stability of the Corn Belt
owes much of this to its specific historical, ecological, and geographical conditions, its
farm commodities, and the unpaid work on women and the rest of nature.
Men Make Their Own History, Just Not as They Please
Agrarian change, like all historical change, unfolded through a complex
configuration of humans and the rest of nature. The development of petty commodity
producers across the heart of the Corn Belt was not simply a human affair, but one bound
to the workings of extra-human natures. The transformation of the productive forces was
a product of the paid and unpaid work of humans and the rest of nature. Pests, disease,
and weather were all central to the reproduction of the form of petty commodity
production and to the development of American capitalism. Prior to World War II, but
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certainly after, the European Corn Borer, corn rootworm, and flies were pests that
thwarted yields. Diseases, like hog cholera and other livestock diseases, continued to
plague the Corn Belt. These extra-human natures were environment-making subjects that
were constitutive of the web of life in the Corn Belt. This section explains the farm
problem, the solutions to the farm problem, and the productivity revolution.
As much as farmers and agribusiness sought to control the unpredictability of
nature and markets, at nearly every turn extra-human nature conspired to limit
productivity gains. The European corn borer, Pyrausta Nubilalis (Hubner), was first
discovered by an entomologist in corn fields outside of Boston in 1917. It was believed
that an import of broom straw from Hungary had carried the Corn Borer to the United
States (Dunlap 1980: 94). The corn borer quickly spread west across the United States
over the coming decades, arriving in Illinois and Iowa in the 1930s causing significant
crop losses. The corn borer feeds on the leaves and the larva tunnel through the stalks
throughout the winter. By late spring the larva emerges as moths and reproduce
throughout the summer, laying eggs on the corn leaves or on the ears, usually producing
two to three generations of larva over the summer. The ear of the corn can be damaged by
way of prematurely dropping from the stalk and/or “by feeding on the kernels” (Olmstead
and Rhode 2008: 86). Many species of the corn borer still persist today.
There was a growing concern over the spread of pests as it decimated eastern
fields and made its way to America’s heartland. Agrarian experts throughout the Midwest
had been aware of inevitable reach of the corn borer and began making plans to stem the
tide of destruction. Having been aware of the boll weevil epidemic that plagued cotton
crops throughout the South, the USDA’s Bureau of Entomology (BOE) knew they had to
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act quickly to contain the corn borer and maintain damage control. The BOE had been
ineffective, partly because of lack of funding, in controlling the reproduction of the boll
weevil, and had learned its lesson that required all hands on deck, including farmers,
federal funding, scientists, county agents, farm organizations like the Farm Bureau, to
ensure minimal losses to the most important crop (Dunlap 1980). Henry A. Wallace and
E.N. Bressman, anticipating the loss due to the corn borer stated that “the European corn
borer has possibilities of causing as much damage to the crop as the boll weevil has
caused to the cotton crop. There is grave danger that it will reach the heart of the Corn
Belt by 1930” (Wallace and Bressman 1923, cited in Olmstead and Rhode 2008: 87). In
1927, President Coolidge signed a bill to allocate $10 million to control the corn borer,
the largest insect-control project under taken in history (Olmstead and Rhode 2008: 87).
The BOE enforced a domestic quarantine that forbid the shipment of corn out of the area
to limit exposure, and eventually recommended that farmers practice sound culture
techniques for controlling the corn borer (Dunlap 1980). Despite the large allocation
given to farmers to plow up their fields to reduce the spread of the pest, it was more
likely that weather reduced the overall population. In 1943 estimates of corn crop loss
were around four percent from Indian to eastern Iowa (Anderson 2009: 17). Nationwide,
the USDA estimated that the corn borer resulted in “an average loss of $144 million per
year over the period 1949-1953” (Olmstead and Rhode 2008: 91). While this did not spell
disaster for highly productive Corn Belt farmers, there was the realization that cultural
techniques of pest control were limited in successfully controlling corn borer populations.
Farm presses and the agricultural colleges believed cultural techniques were
insufficient for pest control. The solution was chemical treatments. Although land-grant
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scientists professed that farmers should engage in a balance between the cultural
techniques and chemical treatments, the message was clear that the use of a man-made
chlorinated hydrocarbon insecticide called dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane or better
known as DDT was the more appropriate option. Iowa State entomologist Harold
Gunderson conducted joint studies with Wallace’s Pioneer Hi-Bred Company,
concluding that corn fields treated with DDT increased yields from twenty to twentyeight bushels of corn per acre compared to untreated fields (Anderson 2009: 18).
Gunderson detailed a four point program for farmers to control for corn borer that
included early planting, clean plowing, purchasing pest-resistant hybrid varieties, and
multiple applications of DDT. While the editors of Wallace’s Farmer claimed farmers
should practice an array of strategies for controlling pests, they showed the weaknesses of
each technique and concluded that the best solution to farmers’ pest problem was
spraying DDT (Anderson 2009: 18). The state and capital’s promotion of the use DDT as
an effective technique for controlling pest resulted in its greater acceptance and
practice.48
While DDT was first manufactured in the nineteenth century and its use was
primarily for war, its rise and fall on American farms was rapid, lasting roughly two
decades. The most important decline of DDT in terms of treating crops, at least prior to
an environmental backlash, was the development of hybrids that were resistant to them
(Anderson 2009). In the 1950s, the major seed companies were breeding hybrids that
were specifically designed to resist or tolerate the corn borer. Since the majority of Iowa
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Farmers had treated roughly 50,000 acres with DDT in 1947, several years later they
had treated over 1.7 million acres (Anderson 2009: 19).
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and Illinois farmers had already regularly purchased hybrid seed corn, it did not make
sense to purchase insecticide for treating crop pests.
During the post-World War II period DDT was also used for eliminating flies
around dairy cows. Agricultural leaders quickly realized that flies would reduce the
productivity of dairy cows. Farmers would spray their livestock with DDT and have a
barn free of flies, at least temporarily. Flies that survived the spraying reproduced
offspring that were also resistant to the insecticide. Regulators soon realized that
livestock sprayed with DDT entered the food chain that when consumed could be
threatening to human health (Anderson 2009). After DDT was banned from applying to
animals and barns, malathion and diazinon could be applied, but were significantly more
expensive. These too were eventually banned. A series of highly toxic chemical
treatments had been banned, yet many farmers continued to use DDT and other
chlorinated hydrocarbons. By the late 1960s studies revealed that insecticides, along with
commercial fertilizers, were not only in crops and livestock, but were poisoning groundand surface-water like the Mississippi and Missouri rivers.
The biggest problem a farmer’s corn crop faced was not insects, but weeds.
Weeds continuously choked the lifeblood of the field by appropriating moisture, sunlight,
and nutrients that would limit land productivity and reduce yields. Weeds, unlike the corn
borer, were visible, and farmers had been managing weeds for generations. In the great
demand of World War II, and the temporary elimination of production controls, farmers
spent more time planting and harvesting corn and soybeans, and less time on cultivating
weeds. In 1947 Wallace’s Farmer said that “Weeds Won in War Years”. Extension
directors noted that weeds were becoming a greater problem than ever before.
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Throughout the 1950s annual losses caused by weeds and the cost of their control was
roughly $5 billion (Peterson 1967: 253). Recall, farmers cultivated weeds at least twice
during the growing season. For farm families managing weeds was a labor intensive and
time-consuming process. Multi-billion dollar chemical companies, like Dow Chemical
and American Chemical Paint Company, promised the farmer a ‘weed-free’ farm, with its
2,4-D, a growth regulator herbicide (Nordin and Scott 2005; Anderson 2009). 2,4-d
“marked the beginning of the post-war chemical revolution in crop production and the
birth of the agro-chemical industry” (Kirby 1980: 1, cited in Argue et al. 2003: 210).
The growth of 2,4-D was impressive through the post-war period. In 1945, its first year of
public testing, total production stood at 917,000 pounds. Five years later annual
production was over 14,000,000 pounds, and in 1964 production increased to 53,000,000
pounds (Peterson 1967: 252). Herbicides, like 2,4-D, “reduced the requirement for tillage
machinery” (Lewontin 1998: 74), thereby reducing soil erosion due to tillage. Sprayers
subsequently increased around the Corn Belt. “One year after 2,4-D came on the market,
5,000 Iowa farmers owned sprayers” (Anderson 2009: 38). Farmers preferred to purchase
sprayers over paying for custom work as sprayers were relatively cheap and they were
already in use for insecticides. Some farmers applied herbicides prior to seeding, and in
some cases farmers employed aerial spraying. The use of herbicides eventually ended the
“cultivation of cornfields” (Nordin and Scott 2005: 139).
Herbicides were not the miracle chemical companies promised. Herbicides were
not uniformly effective. Ecological conditions posed an obstacle to effectively treating
weeds with herbicides. Too much rain, colder temperatures, and high wind patterns all
conspired to lower the effectiveness of killing weeds. Strong winds could and did blow
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the poison across unintended targets like gardens, vegetable fields, and orchards. In the
1960s commodity farmers began displacing beekeepers and grape growers as 2,4-D use
increased with the expansion of commodity production (Fitzgerald 2005: 403). The
greater use of 2,4-D for killing broadleafed weeds only reduced the competition for
grassy weeds like the giant foxtail, which had spread across every county in Iowa in a
matter of a few years (Anderson 2009). A whole array of expensive and more toxic
herbicides, like Amiben and Atrazine, came on the market to reduce weeds. From the
1960s to the 1970s, the cost of herbicides increased, making up a larger proportion of the
farmers operating costs (Anderson 2009). Many weeds existed throughout the Corn Belt,
including cocklebur, Canada thistle, smartweed, foxtail, etc. Some of these still persist
despite chemical companies continuous innovation of weed killers.
Finally, perhaps more important than insecticides and herbicides, was the greater
use of commercial fertilizers on commodity crops. By the 1940s nearly every farmer in
Illinois and Iowa were using hybrid seed corn in their fields. Hybrid varieties
appropriated the nutrients of the soil much faster than open varieties, necessitating
farmers utilize commercial fertilizers to restore nitrogen, phosphorous, and potassium
levels. Under the AAA’s production controls corn acres were reduced, giving farmers’
greater incentive to increase the density of corn per acre, thereby increasing a greater
need for the use of commercial fertilizer. Farmers used commercial fertilizers to boost
yields and profits, a process that took place during planting season. Commercial
fertilizers were made economically viable by the Haber-Bosch synthesis, which,
according Vaclav Smil (2001), was one of the great agricultural inventions that
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transformed farming. Above all else, farmers’ use of fertilizers was to increase yields via
fixing nutrient depleted soils.
Commercial fertilizers promoted by chemical companies quickly jump started
yields that had been previously stagnate throughout the last two decades (Perelman
1977). The use of synthetic fertilizers in the early hybrid varieties of corn more than
doubled the yield per acre, fetching returns of 300 percent or more (Cochrane 1993: 127).
Nitrogen, phosphate, and potash, the three main nutrients in fertilizer, all increased in use
for the period between 1940 to 1970.49 Nitrogen increased from 419 million tons to 7,549
million tons; potash increased from 435 million tons to 4,035 tons; and phosphate
increased from 794 million tons to 4,574 million tons (Cochrane 1993: 127-8; Nelson
1990: 470). In the 1930s synthetic fertilizer consumption was concentrated in the Atlantic
states and the South. In 1934, the Corn and Wheat belts were slow to utilize fertilizer.
However, by the 1960s the Corn and Wheat belts had become the two largest fertilizerusing regions in the United States (Nelson 1990). Fertilizers constituted one of the
biggest energy expenses for farmers. However, a combination of government subsidies
funneled into big developments projects like the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) was
used to research, develop, and distribute fertilizers to soil-conservation associations. The
highly-concentrated fertilizer industry was underwritten by cheap energy flowing from
the oil- gas-fields of Texas and California.
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World consumption of commercial fertilizers grew more than 280 percent between
1946-1962 (Nelson 1965: 2). Over the twentieth century there has been a 125-fold
increase in the global rate of inorganic nitrogen “per hectare of cropland” (Smil 2001:
141). While almost half of total amount of nitrogen fertilizer was consumed in the last
two decades, its origins and significance began in the postwar era (Smil 2001: 141).
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Industrialization of fertilizer industry advanced following World War II.
Technological transformations in manufacturing ammonia cut production costs in half. A
typical plant could produce 300 tons of ammonia a day at around $40 a ton. With the
introduction of the “Kellogg system” a plant could produce 1,000 tons per day at around
$20 a ton (Perelman 1977, 170). Now, fertilizer companies and the industry faced a
double bind: the costs of modernizing plants was increasing while production greatly
outstripped domestic consumption. The solution, under the aegis of the Green Revolution
and government-supported subsidies for fertilizers, was developing fertilizer markets in
the global South. In Gapan, Philippines between 1965 and 1970 the amount of fertilizer
doubled from 9.2 to 20.5 kg. per hectare (Griffin 1979, 58). The United States was the
largest producer and exporter of commercial fertilizers. Companies like ESSO and IMC
developed plants in India, the Philippines, and elsewhere (Perelman 1977). Under PL480, Cooley Loans were given to US agribusinesses to use in the recipient nation in
which over one-third of the loans were given to US fertilizer companies operating in the
Near East and South Asia (Bauerly 2015: 315). In the postwar era America’s cheap food
model went global.
Overall, the consumption of synthetic fertilizers grew throughout the United
States and the world. From 1961 to 2010 worldwide consumption increased more than
fivefold, from 31 to 178 million metric tonnes, with nitrogen fertilizer leading the way.
Today, US farmers, which constitute .25 percent of the world’s farmers, consume more
than one-tenth of the world’s annual fertilizer consumption (Weis 2013: 106). One study
estimated that the increased yields of hybrid corn between the years of 1939-1961
showed that synthetic fertilizers accounted for 31.4 percent, 17.8 percent due to
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geographic location, and 15.1 percent to other factors (Nelson 1990: 486). The increased
yields of hybrid corn were achieved at the expense of protein quality (Perelman 1977:
45). This was not a problem for American capitalism given that quantitative
accomplishments overrode qualitative ones.
Resolving the Farm Problem: Modernizing the Farmer and Fields
The farm woman problem and the farm problem of the first quarter of the
twentieth century was an obstacle to capital accumulation. Recall from chapter four that
home economists had made only partial progress in modernizing the farm wife and
household. The farm crisis, extending from 1920s to 1930s, resulted in high prices for
urban workers and generated financial crises beyond the farm. The solution to the twin
crisis of the farm was the second American agricultural revolution. It was believed that
productivity gains would increase income for farmers that would in turn allow them to
purchase better farm and household equipment, and thus, improving their wellbeing. The
reality was that the second agricultural revolution displaced many of the ‘uncompetitive’
farm families, allowing capitalist and petit bourgeois yeoman households to increase per
capita incomes and enjoy prosperity while delivering cheap food.
The solution to the farm problem were the forces of science, capital, and
technology. Under the banner of “education,” a combination of agricultural colleges, the
USDA, extension agents, and farm organizations were there to educate and rationalize the
subjectivity of the farmer. This entailed improving farming practices and adopting new
technologies. According to the “New Agriculture” science and technology were the tools
for the modernization of American agriculture. The task for reformers was to remove the
physical labor of farming so as to elevate farming to the status of a middle-class
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occupation that required more mental than physical skills (Neth 1995). In short, the idea
and materiality of farming required a shift from farming as a way of life to farming as a
business.
Abstract social nature not only transformed the household, but farming as well
with the scientification and quantification of agriculture. In 1905, the USDA housed
several bureaus and agencies, including the Office of Farm Management, the Bureau of
Markets, and the Division of Statistics, which began to collect and analyze farm data. By
1922, these were consolidated into the what we become one of the most powerful
agricultural agencies in the federal government, the Bureau of Agricultural Economics
(BAE). The BAE encouraged each state to calculate the costs of production for grain
crops. The federal government in conjunction with individual states began to coordinate
in a more systematic and scientific manner with the intent that farming practices would
become standardized. These agencies and bureaus, operating at the state and national
level, collected quantitative data on farming across the United States. The diversity of
farming in the United States posed a problem for the federal government and states
because they believed diverse socio-ecological conditions would thwart standardization.
Simplifying complex socio-ecologies meant standardizing and rationalizing agriculture to
advance labor productivity. The federal government and capital could exercise greater
control over farmers and their practices if farming could be restructured to reflect
generalized standards. As Fitzgerald (2003: 34) explains, the rise of quantification and
the rationalization of agriculture entailed states collecting “numbers—how many, how
few, how big or small, how much, how old, what amount”. As a result, data collection
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became more scientific and abstract. In short, it became less about people and their
problems and more about rationalizing processes and products (Fitzgerald 2003).
Agrarian reformists allied with private capital to incorporate the productive
capabilities of the modern science and farm management into raising crops and livestock.
This not only entailed physical instruments of production but a new worldview of
farming altogether. Fitzgerald (2003: 21) argues that there was an “overwhelming
consensus…that farmers needed to become more businesslike, more like economists, in
conducting their affairs”. The future of farming from the middle-class worldview
abstracted the farm as a business from the community and family (Neth 1995). Even prior
to the County Life Movement, agricultural economists and farm managers working with
the land-grants colleges and the USDA stressed to farmers that in order to be successful
at farming they must begin quantifying costs of investments, labor income, number of
crops per acre, number of productive livestock, etc. (Fitzgerald 2003: 50). Agricultural
economists and farm managers conducted surveys detailing the quantitative dimension of
the farm, but they encouraged farmers to take responsibility in practicing the
quantification of their own farms. The thought was that by farmers practicing accounting
of their buying, selling, and investing, they would begin to internalize what it was like to
be a businessman and be able to pinpoint losses and gains. Poorer farmers were less
likely to engage in quantifying the farm because some felt embarrassed that neighbors
would know their economic standing (Fitzgerald 2003). Middling Illinois farmers readily
adopted such practices, and generated an overwhelming demand for extension agents and
agricultural scientists. Illinois farmers paid $17 a year and detailed their records of the
farm operations. In return, they received advice from agricultural experts. At the end of
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the year farmers received a report that detailed the most profitable farmers in their
county, the least profitable, and the average, in terms of livestock, land investments,
cropping, farm receipts, and labor and machinery expenses (Fitzgerald 2003: 51). The
report ended with advice to farmers on how to improve the profitability of their farm. The
farm problem could be resolved through the emulation of successful ‘progressive’
farmers.
There was a growing concern from farmers, the federal government, and
consumers over livestock diseases. Hog cholera was especially virulent throughout the
Midwest. In South Dakota between 1894 and 1896 cholera had decreased the hog
population by more than half (Stalheim 1988: 116). Farmers and eventually packing
plants began to suffer from the loss. Farmers used a variety of remedies and preventions,
but to no avail. State colleges throughout the Midwest tested numerous cures and
preventatives, but, again, to no avail. In 1884 Congress created the federal Bureau of
Animal Industry (BAI), providing funds for veterinary research to control and eliminate
animal diseases. Finally, between 1903 to 1908 Doctors Marion Dorset, Charles N.
McBryde, and William B. Niles from the BAI discovered the infection traced to a
filtrable virus. By 1907, the three scientists at the University of Iowa had developed an
effective vaccine that was a serum collected from a pig that had recovered and the blood
of an ill pig (Ross 1951: 132). The following year over 2,000 pigs in 47 herds in Iowa
were vaccinated (Stalheim 1988: 118). It was estimated that by World War I the serum
had reduced the deaths caused by cholera by 20 to 30 fold during the peak years (Ross
1951: 132). Hog farmers were optimistic that scientists had resolved the deadly disease,
and lined up with pails outside the Hog Cholera Station. Shortly thereafter over 400 firms
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began manufacturing the serum, but farmers realized that many firms sold a defective
product. However, it would not be until 1951 when at the National Animal Disease
Laboratory in Ames, Iowa would scientists discover a more effective live-virus serum
(Skaggs 1986: 151). In any case, farmers realized that scientific agriculture could make
progress on farmers most pressing issues.
Soil conservation was also an element on the production side of the New
Agriculture. The Country Life Report stated that the conservation of soil and natural
resources were essential for the long-term sustainability of farming and the prosperity of
the nation (Bailey 1909). Loss of soil fertility would have economic, social, and political
consequences. For Bailey and the commission (1909: 40), fixing the soil fertility entailed
“a system of diversified and rotation farming, carefully adapted in every case to the
particular region”. The Country Life Commission made direct links between the
wellbeing of farmer is dependent on the wellbeing of the soil, and that this relationship
between farmer and soil fertility was linked to question of power and wealth from
different capitals. This was largely ignored in favor of technical fixes. In technical terms,
the commission would leave it to experiment stations and land-grant colleges to remedy
soil depletion. Head of the agronomy department at Iowa State and of the soil section of
the Agricultural Experiment Station, William H. Stevenson, an influential soil scientist,
supervised a series of county soil surveys, and led the push for drainage, liming, and crop
rotation. By 1904, Stevenson and the Experiment Station declared over four million acres
in the north-central counties of Iowa were in need of drainage (Ross 1951: 123-4).
Stevenson along with engineers at the experiment station formed the State Drainage
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Association, which helped push legislation to eventually open highly productive farming
regions. The last bit of the frontier was now in full utilization.
Hybrid Corn Revolution
While wheat cultivation and harvesting was foundational to the first American
agricultural revolution, hybrid corn was foundational to the second American agricultural
revolution. The watershed moment of the second agriculture revolution was the invention
of the hybrid corn seed in 1933. A combination of science, publically funded agricultural
research, and profitable opportunities resulted in the invention of the hybrid corn seed
(Kloppenburg 2004). Importantly, the seed, the biological basis of farming, was
commoditized, forcing farmers to pay for an input that was historically free. Illinois- and
Iowa-based the Funk Brothers Seed Company, Pioneer Hi-Bred, and DeKalb were the
leading private companies selling hybrid seeds who had appropriated the dead labor of
land-grant universities turning a public good into private profit. By 1942 nearly of Iowa’s
corn fields were planted with hybrid seeds. In 1965 over 95 percent of the United States
corn acreage was planted with hybrid seed (Kloppenburg 2004). Hybrid corn became the
model for other major cash crops, including wheat and cotton. By 1985, farmers were
achieving yields well over 125 bushels an acre (Hurt 1986: 53). Corn more than other
crops reacted better to the introduction of commercial inputs, so much so that fertilizer
and pesticide manufactures became profitable businesses following World War II. Corn
was also input for livestock and commercial processed food. Hybrid corn farming was at
once an impetus for off-farm industries to profit from and for corn to be an important
input for postwar “durable food complex” (Friedmann 1993). These economic and no
less ecological linkages figured significantly in the making of the rise and development
of the second agricultural revolution.
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Postwar American agriculture was in all senses of the word revolutionary. In the
first three decades of the twentieth century total factor productivity in farming increased
at a .5 percent annual rate. 50 However, from 1935 to 1975 total factor productivity
increased at a 3 percent annual rate. Labor productivity were equally significant. Prior to
1930 labor productivity was less than 1 percent annual rate of growth, while after 1935
labor productivity advanced more than 4 percent annually (Clarke 1991: 101-102). Labor
productivity in agriculture outpaced all major economic sectors and continued throughout
the second agricultural revolution. During this period labor productivity in non-farm
sectors increased 2.5-fold. Labor productivity in agriculture increased 7-fold (Conkin
2008: 98). Labor hours to grow a bushel of wheat, corn, and cotton decreased
precipitously throughout the twentieth century (see table 3).
Labor Hours to Grow 100 Bushels of Wheat and Corn and 100 Bales of Cotton,
1900-1990
Wheat
Corn
Cotton
1900
147
147
248
1950
14
16
100
1990
6
3
5
Table 13
Source: Conkin 2008: 98
Between 1945 and 1970 the area dedicated to corn cultivation dropped from 80 million
acres to 55 million acres. Even with less land under cultivation corn production surpassed
84 million tons in 1956, and reached 112 million tons in 1964. In the mid 1970s corn
production increased to 154 million tons (Warman 2003: 187). Between 1930 and 1965
the volume of production increased by 2.3 billion bushels (Kloppenburg 2004: 91). In the
United States in 1945 corn yields averaged 35 bushels an acre—corn yields increased to
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The century before 1935 the annual growth in full-factor productivity in agriculture
rose about 1 percent a year (Conkin 2008: 97).
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87 bushels in 1970 (Pimentel et al. 1973: 444; Nordin and Scott 2005). “By 1970, in the
heart of the Corn Belt, it was common for the average to exceed 100 bushels an acre
(Nordin and Scott 2005: 161). Between 1945 and 1970 corn yields increased 240 percent,
while the labor input decreased by more than 60 percent (Pimentel et al. 1973: 445).
Output per worker on farms grew 68 percent in the 1950s and 82 percent in the 1960s.
Between 1935 to 1997 output per farm increased ten-fold for field crops, and even faster
for poultry and hogs (Conkin 2008: 98). In Marxist terms, there was a rising organic
composition of capital in farming as productivity advanced and machines replaced human
labor.
It is no surprise that the hybrid corn revolution centered in the same geographical
region where the mechanical reaper had emerged—the northern half of Illinois and east
to central Iowa. Funk Brothers Seed Company, Pfister Hybrid Corn Company, DeKalb
Agricultural Association, and Pioneer Hi-Bred were the leading private companies selling
hybrid seeds. The first three companies were located in Illinois and the last, Henry
Wallace’s seed company, was in Iowa. In the emergence and development of hybrid seed
corn, geography and ecology mattered. The ecology of the seed was based on its specific
location, primarily in central Illinois and Iowa, which posed a problem of adaption to
different ecological conditions. In any case, the success of these companies was premised
on the appropriation of the dead labour of land-grant universities.51 Private seed
companies, like all agribusinesses, are profit-driven. The drive for profitability required
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The Funk Brothers Seed Company had a close relationship with the Illinois research
experiment station, in which the experiment station regularly provided valuable
information to the private seed company (Fitzgerald 1990).
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gaining control of the market through coercion in agricultural research, policy, and initial
consent from farmers.
In Illinois, the top seed companies in the nation were focusing on developing
hybrid seed corn to increase yield and increase disease- and insect-resistance of the
state’s number one crop. Eugene Funk had noticed that part of the reason for declining
yields was an increase of corn disease. For example, in Illinois corn disease “decreased
yields by 12-15 bushels per acre” (Fitzgerald 1993, 334). The Funk Brothers Seed
Company working in conjunction with the USDA, became a leading seed company
developing hybrid seed corn. While agricultural scientists at the experiment stations at
the University of Illinois were constrained by the demands of farmers’ needs, the politics
of college administration, and its attention on other facets of agriculture besides
improving corn, the Funk Brothers Seed Company focused primarily on corn
improvement. The top seed companies, therefore, were not constrained by the demands
of farmers and could draw on resources from other agribusinesses.
The Funk Brothers Seed Company were the forerunners of private seed
companies. Recall, Cattle King Isaac Funk had moved his family to central Illinois by the
mid-nineteenth century had developed a large-scale livestock feeding operation. The
family accumulated more than 27,000 acres of land in McLean County, Illinois (Prince
1997, 133). The Funk Brothers stood out from most seed companies in that they
promoted a scientific image in which they sought to unify science and business. Unlike
most private seed companies of the time, and even experiment stations, the Funk Brothers
had access to large quantity of land and were engaging in the latest scientific research,
employing the top researchers in the world, like J.R. Holbert (Fitzgerald 1990). Holbert
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had been involved scientific research at Purdue before being hired by Eugene Funk. The
USDA set up a federal field station at the Funk farm in 1918, collaborating with the seed
company and employing Holbert. Private and public research were indeed mixed and
cooperative. The scale of operations that the Funk Brothers Seed Company was
unmatched both in business and public research. This allowed a great deal of flexibility
but also allowed the company to generalize results. The twenty-year relationship between
the USDA and the Funk Brothers Seed Company signified the close connections between
capital and the state (Fitzgerald 1990).
Illinois University scientists, on the other hand, had to rely on farmers to perform
field trials and report the results. During the first two decades of the twentieth century
experiment station scientists, who were beginning to focus on “pure” planting research,
focused primarily on theory. These scientists, in part, were influenced by a number of
theoretically orientated scientists in Germany, who saw value beyond everyday practical
matters (Rosenberg 1976). This shift from focusing on farmers’ practical concerns to
theoretical research was made possible by the Adams Act of 1906, which provided
greater funds for “original research” (Rosenberg 1976). By the 1920s, land-grant
scientists and the Funk Seed Company were collaborating in joint research, primarily
through Holbert, focusing on corn disease and improved yields. Average farmers were
being replaced by wealthy farmers, changing the collaborative relationship between
farmers and scientists. Results were publicized to farmers in the form of bulletins and
demonstrations.
In Iowa, at the turn of the twentieth century the Wallaces had become an
influential agrarian dynasty. The farming dynasty began in Iowa in the 1870s with Corn
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Belt farmer Henry Wallace, who owned three farms in Adair County and started the
famous Wallace’s Farmer magazine in 1890s (Rogers 1974). In 1908, President
Theodore Roosevelt requested that Henry Wallace form and serve on The Country Life
Commission that would detail rural conditions and propose solutions to agrarian social
problems. Henry’s son, Henry C. Wallace, served as secretary of agriculture in 1921
under President Harding. Henry C. took over Wallace’s Farmer for over 26 years. Henry
C.’s son, Henry A. Wallace, also became sectary of agriculture in 1933 under President
Franklin Roosevelt, and was one of the most influential individuals in the “agrarian New
Deal” (Gilbert 2015). Needless to say, the Wallace family had not only influenced
national politics, but also influenced farmers regionally and beyond with one of the
longest running farming magazine.
Henry A. Wallace had formed his own private seed company called Pioneer in
Des Moines, Iowa. Initially Wallace believed that farmers were in the best position for
breeding improvements of seed corn in terms of an open-pollinated method because they
had the greatest knowledge of the ecological conditions. Wallace soon realized, however,
that Donald Jones work at the Connecticut experiment station on the “double cross”
hybrid, which is “the product of crossing two single crosses,” held great potential for
improving yields (Kloppenburg 2004: 99). Wallace acknowledged that the future of corn
breeding should be in the hands of scientists, not farmers. Henry A. Wallace encouraged
his father Henry C. Wallace, then Secretary of Agriculture, to increase funds for research
solely focused on hybrid breeding techniques. Funds for research on hybrid breeding
techniques “increased tenfold” (Berlan and Lewontin 1986). Wallace published the
potential revolutionary nature of the hybrid breeding techniques in Wallace’s Farmer. In

245

1926, Wallace’s company Pioneer became the first company to produce commercial
hybrid corn (Hurt 1994: 51).
For Wallace, farming, and thus the production of nature, took a particular form. It
was the family farm that informed his worldview, a family farm that was on the cutting
edge of an emerging revolution. With one foot in family farming and another foot in
agricultural science and economics, Wallace, an “agrarian intellectual,” was on the
frontline of a revolution (Gilbert 2016). “In less than thirty years, from the 1920s to the
1950s, Wallace fulfilled the manifest destiny of American farmers by “industrializing”
corn breeding and thus laying the foundations of modern American agribusiness” (Fussell
1992: 67). Today, Pioneer Hi-Bred International still operates in Des Moines as a
powerful force in the seed market.
Success was not immediate, however. Perry Greeley Holden, an enthusiastic
leader with popular appeal, led the extension service in Iowa which had turned into the
pioneering institution throughout the United States (Ross 1951). Holden was hired as the
head of the Agronomy Department at Iowa State College traveled rural Iowa presenting
on corn-seed selection and cultivation. 52 Holden, with the support of the Rock Island
Railroad, Wallace’s Farmer, and other state organizations, began performing his
demonstrations on rail cars over thousands of miles in 97 of Iowa’s 99 counties. College
officials estimated that 145,700 people heard his presentation (Schweider 1996, 148).
Demonstration trains were initiated and carried out by “Uncle” Henry Wallace, but it was
Holden that gave the practice national publicity (Ross 1951). In effect, Holden was laying
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Holden previously worked at the University of Illinois and later for the Funk Brothers
Seed Corn Company.
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the groundwork for the widespread adoption of hybrid corn seed in the post-war era.53
Taking hybrid seed corn as foundational for the second agricultural revolution, we can
confidently state that serious corn breeding took around thirty or more years before the
transition to generalized hybrid varieties took hold across the Midwest and beyond.
Like most technical innovations in agriculture there were significant problems
associated with early hybrid varieties. The first problem was one of adaptability. Jones’
early double-cross hybrids created at the Connecticut experiment station performed
poorly in the Corn Belt (Berlan and Lewontin 1986). Most of the private seed companies
had originated in central and northern Illinois and Iowa where favorable ecological
conditions prevailed. Corn seed were bred for those conditions, and as a result, were not
productive outside of those areas. Southern Illinois farmers who had purchased hybrid
seed corn from breeders in central Illinois experienced no increase in yields. In fact,
open-pollinated varieties that had been adapted and adjusted to the local ecological
conditions performed better than hybrid varieties (Fitzgerald 1990). For private seed
companies producing hybrid varieties the question of adaptability to specific ecologies
posed an obstacle to its future profitability. Nonetheless, the hybrid seed revolution
would take hold over the 1930s and accelerate after the war.
The widespread adoption of hybrid corn ultimately turned on two major
developments in the 1930s (Fitzgerald 1990: 220). First, successive droughts in the
middle of the 1930s resulted in a scarce supply of seeds. Second, the AAA acreage
reduction program paid farmers to reduce their improved acreage for government
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The “Young” Henry A. Wallace believed that Holden was more influential to Iowa
farm boys prior to World War I than anyone he knew. Holden later moved on to work for
a harvester manufacturing company in Chicago (Ross 1951).
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payments. The revolutionary nature of hybrid corn was twofold: drought-resistant and
increased land (and labor) productivity. Farmers seeking to service debts and maintain
their enterprise on fewer acres adopted hybrid corn as a strategy for squeezing more work
out of extra-human nature.
The Golden Bean
The other miracle crop that came onto the scene at the start of the second
agricultural revolution was soybean, Glycine max. Soybeans provided at least three
benefits to the farmer. As a legume the crop has the ability to appropriate nitrogen from
the atmosphere to be processed as a nutrient and taken up by plants. Corn, a nitrogenintensive crop, when rotated with soybeans increased next year’s corn yield. Finally,
soybean has a high protein content making for an excellent feed for livestock (Hudson
1994: 158-159). Soybeans 40 percent protein content, which is twice that of beef, sped up
the weight-gaining process of hogs, poultry, and cattle that many feeders were looking
for (Morgan 1979: 99). More to the point, soybeans “fixes nitrogen in the soil, is easily
mechanized and, when processes into oil and meal, brings in cash” (Berlan 1991: 123).
Soybeans, like hybrid corn, would revolutionize farming initially in the Corn Belt and
later the South.
Soybean enthusiasts, like J.C. Hackleman, an extension agronomist at the
University of Illinois, and the American Soybean Association were crucial for spreading
the high returns from farmers producing soybeans (Hudson 1994). Hackleman attempted
to convince Illinois farmers that soybeans were like ‘green manure’ in its ability to fix
nitrogen in the soil. He then convinced four processing companies to contract to soybean
growers around Illinois and purchase 250,000 tons of soybeans (Fitzgerald 1990: 116-
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117). Early on, most of the leaders of the American Soybean Association were
academics, but two decades since its inception in 1919 industries and corporations
became influential members. Railroads “ran exhibition trains throughout the Midwest to
familiarize farmers with” the potential of the ‘golden bean’ (Berlan 1991: 125), a process
that had occurred with corn earlier.
Part of the initial challenge aside from publicizing the promise of producing
soybeans was having mills to process the product. Processors were only willing to
construct mills if there was high enough production of soybeans, while farmers sought to
achieve high prices by withholding their soybeans from the market. This did not last long.
In 1943 Cargill set up two mills in Iowa and one in Illinois processing soybeans (Kneen
2002). Archer-Daniels-Midland and General Mills also set up mills around the Midwest
(Hudson 1994). The state sought to protect the nascent industry with the Hawley-Smoot
Tariff that placed high tariffs on major imports like coffee, bananas, and soybeans. With
protection from global competitors, mills were able to produce an array of oil-based
products that eventually, with the help of tax loopholes, eased United States processors
dependence on international tropical oils (Friedmann 1991).
During the 1930s the corn acreage reduction program gave greater impetus for
planting more soybean. By the late 1940s soybean production was concentrated on the
best farmlands in the Corn Belt where fields were well-drained, flat, and could be
effectively harvested with machines. These lands resided in central Illinois in the Grand
Prairies as well as the Des Moines lobe in Iowa (Hudson 1994). The geographical spread
of soybean, like corn, was like a “Y” cutting across the heart of the Corn Belt. Soybean
and its by-products would be integrated into human and livestock diets and as inputs for
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industrial manufacturers. As farmers received regular payments for reducing their corn
acreage, they were able to invest in producing soybean, an industry that was not nearly as
developed as other major commodity crops. The state’s payments reduced the risk in
farmers’ investments, allowing for a great expansion in soybean production. Soy oil
flowed eastward as processing plants soon thereafter followed, and soy based feed flowed
throughout the feedlots that were emerging as concentrated operations.
Until World War II China was the largest producer of soybeans, with Manchuria
as the leading exporter. Manchuria’s climate was similar to the United States Corn Belt,
making it an ideal crop to integrate into farming. World War II had stimulated demand
for greater production of soybean and soybean by-products to “replace other oil and feed
supplies which might be cut off by the war” (Fornari 1979: 246). Prior to the war the
United States had imported roughly 40 percent of its fats and oils. After the war, the
United States became the largest exporter of oils and protein meals. In Illinois, the leader
in soybean production, farmers produced over 7,760,000 bushels from 760,000 acres in
1932 and at the end of the war produced 74,258,000 bushels from 3,957,000 acres
(Nordin and Scott 2005: 102). Fear of overproduction of soybeans, the federal
government encouraged the greater consumption of meat as citizens’ patriotic duty
(Friedmann 1991). In the United States, between 1941 and 1977 soybean acreage
increased from 5.8 million to 58 million, and in those same years there was a
corresponding increase in bushels produced, from 108 million to 1.7 billion bushels
(Fornari 1979: 248).
The rise of soybean as the other miracle crop was due its use as an industrial oil
for manufacturers. Initially used for paints and varnishes, a breakthrough in processing

250

allowing the hydrogenation of soybean oil became affordable on a large scale, allowing
for the production of margarine (Berlan 1991). During the 1930s margarine
manufacturers contracted with Corn Belt farmers to supply soybean (Friedmann 1991:
78).54 The promise of soybeans rejuvenating the exhausted soils while generating new
markets through margarine and other processed foods was enticing for Midwestern
farmers, many whom experienced significant losses during the extended farm crisis.
Perhaps, even more enticing for Corn Belt farmers was that soybean was a protein
rich feed for livestock. Recall, that by the late nineteenth century central Illinois and
north-central Iowa were specializing in cash-grain farming. Cash-grain farming entailed a
removal of livestock from farming operations and corresponding acreage dedicated to
corn and soybean. During the second agricultural revolution soybean acreage displaced
other forage crops like oats and hay as higher returns could be realized with soybean. For
example, in Ford County, Illinois between 1949 and 1982 acreage for oats decreased
from 68,000 to 2,000. In those same years, soybean increased from 27,000 to 123,000
acres (Hart 1991: 133). Throughout much of the Corn Belt there was a general shift from
three-crop rotation to two-crop rotation that centered on corn and soybean.
To be quite revolutionary these miracle crops necessitated a transformation in
harvesting. During the inter-war years Corn Belt farmer Carl Hamilton claimed that
hand-picking corn was the worst drudgery on the farm (Anderson 2009). 55 Prior to the
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In fact, it is possible that soybean marketing were the origins on contract farming
(Berlan 1991).
55 Prior to mechanical corn pickers, corn was harvested by hand using three different
methods. The first involved cutting and bounding stalks and then removing the ears for
use and the stalks were fed to livestock. The second method involved cutting ears from
the stalk and chopping the stalk for silage. And third, which was the most common
method in Iowa, was hand picking from stalks left in the field (Colbert 2000: 531). The
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mechanical corn picker harvesting could take up to weeks and even months. More
troubling was that when the cold weather hit farmers could be ankle deep in snow
handpicking corn with torn up bloody hands (Bogue 1983). When wind had blown down
the stalks farmers had to bend down and pick up the corn. Hand-picking corn, then, was a
labor-intensive process that was often completed over several months. Farm women
welcomed the end of the hand corn-picking era as this drastically reduced their work of
cleaning and caring for hired hands.56 Hybrid corn and soybean went hand in hand with
mechanization. The success high yielding crops was a cause and consequence of the
‘tractor’ revolution that was unfolding. The increasing standardization of corn plants
through hybridization, with stiff stocks and strong roots, facilitated the expansion of
mechanical corn pickers. Between 1930 and 1950 the mechanical picking of corn
increased nine-fold (Kloppenburg 2004: 117). In part, this was due to the changes in the
plant architecture that made it difficult and thereby costly for hand pickers.
During the first two decades of the twentieth century land values increased
dramatically for the best farmland. Recall, land served two main purposes for farmers.

process required that harvesters wear a husking pin, which was a metal hook strapped to
the hand that enabled both the opening of husks and holding the ear as it was broken from
the stalk and thrown into the wagon. The wagon was driven by the eldest son and pulled
by a team of horses. An excellent hand husker could harvest and unload 100 bushels of
ear corn a day (Colbert 2000: 531).
56 Farm women were expected to keep a clean house and sleeping quarters for men.
Moreover, women had to clean their clothes and feed them. One farm woman recalls
baking 10 loaves of bread every day during the harvest season (Fink 1986: 152). Farm
women made, served, and cleaned up three to five meals a day. In one case food
preparation started as early as 3:30 a.m (Schwieder and Fink 1999: 194). Supper might
begin at nine or ten o’clock at night. Women served a pre-lunch meal to men out in the
field, allowing her to escape a hot kitchen, but requiring that she juggle a hectic schedule
of domestic and field work. The non-stop cooking and cleaning during the harvest season
tested women’s skills on a number of fronts, something that many home economists
ignored.
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Purchasing more land would allow farmers the opportunity to increase overall profits.
Greater overall production would enable farmers to pay off their debts and make
reasonable profits. Land was also source of wealth to acquire more wealth i.e. through
speculation. Some of the best lands in the heartland were worth $400, allowing farmers to
accrue greater wealth (Prince 1997: 229). Land speculation was particularly prominent in
states like Iowa and Illinois, where land values were some of the highest in the nation. In
this context, farmers were able to obtain low-interest loans to purchase tractors to make
up for the scarce labor force. The combination of labor scarcity from each of the world
wars and inflated land values conditioned and enabled the mechanization of farming in
the Corn Belt.57
Mechanization was quite limited in the Midwest prior to World War II, although
tractor sales increased ironically during the agricultural crisis of the 1920s and the Great
Depression of the 1930s (Nordin and Scott 2005). Between 1920 and 1930 the percent of
farms with tractors in Illinois and Iowa went from nine to 30 percent (Ankli 1980: 134).
By 1929 Iowa had 60,000 tractors in use, second only to Illinois. Fourteen years later
Iowa had over 160,000 tractors working its fields (Ross 1951: 154). While the Great
Plains and western agricultural regions were the early adopters of tractors, the greatest
profitability for tractor manufacturers lay in the Corn Belt where there was a greater
concentration of prosperous farmers.
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The total value of all farm property in Iowa between 1910 and 1920 increased
markedly. The largest percentage of this increase was in machinery, which grew over
223.8 percent (Ross 1951: 145). Land values as a percentage of total assets increased
from over 60 percent in 1950 to over 70 percent in 1990 (Cochrane 1979: 203).
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Farm equipment manufacturers rushed to market their latest tractors during the
boom of World War I without sufficiently testing the durability and efficiency (Fitzgerald
2003). The adoption of expensive farm equipment had always been a highly uneven
process in which wealthy farmers are usually the first to purchase and poorer farmers
wait until the ‘kinks’ are worked out (Hurt 1994). 58 Tractor manufacturers were attracted
to the diverse Corn Belt because the region was highly productive without being heavily
capitalized. If manufacturers could overcome the obstacles that row-crop farming
presented to using tractors a massive market would be made available. Henry Ford’s
“Fordson” was affordable at $750 and small enough to handle smaller farms, yet did not
possess the power most larger farms required (Fitzgerald 2003). Further, the Fordson
could not be driven down the characteristic row-cropped fields of the Corn Belt without
damaging crops (Hurt 1994). While there were significant problems with the Fordson,
Ford introduced mass production to tractor manufacturing which in turn eliminated many
competitors.
The tractor that revolutionized the Corn Belt was International Harvester’s
McCormick-Deering Farmall tractor. Introduced in 1924, a Farmall tractor was built for
the row-crops of the Corn Belt. Its tricycle design allowed for the two closely spaced
front wheels to travel between the crop rows, while its high axle in the rear allowed to
“straddle the growing crop during cultivation” (Hurt 1994: 248). The Farmall, unlike
earlier tractors, was able make sharp turns in the fields. Two years later, International
Harvester introduced a power-take-off (PTO) shaft to its tractors that allowed it to run
tractor-powered machinery. At the turn of the twentieth century there were a few hundred
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In 1920 less than four percent of farmers owned tractors (Hurt 1994: 244).
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tractor manufacturers. Just two decades later there were only a handful of companies with
International Harvester leading the pack. 59 Productivity gains were evident with the
purchase of tractors. A typical Corn Belt farmer was likely to work a team of horses for
nearly every task in the field. A team of horses could plow 6 acres in a 10 hour day.
Whereas a tractor could plow 10 acres in the same time. Ankli (1980) estimated that for
all the different tasks of producing corn a tractor saved roughly seven hours per acre
compared to a team of horses. Gains were even greater on larger farms as the average
unit costs continued to decline. Farm size mattered, then. Tractors were said to be cost
effective on farms of at least 100 acres (Clark 2002: 93). During the 1930s the majority
of farms in Iowa and Illinois averaged slightly over 130 acres.
Promotion of tractors and other farm equipment was widespread across Iowa and
Illinois. Henry A. Wallace promoted state hand husking contests, in which the best
farmers competed with one another to see who could husk corn the fastest by hand. In
1924, during one of the hand-husking competitions, a parallel performance in which one
man operated a single-row mechanical picker powered by a tractor. “The machine proved
to be three times faster than the fastest hand husker” (Colbert 2000: 534). The mechanical
corn picker, said to be the most important corn harvesting equipment of the first half of
the twentieth century (Roe 1988), was a major labor-saving device. This reduced the
number of hired hands to harvest corn by hand, lowered the time required to harvest, and
reduced the physical hardships of picking corn during harsh winters (Colbert 2000).
Importantly, nobody missed the hand corn-picking era, especially farm women who had
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There were 47 kinds of wheel-plows before World War I. After the war there was 15.
The 788 corn and cotton planters were reduced to 31 (Fitzgerald 2003: 90).
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to care and clean after hired hands. Tractors and their implement attachments gained
greater attention at the Iowa state fairs with each passing year. At one point there were so
many tractors and farm trucks at the fair that it posed a logistical problem for parking
(Ross 1951).
A generation of agricultural engineers came of age during the first decade of the
twentieth century. Agricultural engineers partnered with agribusiness to transform
farming from “unorganized” and animal-powered to rationalized and machine-powered.
In 1907, Iowa State University was the only higher education institution to offer a fouryear degree in agricultural engineering (Fitzgerald 2003: 86). Over the next decade
several colleges began offering agricultural engineering degrees. Soon thereafter, a
partnership between agricultural engineers and farm equipment manufacturers (i.e.
agribusiness) developed to increase efficiency and standardization. To overcome stagnate
productivity, agricultural engineers and farm equipment manufacturers sought to improve
on the tractor and combine. Companies, like International Harvester Company, boosted
how tractors were the wave of the future of modern farming. Not only would tractors
increase productivity, eliminate the need for labor, and increase overall profitability, they
would eliminate the drudgery of fieldwork. The tractor was claimed to be the “Great
Emancipator” (Ramey 2014). Manufacturers also emphasized that tractors were
predictable unlike horses and mules who required feed, a personal relationship, and care.
However, tractors were susceptible to breakdowns that were time-consuming and costly.
Tractors compacted soil that resulted in poor drainage and limited root penetration (Hurt
1994). They also compacted the soil to a greater extent than horses and mules. In any
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case, boosters and advertisements sought to highlight benefits while neglecting the
problems associated with tractor farming.
The productivity capacity of corn pickers and combines in combination with
artificial fertilizers necessitated a corresponding transformation in the modernization of
storage. Farmers realized quickly that a disproportionality emerged between the
advancing productivity capacity of harvesting equipment and primitive corn cribs. Not
only did farmers not have enough physical space for storing all the corn, but the
accelerated temporality of harvesting corn by machine rather than by hand created
problems in adequate drying. When corn was picked by hand over a period of weeks,
even months, corn had plenty of time to dry. With modern harvesting equipment tons of
the corn were stored without time to dry, resulting in mold. Farmers either constructed
seasonal make-shift corn cribs or purchased expensive state of the art storing and drying
equipment (Anderson 2009). In this way, the revolutionary nature of hybrid corn was
generative, necessitating more capital investment and more unpaid work of soil and offfarm inputs.
Farm mechanization symbolized the successful progressive farmer. No other farm
technology more epitomized the successful farmer than the tractor. Tractors during the
first two decades were prohibitively expensive, and only the wealthiest farmers could
afford one. For those that could afford to purchase and equally important to repair a
tractor symbolized a successful farmer, whom as a result would not force his wife to
work in the fields or to hire workers. The reality was that the tractor took decades to
become more efficient than horses and mules before its widespread adoption. However,
capital and agrarian reformers were changing the expectations of a successful farmer. It
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did not matter so much that the reality did not match the emerging model, but what was
crucial was that enough farmers were able to purchase farm machinery to increase
productivity and intensify the competitive nature of farming.
Likewise, farmers who resisted purchasing machinery were characterized as
stubborn, uneducated, and backwards. An advertisement in the Country Gentlemen asked
farmers, “Are you a stick in the mud? One who doesn’t believe in such “pesky”
contraptions as tractors? Who won’t rotate crops or feed stock? Who bars all
conveniences from his home?” (Neth 1995: 218). Capital had sought to capitalize on the
insecurities of farmers based on their use or lack thereof the latest farming and home
technologies. In large part, the middle-class urban ideal required that farm men should
purchase productive technologies so that their wives would no longer have to labor in the
fields and barns and concentrate of housekeeping and leisure activities. The reality was
that many farm women during World War II and afterwards frequently ran tractors
(Jellison 1993). The point, however, is that capital and the state had constructed an ideal
farmer that could be taken advantage of by playing on the insecurities of masculinity.
The generalization of the farm tractor was a class project. Regarding the
tractorization of farming in the United States, Secretary Henry A. Wallace in a speech
asked, “Shall American agriculture let an uncontrolled technology wipe out the
independent family-sized farm, or shall American agriculture turn its back on technology,
in order to preserve the family-sized farm?” (Ramey 2014: 94). Some groups that
opposed the purchasing of tractors like the Horse Association of America argued that the
adoption of tractors was to blame for overproduction, falling farm prices, and
bankruptcies that occurred during the farm crisis of the 1920s and 1930s. However, banks
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that believed the end of the horse era began changing their loan policies. No longer were
horses accepted as collateral, but banks and agribusiness “would carry notes for the
purchase of a tractor” (Ramey 2014: 94). In short, banks made it easier for farmers to
purchase a new tractor, while discouraging the use of horses.
The long-lasting debate between horse power versus mechanical power came to
an end during the 1930s with two developments. First, scorching heat during the early
1930s slowed productivity of horses with some even dying from heat exhaustion. On
extremely hot days Iowa farmer Elmer Powers had two separate teams of horses that he
used daily, working one team while the other team rested from the heat. Powers noted in
his diary on June 6, 1933 that horses appreciated cooler temperatures, which showed in
their behavior and productivity. The second development was two federal farm programs:
the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC), an agency of the USDA, and the Farm Credit
Administration. Farmers that signed up with CCC were guaranteed a place to store their
crops while also providing loans to purchase farm equipment and storage facilities. “If
prices advanced above the loan rate, farmers could sell their crop and keep the difference
between the two prices. If prices failed to rise above the loan rate, farmers forfeited their
crop to the U.S. government and kept their loan payment” Anderson 2009: 187). The
Farm Credit Association provided the credit to do so.
While class and capital underlie the widespread adoption of tractors, the question
of work/energy must be explicated. In order to reorganize the farm around the general
tractor has required cheap energy in the form of fossil fuels, resulting in greater marketdependency. The shift from renewable energy like plants, animals, and humans to nonrenewable energy sources further alienated the farmer from the means of production.
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During the second agricultural revolution corn yields more than tripled yet energy use
increased faster. “Corn production per unit of energy declined 24 percent between 1954
and 1970. Between 1940 and 1982, tractor horsepower increased sixfold and the quantity
of fuel fivefold. Since yields rose far less dramatically, energy efficiency fell” (Perelman
1977: 14). The productivity revolution not only displaced uncompetitive farmers who
lacked the resources to increase their organic composition of their farm. As part of the
productivity revolution farmers in the United States were appropriating an everincreasing portion of cheap natures forming a distinctly new capital-intensive foodenergy complex. Energy use in the Corn Belt skyrocketed with the use of fossil-fuel
powered tractors and combines that when combined with hybrid corn and the necessity to
use pesticides and fertilizers was disastrous. “For each calorie of food produced…more
than six calories of fossil fuel are consumed” (Perelman 1977: 12). Between 1954 and
1970 corn production per unit of energy declined by nearly a quarter (Perelman 1977:
15). The second agricultural revolution, then, has been a source of cheap food enabled
through fossil fuel-based energy.
Farming during the second agricultural revolution restructured farm work and
agricultural markets. “By 1950, more than 3 million tractors had freed an estimated 70
million acres for the production of food and fiber” (Hurt 1994: 317). The displacement of
horses and oats as their feed, initiated the increasing specialization of Corn Belt farming.
A two-crop rotation of hybrid corn and soybean that when combined with tractors
fundamentally transformed the Corn Belt. “These crops produced the greatest volume,
thereby reduced unit costs, and provided the highest returns on their investments” (Hurt
1994: 357). Productivity gains lowered the socially necessary labor time for producing
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corn, which in part, determined the market exchange value. For those able to maintain or
advance labor productivity were able to realize greater overall profits. For those unable to
meet the socially necessary labor time fell further behind. In effect, progressive farmers
with the support of agricultural experts and the state were increasing the organic
composition of capital that led to the displacement of uncompetitive farmers.
The simplification of crop production corresponded with the intensification of
livestock production. During the 1950s agricultural scientists made significant advances
in animal sciences that allowed a reorganization of livestock rising. Raising hogs became
spatially concentrated on the farm, allowing for larger herds to be managed on less land.
This was made possible through the “life sector” primarily led by pharmaceuticals
(Friedmann 2016). A study by the Iowa Extension Service found that farmers that mixed
stilbestrol, an antibiotic, with feed “could reduce feed costs by 10-20 percent” (Anderson
2009: 96). The intensive livestock complex turned on a new way of organizing farm
relations, evidenced in farmers purchasing synthetic hormones and antibiotics,
commercial feed, specialized outbuildings, waste removal, etc. (Van Arsdell and Nelson
1984). The effect of the development of the intensive livestock complex was a reduction
in labor requirements and advancing of labor productivity (Page 1997). In 1940 Illinois
produced nearly three million hogs. By 1974, Illinois was producing nine million hogs. In
those same years, Iowa’s hog production increased from five million to 11 million (US
Census 1940, 1974). In short, large-scale confinement operations that raised and housed
livestock accelerated the livestock commodity chain, reducing “the biological time
required to bring a pig [livestock] from birth to slaughter” (Page 1997: 138). The second
agricultural revolution forced many farmers to substitute farm machinery and chemicals
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for human labor, thereby reducing the unit costs of production, a process that worked
through both crops and livestock.
Trends and Outcomes of the Second Agricultural Revolution
Similar to the first agricultural revolution that displaced a significant number of
European farmers, the second agricultural revolution displaced a significant number of
American farmers. Between 1940 and 1980 the farm population declined tenfold and the
number of farms declined by more than half. Competitive, and heavily subsidized, farms
were buying out their neighbors and increasing in size. Average acreage for this period
more than doubled (Lobao and Meyer 2001: 107-109). Similar trends are evident in
Illinois and Iowa. Table 4 depicts the changing number of farms in Illinois and Iowa and
a corresponding increase in the average acreage per farm for the period of 1945 to 1969.
Tenants rates decreased in every Midwest state over this same period, with Illinois and
Iowa decreasing from 29.6 percent to 25 percent and 32.9 percent to 24 percent
respectively (Nordin and Scott 2005: 173).
Change in Number of Farms and Average Acreage in Illinois and Iowa, 1945-1969
Number of
Average
Number of
Average
Percent
Farms in
Acres per
Farms in
Acres per
Increase of
Farm in
Farm in
Average
194560
196961
1945
1969
Acres
Illinois
204
155
126
234
51.1
Iowa
209
163
141
244
49.7
Table 14
Source: Nordin and Scott 2005: 172
Those displaced farm families migrated to urban industries including
manufacturing and service. Urbanization, and thus proletarianization, accelerated over

60
61

Measured in thousands.
Measured in thousands.
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this period. Between 1930 and 1970 the United States urban population went from 51.4 to
67.7 percent, while the farming population declined to 4.8 percent of the population
(Gordon 2016: 98). In Illinois, the rural population dropped to 35 percent, while Iowa’s
rural population dropped to 42.8 percent (US Census 1995, 2008). Proletarian households
were spending less on food—dropping from 24 percent to 14 percent (Moore 2015: 251).
Aided by cheap food, growth in real wages occurred throughout the 1950s and 1960s,
enabling an increase in middle-class consumption. Productivity gains outside of farming
and world economic growth led by the United States was unprecedented in world history
(McNally 2011: 27). Yet, during this period productivity gains in farming were still
higher than in industry (Conkin 2008). Like the first American agricultural revolution
that consolidated British hegemony, the second agricultural revolution enabled American
hegemony.
How did farm women figure into the second agricultural revolution? The
transformation of the farm’s chicken enterprise is illuminating in the status of women. All
Corn Belt families during the first half of the twentieth century had poultry operations,
ranging from a few dozen to hundreds of chickens per farm. Raising, caring, tending,
processing, and marketing of chicken and eggs was women’s work. For men, chickens
were lesser of an animal than cattle, hogs, and horses, and were associated with the daily
housework chores. As such, women were responsible for the daily chores and seasonal
tasks of the poultry operation, a year-round job. Daily chicken chores included feeding,
watering, and gathering eggs. Chores also included hatching the eggs and brooding the
baby chicks (Wright 1995). Chicken houses were cleaned once or twice a year,
sometimes by the husband or a son (Vanek 1980). In the spring farm women hatched
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eggs or raised chicks. Raising chicks was no easy task as they could die from lack of
heat. Even after the introduction of incubators with brooding boxes finicky thermostats
did not maintain a constant temperature, a certain death sentence for chicks. On really
cold days or when the incubator wasn’t working eggs and chicks were brought into the
house and warmed around a stove or heater. Some farm women with larger poultry
operations began feeding “special feed” that provided better nutrition. In this way, care
work for poultry was productive work in which women were the main producers.
Poultry, like most farm animals, had their own demands and challenges. The
temperamental nature of chickens and other poultry was unbecoming, and most did not
desire to form human-animal bonds. This was more so the case with large flocks where
farm women rarely had close relations with an individual chicken or duck. As the poultry
operation on farms began to grow they required more work and resources. Bigger and
better coops were required as well as better and specialized feed. Farm women became
experts in raising and selling poultry meat and eggs by everyday experience, reading
journals, and attending husbandry meetings. Improved breeding and improved living
conditions equated to better products in the form of more eggs, more meat, and more
stock (Pooley 2012: 49).
The size and contribution of poultry operations varied across farms. In Iowa, the
leading egg producing state during the first half of the twentieth century, farm flocks ran
from small to large. One study (Stewart 1946, cited in Fink 1986: 141-2) attempted to
classify and distribute the size and contribution of flocks of poultry in Iowa. They are as
follows:
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1. Backyard flocks ranged from ten to 50 hens that produced eggs and meat strictly for the
farm. This was subsistence poultry farming.
2. Pin-Money flocks ranged from 50 to 100 hens provided additional money to the family
beyond supplying eggs and meat
3. Grocery-bill flocks ranged from 100 to 200 hens provided enough income or trade to
cover the grocery bills
4. Semi-commercial flocks ranged from 200 or more hens provided a fairly large total of the
farm income and was on par with the cattle and hog operations
A 1940 study by the USDA found that the majority of farm operations in
northwestern Iowa had poultry operations that were grocery-bill flocks (Fink 1986: 142).
The second largest group was the semi-commercial flocks. This indicates that the poultry
operation was crucial to the family farm. By 1939, 70 percent of poultry farming was
done by women, even while a process of modernization was unfolding (Kleinegger 1987:
166).
Not only did women produce eggs and meat for the family, they marketed
surpluses to pay for household goods. Marketing entailed women transporting eggs to the
local retailer who would ship the eggs eastward. Women often traded eggs for groceries
and other household items (Fink 1986). Egg money allowed women to receive money if
needed, or more often than not to trade for flour, shoes, or clothes. Local merchants
would keep an account for each farm woman. Record keeping, like work-exchanges,
from merchants and farm women were casual and not precise. Such flexibility allowed
farm women to meet the different demands of reproducing the household. What became
known as “egg money” was the product of women’s work. Egg money was the
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equivalent to the grocery bill, but in some cases more than that (Neth 1995). In the late
nineteenth century farmer Thomas Terril had absolutely no money to his name. His wife
thankfully had sold eggs for 8¢ per dozen and butter for 13¢ per pound, ensuring daily
expenses were met (Pooley 2012: 46). During the 1920s and 1930s, when farm prices for
hogs and corn collapsed egg money had saved the family farm. Women’s egg money
paid for veterinary bills, farm machinery, and land purchases beyond the grocery bill
(Fink 1986; Pooley 2012). Farm women’s participation and work in the development of
the poultry operation ensured the survival of the family farm. However, one study
concluded that 89 percent of farm women cared for poultry, and of that only 25 percent
had poultry money, while 16 percent of women had egg money for their own use (Ramey
2014: 39). This suggests two things. First, money was not a generalized form of exchange
between women and merchants. And second, men still controlled the purse strings.
In the same year that hybrid corn was introduced the National Poultry
Improvement Plan was created as a strategy for greater federal involvement in the poultry
industry, especially regarding breeding, animal husbandry, and disease control (Boyd and
Watts 1996). Promotion of the consumption of chicken, along with other meat
commodities, continued throughout the twentieth century, a growing reflection of the
changing diets of Americans, who were now eating less bread and wheat-based products
and more meat and corn-based products (Ulrich 1989). In 1929, US per capita
consumption of wheat was 177 pounds, which by 1975 had fallen to 107 pounds
(Warman 2003: 189). Corn-fed meat and dairy products like eggs, milk, and cheese made
up for the calories over this period. The livestock and meatpacking industries with the
help of the USDA promoted animal protein as superior to plant protein in which high
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meat consumption became associated with a healthy diet (Weis 2013). In 1948, led by the
poultry industry and the USDA, the A&P retailer created a national contest called the
“Chicken of Tomorrow” to encourage and award the best produced “meat-type”
chickens. The winner was California-based Vantress Hatchery who was able to grow a
“heavier, meatier chicken faster than any other entrant”, receiving a $5,000 cash prize,
along with voluminous orders from farmers around the United States (Horowitz 2006:
103). Prior to World War II, chicken consumption was the lowest among the big three
(beef, pork, chicken). By 1990, for the first time Americans consumed more chicken than
beef (Boyd and Watts 1996: 192). This transformation in the poultry affirmed President
Hoover’s promise of a ‘chicken in every pot’. What explains the transformation of the
American diet?
State practices initiated changes in the poultry and egg businesses. In 1924, Iowa
legislature passed a law requiring that all farmers marketing eggs must have a license. In
1933, a new hatchery code required that hatcheries upgrade their operations and maintain
more formal accounting that had been lax because of traditional market exchanges.
Hatcheries were barred from selling chicks below the cost of production. These
developments, Fink (1986) argues, increased standardization in chicken and egg
operations, but more importantly, increased the costs of production for Midwestern farm
women. In short, the state was creating the conditions for turning poultry operations from
women’s work into a fully capitalized industry.
Iowa’s egg production, however, would continue to expand under the impetus of
World War II. In 1940, Iowa produced 214 million dozen eggs and five years later
produced 370 million dozen eggs. This was primarily the work of farm women and their
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modest operations. While most farm women did not have the capital to invest in “egg
factories”, farm men were not willing to make the investments as they believed that
investments should be made in primary commodity production, like in hogs, corn, and
soybeans. To be sure, chicken and egg operations did increase throughout the postwar
era, while the number of operations declined. Despite the lack of capitalization in
women’s chicken and egg business, Iowa remained the leading egg producing state in the
United States until 1959 (Fink 1987).
While the seeds of the modern poultry and egg industries were planted in the
1930s it was in the 1960s when vertical integration revolutionized the industry. Central to
the development of the restructuring of the chicken industry was privatization of genetic
chicken breeding. Similar to hybrid corn, breeders constructed a “biological lock” of the
hybridization of chickens, in which private companies would soon profit from owning the
rights to genetic strands (Boyd and Watts 1996: 198). This was complemented with
government investment in disease control and confinement technology. In particular,
vitamin B-12 and a collection of antibiotics in the feed served two purposes. First,
antibiotics were used to stave off disease that was connected to the confined spatial
relations of chicken raising. Mortality rates from diseases declined 30 percent at the
closing of the 1930s (Boyd and Watts 1996). By 1950, growers were “cramming” three
birds in a space intended for one (Weis 2013: 96). And second, the use of
pharmaceuticals was to encourage the rapid growth of chickens—classic time-space
compression at work. Antibiotics, especially penicillin, enabled the continuation of
20,000 birds and 4,000 hogs to be spatially concentrated (Conkin 2008: 116). With the
aid of electrification labor productivity grew substantially. In 1940, it required 250 hours
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to raise 1,000 birds, by 1955 the time to raise to maturity dropped to 48 hours (Boyd and
Watts 1996: 199). At least temporarily, the work of capital, science, and the state
outpaced the contradictions issuing from what Moore (2014, 1) calls “negative value”—
forms of nature that are hostile to capital accumulation. Hybrid corn had met its livestock
counterpart, the hybrid chicken, and with it, the basis of the postwar productivity
revolution.
Postwar development of now what would be considered confined animal feed
operations (CAFOs) resulted in the consolidation of largely small independent breeders,
feed companies, hatcheries, processing and distributing firms into large agribusinesses
that controlled the entire commodity chain, from credit and loans to marketing.
Companies like Perdue and Tyson, now two of the world’s largest agribusinesses, were
operating on the Delmarva Peninsula and the Deep South respectively (Horowitz 2006).
Processing plants initially employed primarily rural white women. Increased
capitalization of the poultry industry resulted in larger plants and required more
employees. Plant managers quickly shifted to hiring African-American women at lower
wages (Horowitz 2006). Wages remained among the lowest across all industries, even as
working and safety conditions are abysmal. Leading up to World War II and thereafter,
the “broiler” industry had transformed into a tightly vertical-integrated global industry
that sought to control the world chicken market while offsetting the risks through
growing contracts with farmers. Low profit margins necessitated the poultry industry to
increase productivity and protect against market risks.
Corn became the cheap food that sustained both humans and the meat-derived
livestock. The productivity revolution in grain production reproduced the intractable
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overproduction problem, which was partially resolved through the grain-oilseed-livestock
complex. Unlike wheat, it was more cost-effective to feed cattle, pork, and chickens corn
which has historically had a much lower price per bushel (Ulrich 1989). Compared to
cattle and hog, chickens were the most energy efficient in conversion of feed to body
weight. Beef had a conversion index of fifteen to one; pork ten to one; and chicken was
approximately six to one (Warman 2003: 189). Birds are the smallest and most
industrialized of the Big Three, and as such, have the fastest turnover time. Monocultures
and CAFOs, while energy and capital intensive, created path dependencies and increased
specialization that reduced the ability of farm women to reproduction the conditions of
production. They were mutually reinforcing systems that necessitated greater productivity
gains, increases in circulating capital, and faster turnover time.
The transformation of the poultry industry in the postwar era resulted in a loss of
women’s productive work on the farm. The proportion of women’s productive work on
the farm was thus shrinking in relation to the growing penetration of agroindustrialization and, importantly, to the expansion of farm men’s sphere of commodity
production that gained a growing share of capital investments and energy. In this way, we
can see the dialectical contradictions between the emergence of agro-industrialization and
the changing proportions of paid and unpaid work of farm women and men.
What were the consequences of reducing women’s paid work on the farm?
Women entered the non-farm workforce in greater droves than the past and in nearly all
fields. Meatpacking in Iowa and throughout the rural Midwest expanded during and
following World War II, allowing greater opportunities for rural women to work in
packing plants. Meatpacking firms created gendered segregated jobs that paid women

270

less than men. Farm women worked as teachers as well as in retailing. Overall, Fink
(1987) suggests that women’s acceptance of lower wages paid by employers ensured
higher profits while women’s wages ensured the reproduction of the farm and household.
During the 1950s, low farm prices combined with rising farm debts necessitated a
transition in the economics of survival. The appropriation of women’s work, including
dairy and poultry, and the loss that income that when combined with the increased
capitalization of farming forced women into wage work in the postwar era. Farm women
joined the swelling ranks of a semi-proletarian class. Their wages were among the lowest
of any demographic (see table). Between 1950 and 1975 the female workforce increased
from 29 percent to 40 percent (Derifield 2014: 30). In Iowa, a similar trend persisted. The
female paid workforce in 1940 was 170,350. Twenty years later there was an 80 percent
increase in women’s participation in the paid workforce (Derifield 2014: 30).
Average Annual Income of Iowans, 1979
Men
Women

Residence
Urban
Rural
Farm
Table 15
Source: U.S. Census

$13,104
$12,055
$11,494

$5,089
$4,336
$3,926

Iowa Women in the Labor Force, 1950 and 1960
Women
Women
Women Not
Working
Working
Working
(1950)
(1960)
(1950)
249,524
318,117
735,645
165,003
208,842
339,083
51,192
68,327
177,642

State
Urban
Rural NonFarm
Farm
32,929
Table 16
Source: Derifield 2014: 36

40,928
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218,920

Women % of
Men’s Income
39
36
34

Women Not
Working
(1960)
680,478
344,244
165,029
171,205

Capital’s appropriation of women’s work did not simply occur through
technological innovation in producing dairy and poultry products. Rather, women worked
to build up production and marketing of these enterprises that were undervalued
compared to commodity crops and livestock. As women’s dead labor had clearly
developed to a certain level agro-industrial capitals appropriated these activities as a
capital-intensive production and marketing processes. As women’s undervalued
enterprises became more capital-intensive and more valued, farm men spent more energy
engaged in these activities. In many cases, those enterprises left the farm, turning into
CAFOs.
To be clear, the technological innovations brought in with the winds of the second
agricultural revolution did not displace women from farming. Farm wage-laborers had
been displaced. Women became “tractorettes” during World War II when men left the
farm to serve (Jellison 1993). After the war, women continued to perform farm work,
including driving tractors, bookkeeping, marketing, etc. Many women preferred farm
work over house work as they enjoyed being outside and the work for some was more
meaningful (Jellison 1993).
Farm women’s double burden of working for a wage and on the farm suggests the
failure of agrarian housewifization. But what of other women? The so-called family-wage
of the post-World War II era created a new social-reproduction/economic production
regime. The state would once again play an important role in organizing this regime.
Higher corporate taxes and greater public investment in education and healthcare
improved the standard of living for the Fordist family. The Fordist housewife for her part
became the symbol of attaining the ideal, a full-time unpaid care worker. The Fordist
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family, however, was reserved for white families, forcing women of color to continue
performing low-wage work (Fraser 2016; Cooper 2017). State-managed capitalism in the
postwar era hardened the gendered division of labor for non-farm families, obscuring
women’s contribution to the household.
The Fordist family and its housewife, however, needed more than entitlements
from the state. It required cheap food and surplus nature from the periphery.
Underwritten by cheap energy, the second agricultural revolution by all accounts
delivered cheap food (Gordon 2016). While the world market was essential for American
farmers, the boom in cheap food in the postwar era was unprecedented to such a degree
that “food dumping” in the form of the PL-480 policy that constituted a geopolitical
strategy to limit the expansion of socialism in the periphery (Patel 2013). Regimes of
forced underconsumption throughout the periphery were also fundamental to the
reproduction of the Fordist family (Araghi 2009).
Conclusion
This chapter has explained the historical conditions that generated the second
American agricultural revolution that originated in the 1930s. The coupling of the farm
woman problem and farm problem with the demands of American ascent required a
revolution in agrarian relations and a revolution in farm productivity. The twin crisis of
the farm were only partially resolved through the second agricultural revolution. The
wealthy and capable farm families that increased the organic composition of the farm
increased the cost of business for farmers everywhere, a cost that was too heavy for
many. Those that were able to survive the second agricultural revolution, certainly fewer
than the first, increased their wealth, income, and standard of living. The agrarian
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household and the farm enterprise, even for many petit bourgeois families, rarely upheld
the ideal of separate spheres as farm women continued their double burden with the
displacement of farm wage-labor.
The prosperity of farm families in the Corn Belt would advance in the context of
the 1970s food-energy crisis. However, as the concluding chapter examines, the 1980s
farm crisis would spell disaster for many farm families in the Corn Belt. How would
families in the Corn Belt recover from this crisis and what would that mean for American
development in the world-system?
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Chapter 6: Crisis, Renewal, and the Family Farm in the American Corn Belt
The maturation of the second agricultural revolution occurred in the context of the
1970s world food crisis. During the 1970s Midwestern farmers experienced prosperity as
they filled the gaps resulting from widespread droughts in Russia and Africa.
Historically, major droughts acted as a boon to farmers as it often resulted in rising prices
for their commodities. The 1970s farm boom brought with it a great expansion of
capitalization of farming in the Corn Belt. Investments in land, machinery, and other
inputs increased the cost of production. However, as had been the case during the golden
age of agriculture, farmers used rising land values as collateral on loans. Also, like the
golden age, lenders were enthusiastic to lend to farmers. By the 1980s, like the 1920s,
another crisis plagued farming, leading to another round of expansion and displacement.
Unlike the crisis of the 1920s, which eliminated many poorer farmers, the 1980s
farm crisis eliminated many highly capitalized farms. Those farm families that were
conservative in their investments during the 1970s booms, and were more diverse
increased their probability of survival. Other changes were also occurring to undermine
farmers in the Corn Belt, including legislation that prevented corporate hog farming in
Iowa, engendering competition with North Carolina who was now emerging as the
prominent hog producer. More recently, legislation passed to increase the use of corn,
soybean, and other commodity crops as a source of ethanol. The rise of agrofuels was
posed a solution to energy security, mitigating global warming, and creating sustainable
development.
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Prosperity in Crisis
The second agricultural revolution had supplied an abundant supply of cheap food
so much so that following World War II another great wave of world proletarianization
occurred. Cheap energy underwrote America’s cheap food model, resulting in a farm
model that was heavily dependent on fossil fuel energy sources. Waves of cheap food
during the golden-age of American capitalism was utilized as a geopolitical strategy
under PL-480 as aid to the Global South, while attempting to manage food/feed surplus
(Patel 2013). By 1973, the world experienced a converging and unprecedented foodenergy crisis. Two decades or more of food abundance turned to scarcity. Neither food
nor oil were in absolute scarcity, but were expressions of the declining world ecological
surplus constituting the signal crisis of American hegemony and global capitalism. In this
sense, the prosperity and subsequent farm crisis were a product of long waves of
expansion and contraction (Buttel 1989).
Declining world ecological-surplus was a result of several interrelated
developments during 1970s conjuncture. For the first time since World War II world food
production declined in 1972 (FAO 1973: xii). Food prices were rising across the world
due to droughts and floods. In Russia droughts severely damaged its wheat supplies. In
parts of Asia a rice crisis ensued, leading to widespread rice shortages. In Peru floods
damaged land crops, and its fisheries were in decline for the second year in a row. Recall,
severe changes in climate can become an important force structuring the conjuncture and
its solution. During the climatic crisis conditions of the early 1970s, American farmers
prospered on exports. “From 1872 to 1981…agricultural exports increased in value from
$8 billion to over $44 billion (Strange 2008: 18). Japan’s economic growth, especially in
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automobile manufacturing was impressive, and by 1981 had become the top importer of
corn, three-fourths came from the United States (Strange 2008: 18). President Nixon’s
1972 visit to China resulted in new geopolitical relations, opening up the world’s largest
market for American farmers (Barnett 2003). Proletarianization of the Global South did
not depend on its own national agricultures, but on American grains (Friedmann and
McMichael 1989). Prices for wheat increased 132 percent, corn 92 percent, and soybean
52 percent (Strange 2008: 18). Farmers’ net incomes doubled between 1970 and 1973
(Barnett 2003: 164). Declining world-ecological surplus registering in rising consumer
food prices and the prospects of insatiable export market initiated another boom for
American farmers.
The American state’s empire projects in Vietnam and elsewhere had initiated a
period of inflation. American money was overvalued, making it exports expensive and
imports cheap. President Nixon removed the gold standard, leaving currencies and
interest rates to fluctuate. Inflation advanced making the dollar worth less, incentivizing
countries to purchase more American goods. Oil-rich OPEC countries, like Mexico,
Venezuela, and much of the Middle East traded oil for American grains, constituting a
massive market for American farmers (Strange 2008). While food prices continued to rise
for consumers, interest rates were the low, and sometimes negative, aiding the farmer’s
lot. “Global inflation, the general slump or slowdown in the world economy, and dollar
gluts associated with the surplus of ‘petrodollars’ caused these low real interest rates”
(Buttel 1989: 54).
Historically inflation has been positive for farmers. Inflation had generated
another land boom, making farmers millionaires overnight, at least on paper. Federal tax
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provisions on capital-gains had incentivized non-farming investors to purchase more
land. The value of land increased substantially, with the greatest increases in the Corn
Belt (Buttel 1989). From 1970 to 1981 land value of American farms increased from
$176 billion to over $700 billion (Strange 2008: 22). Lenders encouraged farmers to
purchase new farm equipment, modernize outbuildings, and purchase more land. In fact,
many farmers who sought modest loans were discouraged by lenders, who suggested they
borrow several hundred thousands of dollars (Friedberger 1989). Inflated land values
were a source farmers leveraged to increase farm assets. Under expanding export markets
and rising crop prices, inflation and low interest rates were the mechanisms of
capitalization of American farms.
During the 1970s farmers of all kinds expanded their operations. It was a period
of massive expansion in farming operations. Under the rhetoric of Nixon’s secretary of
agriculture Earl Butz, whom stated ‘get big or get out,’ encouraging farmers to plant
fencerow to fencerow. The 1973 Farm Bill dismantled the twin pillars of the agrarian
New Deal: price-supports and production-controls (Baines 2015). As long as export
markets remained healthy, crop prices remained high, and high inflation coupled with
low interest rates, farmers would continue to prosper in crisis. This combination emerged
from a structural crisis of capitalism. By the early 1980s cheap food and cheap energy
had increased the world-ecological surplus. Renewal of world accumulation in the 1980s
transformed the short-lived prosperous combination, imposing hardships on
agriculturalists. For farmers, the good times of the 1970s had sowed the seed of its own
destruction.
The Farm Crisis, 1980s
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The perfect storm of the 1970s conjuncture gave way to deregulation and the
financialization of the global economy. Under the so-called Volcker shock, a period of
deflation and high interest rates ensued. Farmers who had borrowed heavy to expand
their farming operations under the prosperous boom when interest rates were low were
now servicing debts with high interest rates (Friedberger 1989). Throughout the 1980s
interest rates regularly surpassed 10 percent. Farmers were struggling to just pay down
the interest accrued on loans, forcing many to continue to borrow more loans in order to
meet daily expenses. Part of the problem rested in the loan agreements of the boom.
Bankers and lending agencies did not base the farmers credit worthiness on cash flow or
income, but on the rising value of farm assets, especially land. From 1981 to 1983, before
the federal government provided some relief to farmers, bankers were unforgiving to
farmers who could not meet the terms of agreement.
Beyond rising interest rates, which were used to fight rising inflation, export
markets began to dry up. High interest rates meant that the dollar was worth more and it
was costlier for importing nations to purchase American goods. As American farmers
piled on debt during the boom at the same time Latin American countries had become
debt-ridden, giving rise to the 1980s-debt crisis. Inflation was not only a problem for
American farmers but a dire problem for countries of the Global South. IMF structural
adjustment loans meant that countries like Mexico would have to eliminate government
subsidies and social safety nets and were encourage the liberalization of agriculture,
forcing farmers to produce for the world market. As Europe, Japan, and Green
Revolution countries agriculture developed they become less dependent on American
grain imports and the world market tightened. From 1977 to 1992 European grain exports
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increased from seven million metric tons to 23 million metric tons (Winders 2017: 64).
While world imports stayed relatively stable throughout the 1980s, the share of American
exports has declined precipitously, increasing its carry-over stocks from 70 million metric
tons in 1983 to 150 million metric tons in 1986 (Buttel 1989: 57). Despite Reagan’s
attempts to cut farm subsidies, federal commodity programs continued to rise to over $30
billion annually (Friedberger 1989; Buttel 1989; Strange 2008).
Like all farm crises the consequences are uneven. While the Corn Belt had often
been spared the worst of recurrent farm crises, they bore the brunt of the 1980s farm
crisis. Farmers of the Great Plains and the South did not experience the crisis to the
extent of the Corn Belt. The explanation in the differences lies in the devaloriziation of
land. While the Corn Belt experienced the greatest increase in land values during the
boom, the fall was that much further. Before the fall, however, they had capitalized the
farm to such an extent that when a reversal of fortunes occurred, differentiation soon
followed. The farm crisis was not exclusive to farmers. Like the 1920s farm crisis, the
crisis became more real when banks began closing. This was also the case for banks and
lending agencies in the 1980s. Furthermore, farm equipment manufactures also
experienced depressed markets as fewer farmers were able to purchase tractors,
combines, and other farm machinery.
The continuities and discontinuities of the twentieth century farm crisis must be
acknowledged. The farm crisis that followed World War I continued through the 1920s
and into a generalized crisis of capitalism in the Great Depression. Whereas the 1980s
farm crisis had followed on the heels of a structural crisis of capitalism and
corresponding prosperity of American farmers. The earlier twentieth century crisis
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stemmed largely from low crop prices, while the later farm crisis stemmed from low crop
prices and insurmountable debt. Debt seemed to be a larger factor than low prices during
the 1980s farm crisis (Barnett 2003; Strange 2008). This exiting of farming was not
exclusive to small farm families. In fact, if the 1980s farm crisis suggest anything, it is
that it was the larger overcapitalized and less flexible farms that were more susceptible to
changing world markets (Strange 2008). Small and some medium sized farms remained
diversified and were conservative with expansion and investments during the boom so
that when the crisis emerged they were able to weather the storm (Friedberger 1989).
The Industrial Hog and Competing Hog Frontiers
While Chicago revolutionized hog marketing, which in turn handsomely rewarded
Corn Belt farmers, “truck marketing” from the Great Depression had eliminated nearly
half the hog farmers in the Corn Belt by the 1970s (Rhodes 1995: 107). However, the
1970s constituted a new phase in the industrial hog, one that would bring prosperity to
those remaining hog farmers. As late as the 1960s many hog farms were still relatively
small, with a greatest number of herd sizes under 100 hogs, with only 6,000 hog farms
having more than 1,000 or more hogs. “The typical Midwest hog farm was 320 acres,
with 75% of hog rations grown on the farm. The farm operator provided most of the
labor…[and] animal waste was contained on-site and…was spread…on the crops and
pasture” as fertilizer (Furuseth 1997: 393). By the 1970s, herd sizes of a hundred or less
still constituted the largest group of farms, yet the number of farms producing more than
a thousand hogs per year was 16,000 (Rhodes 1995: 108). Some of these large-scale
farms were producing over 50,000 hogs per year. The wide variation between producer
groups suggested potential profitable markets would-be large-scale contract-growers
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(Lawrence 1992). High hog prices from the mid-1960s through the 1970s ensured
prosperity to Corn Belt farms.
The farm crisis created the conditions for advancing contract hog farming in the
Corn Belt. The Southern contract model was brought to the Corn Belt when farms faced
low livestock prices, “debt problems and equity erosion” (Rummens et al. 1991: 1).
While contract farming originated in poultry operations in the South, a development that
undermined women’s productive labor on Corn Belt farms, it had spread to hog
operations, especially in North Carolina. From the boom through the bust the Corn Belt
lost more than half of its hog farms, but still fared better than the national average.
However, over this period the number of hogs per farm in Iowa doubled, while North
Carolina experienced an eight-fold increase in hogs per farm (Lawrence 1992: 1). Iowa
remained the number one hog producer in the United States until 1980s when North
Carolina became the top producer.
What is contract farming? Rhodes (2005: 108-109) defines hog contracting as
follows,
“an owner of feeder pigs engages a producer/grower to take
custody of pigs and finish them in the latter’s facilities to slaughter
weight with feed and health items furnished by the pigs’ owner
(the contractor). This producer/grower…usually receives from the
contractor a set of fee per pig received and/or per hog marketed
and often some performance incentives for providing custodial
care”.
Importantly, the growth of contract production usually occurs in the context of
market monopolization (Mooney 1986). Such was the case in poultry following World
War II. It was also the case in hogs. One example illustrates this well. The Iowa Beep
Packers (IBP) changed the terms of accumulation in meatpacking. IBP was a smaller
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meatpacking company that had no prior experience in meatpacking, began slaughtering
cattle in Denison, Iowa in 1961. IBP installed modern equipment in its “highly automated
one-story facility” (Skaggs 1986: 190). Utilizing stunners, mechanical knives, power
saws, and electronic slicing, labor productivity quickly outstripped demand, resulting in
the displacement of nearly 100,000 meatpacking jobs (Skaggs 1986: 190). The major
transformation that occurred during this period that accelerated circulation of pork was
the development was boxed beef, which allowed IBP and others to reduce the number of
workers in both meatpacking and retailing to process meat into finished goods. This
entailed a deskilling of packers as well as butchers in retail stores (Page 1997). “One
former IBP official acknowledged, ‘the goal was to be lowest cost producer [and] the
lowest cost slaughterer, to enable us to pay a quarter a cent a pound more for desirable
cattle and take them away from the competition’” (Lauck 2000: 51-2). While IBP paid
some of the highest wages throughout meatpacking, its antiunion stance ensured workers
little in the way of benefits. As such, farmers were primarily the beneficiaries of the
revolution in meatpacking. By the 1970s the “Big Three” meatpacking companies
dominated the industry: IBP (Tyson), ConAgra (Swift), and Excel (Cargill). Unlike
earlier periods of meatpacking that focused on slaughtering of multiple species in a single
plant, these companies specialized on a single species. The same companies began the
practice of production contracts that would accelerate in the 1980s and 1990s under the
farm crisis (Rhodes 1995). In fact, each of these companies have in some cases by-passed
contracting with outside growers, utilizing company-run growers.
As the previous section explains the relationship between the boom and bust, hog
farmers, too, had joined in the expansion frenzy. Buoyed by high hog prices, farmers
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modernized their facilities that accommodated larger herds. Overall, there was a general
tendency towards the substitution of capital for labor per hog (Rhodes 2005). A reversal
of fortunes for hog farmers expressed in the farm crisis. Emerging from the farm crisis
were new industrial hog producers linked to agribusiness through contracts. In many
ways, the competitive pressures felt by beef and pork packers derived from the rise of
industrial poultry operations that were primarily located in the South. Thus, it was easier
to establish contract farming in these areas that had been accustomed to such practices.
Contract farming was also easier to establish in areas with cheap land and cheap labor,
such as North Carolina (Rhodes 1995). Through the crisis North Carolina established
itself as the prominent hog producing state. Unlike Illinois and Iowa, who only had 21
and 14 percent of its farms producing more than 5,000 hogs a year, 82 percent of North
Carolina farms produced more than 5,000 hogs a year (Rhodes 1995: 109). Corn Belt
family farms on the whole were resistant to contract production based on a strong
tradition of agrarian ideals (Page 1997). By 1995, The Economist had labeled North
Carolina “Porkopolis” (Furuseth 1997: 392). Although agroindustrialization of hog
production was initiated in Iowa, North Carolina’s agroindustrialization was
unprecedented (Furuseth 1997). The 1980s farm crisis gave impetus to the rise of contract
hog farming. When agricultural lenders restricted providing credit to farmers,
agribusiness was capable and willing to provide the resources to hog farmers.
The Great Hope of Agrofuels
More recently, agrofuel development projects have been enacted with the promise
of energy security, mitigating global warming, and revitalize rural economies (Bain and
Selfa 2013). Agrofuels such as ethanol and biodiesel are derived “plants such as corn, oil

284

palm, soy, sugarcane, sugar beet, rapeseed, canola, jatropha, rice, and wheat” (HoltGiménez and Shattuck 2009: 180). The development of agrofuels has engendered global
inequality between the Global North and South centered on a food-fuel complex. Because
of low crop prices for most farm commodities combined with growing debt, farmers of
the Global South have been forced to grow crops for agrofuel production that supplies
western economies with a cheap, somewhat renewable fuel source. The global agrofuel
boom has spurred a wave of corporate land grabbing, increased contract farming, and
expropriation (White and Dasgupta 2010).
While the Corn Belt was the epicenter of two agricultural revolutions, as well as
the original source of the emergence of commercial soybean in the United States, it is no
surprise that agrofuel development originated in the Corn Belt. Iowa is the largest
producer of corn in the United States, with 86 percent of its farmland planted in corn and
soybean (Bain and Selfa 2013: 354). While many crops can be used as sources for
agrofuels, corn by-far outranks all other crops as a source. The United States produced 48
percent of ethanol used in the production of global agrofuels (Baines 2015: 295). Iowa
produces roughly 30 percent of the United States ethanol (Bain and Selfa 2013: 352). The
2005 government mandates and tax credits have greatly expanded production in Iowa. In
2005 Iowa had 14 ethanol plants and by 2011 there were 41 plants operating (Bain and
Selfa 2013: 355). While “between 1997 and 2007 Iowa lost nearly 12,000 mid-size
farms,” the corn-ethanol boom has created 50,000 jobs in Iowa alone, giving Iowa
farmers hope of prosperity (Bain and Selfa 2013: 356).
As might be expected the benefits of the ethanol boom are not shared equally
amongst groups in agriculture. As agribusiness gained nearly monopoly power over
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agriculture, they soon penetrated the ethanol market. Companies like Archer Daniels
Midland (ADM) dominated ethanol markets. Monsanto and DuPoint, too, were key
players in the development of ethanol markets, as each saw profitable opportunities in the
expansion of corn production through the use of their chemical-inputs and genetically
modified corn seeds. The ethanol mandates of the early-2000s had rechanneled corn as
feed for livestock to corn as a feed for fuel (Baines 2015). This was problematic for
livestock growers whose largest expense was feed. Overall, as Baines (2015) argues, the
corn-growers and traders, like ADM, benefited from the massive expansion of ethanol,
and largely at the expense of livestock farmers and processors.
Beyond the benefits of corn-growers, the boom in agrofuels has been detrimental
humans and the rest of nature. Agrofuels have been linked to rising food prices around
the world. As an alternative to fossil fuel energy, the net energy gains from agrofuels
have been minimal at best (White and Dasgupta 2010). Agribusiness giants like ADM
and Petrobas have “rearrange[d] capital flows and relations of power, establish[ed] new
forms of ownership over land and genetic resources, and transform[ed] markets on global
scales (Holt-Giménez and Shattuck 2009: 181). Agrofuels, like oil palm and sugarcane,
are notoriously land-intensive, giving rise to increased rural instability worldwide. The
prospects and promise of agrofuels have certainly benefited corn growers in the Corn
Belt, but at a high cost to rural producers worldwide.
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Conclusion: Looking Back, Looking Forward
The following study has provided a world-ecological accounts of the origins,
development and crisis of the Corn Belt family farm. I argued that Illinois and Iowa, the
heart of the Corn Belt, were the epicenter of two successive agricultural revolutions that
fundamentally transformed world accumulation and world nature. The study has
contributed in two ways: historical and methodological. First, I have provided a nuanced
historical reconstruction of capitalism’s successive agricultural revolutions through the
interrelationships of family farming, proletarianization-housewifization, and national and
world markets. Utilizing a world-ecological framework, I historicized and theorized the
contradictory nature of farm relations and world accumulation that gave rise to
agricultural revolutions. Those agricultural revolutions, in turn, restructured the gendered
division of labor on the farm, appropriating more unpaid work from extra-human nature.
The net effect of agricultural revolution went far beyond the point of production,
reshaping the capitalist world-ecology. Specifically, I demonstrated how agricultural
revolutions resulted in the twin process of proletarianization-housewifization. Finally, the
research demonstrated how cheap families and cheap food constituted the United States
unique position in the capitalist world-ecology.
Prospective Research
The following study has provided a world-ecological account of the origins,
development, and crisis of the Corn Belt family farm. I focused on the dialectical
dynamics of social reproduction regimes in relation to production regimes of agrarian
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households that underwrote America’s cheap food model. The household and national
and world markets formed the second dialectic, whereby the Corn Belt held a unique and
relatively prosperous position within an international agrarian division of labor. The
study has emphasized the importance of agricultural revolutions, specifically in terms of
housewifization, proletarianization, and world accumulation in the web of life.
There are two avenues of research worth pursuing that build off the current study.
The first is the question of the fate of the peasantry in China. In China’s Corn Belt
(Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Heibei provinces) existing at similar latitudes as the American
Corn Belt, lies a mix of many small- (around 1-2 acres) and fewer large-scale farms
(several hundred acres) producing commodity crops like corn and soybean. The Corn
Belt of North China is the epicenter of farm mechanization due to the relatively flat
landscape and close proximity to old industrial belt. Like the United States, China’s Corn
Belt produces feed primarily for hogs and other livestock. Today, China is the largest hog
producer in the world (Schneider 2011). The Corn Belt also feeds the largest proletarian
class in the world.
Chinese peasant producers are now facing international competition from the
United States Brazil. Since joining the World Trade Organization in 2001, China was
required to reduce export subsidies on corn and open its markets (Schneider 2011). Cheap
American and Brazilian corn and soy imports are undermining Chinese peasant
households, requiring women to engage in a set of strategies to reproduce the household.
Unlike agrarian development in the United States that shifted women into off-farm
employment, in China men of peasant households are leaving for urban industrial centers,
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resulting in what has been termed the “feminization of agriculture”. This has left women
to care for the elderly and children while continuing to farm.
This raises several important questions for peasants in China’s Corn Belt. The
first is to what extent are women relying on community relations to reproduce the
household? Are they deepening market dependence by focusing on growing more corn
and soy, or are they diversifying their operations? Are they expanding their farmland to
increase overall production? Are they purchasing more commercial inputs to increase
productivity?
The second set of questions relates more broadly to the relationship between
peasant households and economic development. The PRC has imposed two contradictory
models upon peasants in the Corn Belt. The first model is family farming based on the
use of farm equipment, commercial inputs, and the use of some wage labor, emulating
the American model. The second model is agroecology, or what might be referred to as
sustainable agriculture. That is, farming should be practices with attention to maintaining
soil nutrients, water-quality, and hygiene standards (Huang 2014). Which model is the
reality in the Corn Belt? Will peasants in the Corn Belt be displaced as large-scale
commercial farm units become more common? To what extent has cheap food advanced
China’s economic prominence in the world-system?
The second prospective project could explain the re-arrival of small-scale, organic
farming linked to building local sustainable food systems. In Iowa City, Iowa, a group
called “Ecopolis” that included farmers, politicians, local businessmen, and urban
citizens are seeking to remedy the unsustainable nature of the city’s food, energy, and
transportation systems. In the process, Iowa City has been claimed a “regenerative city”.
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Regenerative city projects around the world have been offered as the solution to
restructure our food and energy systems to create long-term sustainability. The research
asks to what extent are farmers in Iowa marketing their commodities to an emerging local
food system? And, who are the kinds of farmers involved in reconstructing sustainable
food systems in Iowa City?
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